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Abstract 
This thesis is an investigation of Britain’s negotiations of its EU budget rebate. It attempts to 
answer the main question of why Britain decided to reduce its rebate in the 2005 financial 
negotiation for the financial perspective for 2007-2013, instead of defending the rebate. What 
motivated Britain’s behaviours in the rebate negotiations?  
       Drawing upon European integration theories, particularly Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
(LI), this thesis challenges LI’s lack of explanation of the role of domestic political parties in 
shaping the formation of a national preference, member states’ behaviours in inter-state 
bargaining, and the role of the presidency of the Council in EU institutions. This thesis 
emphasises the role of domestic political parties in shaping member states’ approach on 
European integration which affects member states’ behaviours within decision-making. In Britain, 
the governing parties’ ideologies are not only a lens to evaluate European integration but also 
bring about intra-party factions and cross-party factions in shaping Britain’s approach. In 
contrast to LI’s explanation of member states’ behaviours, this thesis adopts the constructivists’ 
argument of a ‘logic of expected consequentialism’ and a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in order to 
explain Britain’s behaviours in financial negotiations and argues that the governing party’s 
attitude is a decisive factor for Britain in choosing its behaviour from the two logics above. In 
addition, with regard to the debate between rational choice institutionalists and sociological 
institutionalists on the role of the presidency of the Council in EU decision-making, Britain is 
able to choose its behaviour in the role of the presidency as decided by the governing party’s 
approach. When Britain has pro-European approach and its preferences are a central issue in 
blocking a financial agreement, it may be that the UK presidency’s appropriate behaviour makes 
extraordinary concessions on their preferences to secure deals that will enhance their reputation 
as presidency. Since the time of Britain’s initial membership negotiations, this behavioural logic 
has been evident in the EU’s budgetary decision-making. In the 2005 financial negotiation, the 
UK presidency’s pro-European approach recognized that its rebate was a central issue in 
blocking the negotiation. Consequently, after lengthy and difficult negotiations, the UK 
presidency decided to make a concession about the reduction of the rebate in order to achieve the 
financial agreement. 
  
iii 
Table of Contents 
                                                                                                                                                                                                Page                      
 
Abstract:          ii 
Table of content:         iii 
List of tables:          iv 
List of figures:          vi                                               
Acknowledgements:         vii 
Author’s declaration:         ix 
List of Abbreviations:         x 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: the politics of the UK’s budget rebate        1      
 
2. Setting the framework: domestic politics, budgetary negotiations and  
the role of the UK in the EU          11      
 
3. Securing the rebate: the road to Fontainebleau (from the 1950s to 1984)     37 
 
4. Defending the rebate: the UK’s successful resistance in the 1980s and 1990s    79 
 
5. Sacrificing the rebate: the UK’s concession in 2005      137 
 
6. Conclusion: budgetary politics and the UK’s approach to European integration   180 
 
List of reference          195 
Appendices           224 
 
 
  
iv 
List of Tables: 
  
Table 1.1  The own resources mechanism         3 
 
Table 2.1  List of parties and prime ministers in the United Kingdom (1957-2007)   23 
 
Table 3.1  The expectation of the British net balance in 1978      51 
 
Table 3.2  Simulated breakdown of the financing of the budget under the definitive own resources system, 
1973 and 1974            59 
 
Table 3.3  Simulated distribution of relative shares in the Community budget and GDP, 1973  
and 1974            60 
 
Table 3.4  Relative shares in resources derived from VAT, 1973 and 1974    60                                   
 
Table 3.5  UK contribution to and receipts from the EC budget, 1981-84     69 
 
Table 4.1  Impact of the enlargement, 1973-1986       84  
 
Table 4.2  Financial perspective 1988-1992        86       
 
Table 4.3  EC Expenditure, 1987-1992         97 
 
Table 4.4  Financial perspective 1992-1999       100      
 
Table 4.5  Impact of enlargement        119    
  
Table 4.6  Financial perspective 2000-2006       123    
 
  
v 
Table 4.7  A historical perspective on agriculture in Europe     127 
 
Table 5.1  Financial Perspective 2007-2013       148 
 
Table 5.2  Classification of net recipients and net contributors     161           
 
Table 5.3  Towards Lisbon-related goals       163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
List of figures: 
 
Figure 4.1 Net-contributions and net-benefits of member states     113 
 
Figure 4.2 Budgetary balance of the United Kingdom      132 
 
Figure 5.1 The distribution of EU budget expenditure in 1965-2005    155 
 
Figure 5.2 Member states' contributions to and receipts from the EU budget as a percentage of  
GDP in 2004           156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
Acknowledgements 
In December 2005, I frequently heard news about the Blair government’s decision to reduce the 
UK’s rebate, which was criticised by the opposition parties. These debates aroused my curiosity 
about the UK’s behaviour in the EU and politics of the EU’s budgetary decision-making process. 
This was the start of my PhD process, during which I faced two problems. First of all, I had to be 
become much more familiar with the history of the EU, as my background was not on European 
integration, and then understand the intricacies of the EU budget politics. Secondly, I had to 
work really hard to find a coherent explanation for the UK’s behaviour in the various EU 
budgetary negotiation rounds. This further complicated by the fact that budgetary negotiations, 
often, involve economic as well as political considerations. Eventually, I understood that the 
UK’s behaviour has been affected by the ideology of the governing party, which in turn affects 
its approach to European integration.    
With regard to this process, my deepest gratitude goes to my excellent supervisors, 
Professor Maurizio Carbone and Professor Alasdair Young. Without their invaluable guidance, 
encouragement, and appropriate pressure, the completion of this thesis would have been 
impossible. In particular, my first supervisor, Professor Maurizio Carbone, provided a role model 
as a scholar: be precise and critical, but always be aware of one’s own limitations and the 
possibilities for improvement. I also wish to express appreciation to my anonymous interviewees 
in the UK and in Brussels; their insights have helped me develop my argument. I also want to 
thank the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow for supporting my research and 
professional development throughout. I would like to sincerely thank my colleagues, particularly 
Ahmed Ben Aessa, Scott A.W. Brown, Arantza Gomez Arana, Ali Solf, for their encouragement 
and for sharing the burden of PhD hoods. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to a 
number of my friends, particularly Jae Ho Choi, Rev. Hwang, Hand-Deok, Sun-Ok, Young Boo, 
Eun Jin, Ga Bin, and Jun-ho.  
I owe large gratitude to my family for their unwavering faith and generous support: my 
parents: Sang-Gyu and Yeong-Sun, my in-laws: Jae-Gyu and Jeom-Sun, my brother Kwan-Hee, 
my sister Sun-Hee and my brother-in-law Geon-Pyo. In particular, my deepest gratitude goes to 
my lovely wife Ill-Soon and my son Je-Ma, who not only gave hope to me but also helped me to 
stand up again when I had health problems during the process. I could not have completed my 
  
viii 
PhD without their support. Finally, a special thought is for my God, who blesses and protects my 
long journey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
Author’s declaration 
 
 
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this 
thesis is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the 
University of Glasgow or any other institution.  
 
 
Signature:  
 
 
Printed name: Chung Hee Lee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AES    Alternative Economic Strategy 
BATNA   Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement  
CAP    Common Agricultural Policy 
CDU    Christian Democratic Union  
CEEC    Council for European Economic Co-operation  
CEECs    Central and Eastern European Countries 
CET    Common External Tariff   
CFSP    Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CoR    Committee of the Regions and Local Authorities  
Coreper   Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CSU    Christian Social Union  
DG    Directorate General 
EAs    European Agreements 
EAGGF   European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
EC    European Communities  
ECB    European Central Bank  
ECJ    European Court of Justice 
Ecofin    Economic and Financial Affairs Council  
ECSC    European Coal and Steel Community 
EDC    European Defence Community 
EDF    European Development Fund 
EEC    European Economic Community 
EFTA    European Free Trade Association 
EMS    European Monetary System  
EMU    Economic and Monetary Union 
EP    European Parliament  
  
xi 
EPC    European Political Cooperation 
ERDF    European Regional Development Fund 
ERM    Exchange Rate Mechanism 
ESCB    European System of Central Banks  
ESF    European Social Fund 
ETI    European Technology Institute   
EU    European Union  
Euratom   European Atomic Energy Authority 
FIFG    Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
GAF    Globalisation Adjustment Fund  
GDP    Gross Domestic Product  
GNP    Gross National Product 
JHA    Justice and Home Affairs 
ICT    Information and Communication Technologies    
IGC    Intergovernmental Conference 
IIA    Interinstitutional Agreement 
IMF    International Monetary Fund  
IPE    International Political Economy 
IR    International Relations  
LI    Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
MPs    Member of Parliaments  
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NEC    National Executive Committee  
OMC    Open Method of Coordination 
QMV    Qualified Majority Voting 
R&D    Research and Development  
SEA    Single European Act  
SEM    Single European Market 
SFP    Single Farm Payment 
SPD    Social Democratic Party  
TEU    Treaty on European Union  
  
xii 
UK    United Kingdom 
US    United States  
VAT    Value Added Tax 
WEU    West European Union 
WTO    World Trade Organisation   
WWII    World War II 
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: the politics of the UK’s budget rebate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The negotiations for the European Union’s financial perspectives for 2007-2013 
were very tense. Unsurprisingly, one of the most contentious issues was the 
British budget rebate, which the Conservative government headed by Margaret 
Thatcher had obtained at the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984 and 
that has since been preserved by subsequent governments despite strong pressure 
from the European Commission and other member states. In the first half of 2005, 
whilst the rotating presidency of EU was held by Luxembourg, several member 
states demanded that the UK took responsibility as a wealthier country and shared 
the increased financial burden by giving up its rebate. Requests to revoke the 
rebate were resisted and Prime Minister Tony Blair (during the Luxembourg 
Presidency, which was held in the first half of 2005) said that any attempt to scrap 
the rebate would be vetoed. The UK was to hold the Presidency of the EU for the 
second half of 2005 which was regarded as an opportunity for the re-elected 
Labour Government to retain the rebate. Prime Minister Tony Blair then surprised 
a number of people by agreeing to a 20 per cent reduction in the rebate. Why did 
the UK change position over its rebate? To answer this first question, this thesis 
points to the general change of approach towards European integration by the 
Blair government vis-à-vis the previous Conservative governments, but also 
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reviews the main elements underpinning the UK’s negotiations of the EU budget 
over the past forty years. For this, the second research question of this thesis is the 
following: what factors have shaped the behaviour of the UK in EU budgetary 
policy making? 
By answering these questions, this thesis seeks to provide a better 
understanding of both the EU’s budgetary politics and the UK’s approach to 
European integration. Its ambition is to fill a gap and offer new insights to two 
different literatures. On the one hand, existing studies on the EU budget have 
provided good overviews of the decision-making process and the ‘various rounds’ 
of negotiations. They have however failed to fully explain the behaviour of 
individual member states over time. Of course, they analyse the role of the UK, 
paying particular attention to the 1984 and 2005 agreements, but only in the 
context of general discussions (Denton, 1984; Vanden Abeele, 1982; Shackleton, 
1990; Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006; Schild, 2008; Dür and Mateo, 2010). On the 
other hand, the studies assessing the behaviour of the UK in the EU have not 
adequately discussed how and why its preferences on the budget vis-à-vis other 
member states and the general EU context have evolved since membership 
(George, 1998; Young, 2000; Forster, 2002b; Geddes, 2004; Jones, 2007; Wall, 
2008).  
The basic argument of this thesis is that the UK’s behaviour in the EU 
budget negotiations, and particularly the rebate issue, has been affected by 
domestic political parties’ ideologies and their approach to European integration. 
This does not necessarily mean being favourable to a more supranational or a 
more intergovernmental European Union, but more taking account whether the 
EU’s multi-annual budgetary plans incorporated ambitious European integration 
projects. If so, the governing party would be able to negotiate the budget without 
worrying too much about potential criticism from opposition parties and public 
opinion. Taking a pro-integration approach, however, meant accepting the 
principle that holding the rotating presidency implied a potential change of 
position and in some cases acceptance of unfavourable compromises. These issues 
are briefly discussed in the remainder of this introduction, which also touches 
upon the research methodology and provides an overview of the other chapters. 
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2. Understanding budgetary negotiations 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, West Germany and the Netherlands in 1957 The UK decided 
not to join at this stage due to its traditional idea of national sovereignty and the 
special relationships it held with the Commonwealth countries and the US. Due to 
the success of the European Community (EC) and a weakening of the UK’s 
special relationships its views changed. After two failed attempts in 1961 and 
1967, it became a full EC member in 1973, with Ireland and Denmark. During the 
negotiations regarding the terms of Britain’s membership to the EC the issue of its 
financial contributions proved a sticking point. In fact, at The Hague summit in 
1969, the six founding member states had agreed to the establishment of the so-
called ‘own resources system’, which meant that revenues would flow 
automatically to the EC budget rather than through agreement of the national 
parliaments, as had been the case until then. 
 
 
       Table 1.1  The ‘own resources’ mechanism 
 
Customs duties collected on imports from the rest of the world 
Agricultural levies 
Payment based on the VAT base of the Member States 
      <Source: Europa ‘Own resources’ mechanism; 
         http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/budget/l34011_en.htm> 
 
 
This system brought about a disproportionate contribution by the UK, whose trade 
structure on industrial goods and agricultural products was heavily linked to non-
EC countries. Moreover, the fact that about 70 per cent of the budget was used to 
finance the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and that the UK had a small 
agricultural sector meant that the UK gained few receipts under the EC’s 
redistributive policies. Britain’s late joining of the Community thus caused a 
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financial imbalance between its contributions to and its receipts from the EC 
budget. Nevertheless, for the Conservative government of the time (under Prime 
Minister Edward Heath), Britain’s interest in joining the EC was greater than the 
matter of its financial imbalance. After accession, the UK continuously raised the 
financial problem with the other member states, until when at the Fontainebleau 
European Council, June 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher successfully 
managed to secure a rebate system for the UK.   
Following the reform of the EC budgetary system in 1988 which 
introduced the idea of multi-annual budget plans, the European Commission 
proposed the financial perspective for 1988-1992 (Delors I package), taking into 
account two integration projects, both deepening (through the single market) and 
widening (enlargement with some Mediterranean countries) the Community. In 
the financial perspectives for 1993-1999 (‘Delors II package’), the European 
Commission took into account the implementation of Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), notably the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
the associated Cohesion Fund providing financial support to those member states 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland) that would face difficulties in meeting the 
economic convergence criteria (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). In the financial 
perspectives for 2000-2006 (‘Agenda 2000’), the European Commission proposed 
a stabilization in the size of the budget, in that pre-accession aid for the upcoming 
enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Counties (CEECs) would be 
partially compensated by the increased number of net contributors through the 
1995 enlargement (Laffan and Lindner, 2005). The negotiations of all these multi-
annual budgets brought about various types of disputes between net contributors 
and net beneficiaries on the size of the budget, and between the UK and other net 
contributors on sharing the financial burden. In these disputes, net beneficiaries 
put pressure on net contributors to increase the size of the budget and even 
threatened not to sign the packages. To facilitate the agreement of the various 
European integration projects, the net contributors accepted the net beneficiaries’ 
demands, but this brought about conflicts between the UK and other net 
contributors, since the UK was asked to forfeit her rebate and share the financial 
burden more equally. 
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In the financial perspective for 2007-2013, the European Commission had 
to face the costs of the Lisbon strategy – meant to boost the EU’s competitiveness 
in the global market, foster economic growth, and create more jobs in the face of 
the challenges of globalisation – and the costs of the eastern enlargement, 
particularly increased regional aid. For this, it proposed a reduction of the UK’s 
rebate and an increase in EU revenues (Dion, 2005; Mundschenk et al., 2006; 
Laffan and Lindner, 2010). The 2007-2013 financial perspectives were discussed 
at two European Councils in June and December 2005. In the first negotiation 
round, conducted under the Luxembourg Presidency, the UK strongly argued for a 
radical reform of the EU’s redistributive policies, particularly the CAP, but also 
suggested a reduction of both its rebate and CAP expenditures with the aim of 
achieving an agreement. France opposed the UK’s proposal and the negotiations 
continued under the UK Presidency. Facing the CEECs’ pressure to achieve 
agreement which would allow them to modernise their economies, the net 
contributors’ demand to reduce the size of EU revenue, and accepting the 
principle of a ‘responsible’ presidency, at the Brussels European Council in 
December 2005 the Blair government conceded the reduction of the UK’s rebate 
by €10.5 billion. 
 
 
3. Research design and methodology 
This study seeks to investigate the impact of political parties’ ideologies on the 
UK’s behaviour in EU budgetary negotiations. It concludes that party ideologies 
played a significant role, much more than it is generally acknowledged, and that 
the change of governing party can result in a change of Britain’s behaviour during 
negotiations. The selection of the UK as a case study is particularly significant not 
only because its budget negotiations can be seen as a subset of its overall EU 
policies, but also because its rebate has been one of the most controversial issues 
in the evolution of the EU budget. Various governments, headed by both 
Conservative and Labour leaders, have invested much effort in retaining it 
throughout 20 years of difficult negotiations, the decision by the Labour 
government decided to substantially reduce it in 2005. In order to explain the 
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behaviour of the UK in budget negotiations through the years, this thesis draws on 
and contributes to three strands of literature: EU integration theory, the role of the 
UK in the EU, and EU budgetary politics.  
To explain the role of the member states in the European Union, the 
obvious starting point is Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). LI argues that 
national governments drive the integration process forward and their preferences 
are shaped by domestic economic groups. More especially in the case of the 
financial perspectives, it may be expected that, following a rationalist logic, 
member states undertake strategic behaviours, for instance using ‘threatening veto 
power’ and ‘side-payments’, to secure their preferences (Hoffman, 1995; 
Moravcsik, 1998). This thesis, in line with other approaches that draw on 
comparative politics (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim, 2004; Gaffney, 1996; Raunio, 
2002; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Ladrech, 2002; Geddes, 2008), argues that 
national preferences and overall behaviour in the EU are significantly affected by 
domestic political parties. In fact, political parties not only provide elected 
officials to the offices in the government but on the basis of their ideology they 
take pro- or anti-European stances.  
Moreover, in line with constructivist explanations (Adler, 1997; March 
and Olsen, 1998; Rosamond, 2000; Knutsen, 1997), it is argued here that member 
state behaviour may be affected by norms and the desire to behave ‘appropriately’. 
In other words, in a given situation member states may decide to do the ‘right 
thing’ and pursue the common good rather than their own individual interests 
(Checkel, 2001). This thesis will show how Britain’s EU ‘membership identity’ – 
which is derived by accumulating member states’ behaviours on European 
integration (Marcussen et al., 2001) – has gone through different phases, 
involving both periods in which it was an ‘awkward partner’ and periods of 
‘constructive engagement’ (Bache and Jordan, 2008). These differing 
‘membership identities’ also have an impact on the rotating Presidency of the EU: 
while rationalists argue that member states use it to achieve agreements which are 
as close as possible to their preferences, for sociological institutionalists member 
states act appropriately and may make extraordinary concessions in order to 
achieve the common good (Elgstrom, 2003; Tallberg 2004; Quaglia and Moxon-
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Browne, 2006; Warntjen 2008). This applied to the UK in December 2005, when 
the pro-integration approach implied acceptance of the principle of a ‘responsible’ 
presidency. 
Surprisingly, the academic literature on EU budgetary politics is 
extremely limited; for this, I tried to compensate by drawing on the much larger 
literature on the role of the UK in the EU. More importantly, I relied on different 
types of primary sources, with the view to ensuring triangulation (Brunham et al., 
2004). I analysed official documents produced by the European Commission and 
the Council, memoirs of political leaders (e.g. Edward Heath, Harold Macmillan, 
Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair,), speeches in various contexts (e.g. European 
Parliament, House of Commons, universities), written and oral interviews, 
manifestos of both Labour and Conservative parties, and a small number of semi-
structured interviews (lasting between 30 and 90 minutes), conducted between 
November 2009 and February 2010, with senior officials in the UK government in 
London and the permanent representation in Brussels. 
I also used various newspapers sources, which concentrate on EU issues 
or cover more general issues. Agence Europe (published by an international press 
agency), The European Report (a daily newspaper published by the EU as a part 
of its European Information Service), and The European Voice (an independent 
weekly), provided useful information on the negotiation process and on member 
states’ positions. I also used The Financial Times, The Guardian, and The Times to 
acquire additional information about the UK domestic debate during the various 
financial negotiations. Had I been able to read other European member states’ 
languages, I could have obtained more information on other member states’ 
positions on the budget; due to my linguistic limitations, I focused on newspapers 
in English.  
 
 
4. The structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of: an introduction, a theoretical framework, three empirical 
chapters, and a conclusion. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the 
theoretical framework. It challenges both Liberal Intergovernmentalism for over-
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emphasising the role of economic groups and treating member states as rational 
actors, and the characterisation of the UK as an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU. In 
contrast, it emphasises the role of domestic political parties in shaping national 
preferences and member states’ behaviour in EU negotiations. It shows that 
member states act ‘appropriately’, particularly when they take a pro European 
approach and also hold the presidency of the Council. Finally, it points to the 
UK’s membership identity as that of ‘constructive engagement’, in addition to 
‘awkward partner’, depending on the governing party.  
Chapter 3 discusses the main reasons behind the establishment of the 
rebate in 1984. The first section shows why the UK’s decision not to join the EU 
resulted in being strongly penalised in the budget. It points to the fact that in the 
1950s and in the 1960s the Conservative and Labour parties shared similar views 
about British national sovereignty, the role of the UK in the world, and its special 
relationships with the US and Commonwealth countries. When both parties 
witnessed the economic successes of the EC vis-à-vis their weakened benefits 
from their special relationships, they changed their view on European integration 
and supported an application for membership.  This chapter also shows that 
before the UK became a member of the EU in 1973 an ‘own resources’ system 
had been established at The Hague Summit in 1969. The second section focuses 
on the negotiations for the settlement of the UK’s rebate system in the early 
1980s: Britain had a financial problem and in order to solve it.  The Thatcher 
government adopted obstructive behaviour (particularly on the reform of the 
CAP) in spite of its support for European economic integration in line with its 
neo-liberal ideology and in response to criticism from the Labour party and the 
right wing in the Conservative party. The chapter, thus, explores the negotiations 
before and at the Fontainebleau European Council in 1984, which eventually led 
to the establishment of the rebate system.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the UK’s success in retaining its rebate in three EU 
budgetary negotiation rounds: 1987-88, 1993, and 1998-99. In each of these 
negotiations, the multi-annual budget plan was linked to a major ‘European 
project’, respectively: the Single European Market (SEM) and the Single 
European Act (SEA); the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Economic and 
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Monetary Union (EMU); and the enlargement to Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC). In the negotiations for the 1988-1993 financial perspectives, 
although the Conservative government had a pro-European approach on the SEM, 
it was unwilling to support the SEA beyond economic integration and to agree the 
reduction of its rebate. Britain’s behaviour in the negotiations for the 1993 – 1999 
financial perspectives changed as a result of the then Conservatives government 
change of opinion from pro-European to an anti-European approach. Although he 
UK held the presidency of the Council in the second half of 1992, the anti-
European approach prevailed and the Conservative government itself blocked the 
reduction of the rebate. In the negotiations for the 2000-2006 financial 
perspectives, although the new ‘New Labour’ government took a pro-European 
approach and held the presidency in the first half of 1998; the UK refused the 
reduction of the rebate. The central issue for negotiation had been Germany’s 
unacceptable demands which together with the enlargement of the EU in 1995 
meant the reduction of the UK’s rebate was not an essential condition required to 
achieve agreement. 
Chapter 5 addresses the negotiations for the 2007-2013 financial 
perspective in which the UK decided to reduce its rebate. Initially, the new ‘New 
Labour’ government headed by Tony Blair which took a pro-European approach, 
placed significant emphasis on the reform of traditional EU spending, particularly 
the CAP, with the view to modernising the EU in the face of the challenges of 
globalisation. Yet, it strongly opposed the reduction of the rebate, which resulted 
in a failure to achieve a compromise under the Luxembourg Presidency in the first 
half of 2005. Pressure mounted on the Blair government through the new member 
states that sought an increase of the budget to regenerate their economies and 
urged the other member states to obtain a financial agreement as soon as possible; 
and by the fact that the UK held the rotating presidency in the second half of 2005 
and hoped to achieve a compromise before the end of its term. In fact, at the 
Brussels European Council in December 2005, the British presidency announced 
the positive conclusion of the negotiations, which resulted in a substantial cut in to 
the UK rebate.   
Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 6 reviews the main findings of the 
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thesis and looks at the future of Britain’s rebate negotiations. In particular, it 
shows how the pro- and anti-European approaches of the two main parties 
affected the UK’s behaviour during budget negotiations. For instance, in 1984 the 
Thatcher government initially had a positive attitude towards the EC particularly 
on the advantages of the single market, but eventually took a more critical 
approach due to Britain’s budgetary imbalance in order to prevent political attacks 
from the Labour party and the Conservative party’s ‘anti-Marketeers’. During the 
UK Presidency of 1998 the Labour government opposed any change to its rebate 
during negotiations.  At this time the existence of the Lisbon Agenda (Strategy) 
and the responsibility for the 2004 enlargement played a decisive role.  By 
contrast in 2005 Labour took a pro-European approach and were more willing to 
sacrifice the rebate to see more progress on the modernisation of the EU. 
Moreover, the chapter reviews the politics of budget negotiations in the EU, 
looking at the role of the UK in a broader context. In particular, it identifies a 
number of clashes that have occurred between member states over the years, most 
notably between net beneficiaries and net contributors on the size of the budget, 
and between the UK and other net contributors on burden sharing. The last section 
of this chapter discusses Britain’s position in future rebate negotiations which will 
commence in 2013. The expectation is that due to the existence of a coalition 
government, where the two parties do not fully share the same views on European 
Integration, will significantly affect the UK’s behaviour during the SU’s budget 
negotiations and any preference formation for the country. 
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Chapter 2 
Setting the framework: domestic politics, 
budgetary negotiations, and the UK’s approach to 
European integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the issue of the UK’s behaviour in its rebate negotiations as 
part of EU budgetary politics. The UK rebate was a politically symbolic issue in 
the national discourse, epitomising the costs and benefits of EU membership. 
Since the 1988 budgetary reform, the increased size of the budget due to the 
incorporation of European integration projects and poorer countries through 
several enlargement rounds (with the exception of the one in 1995) brought about 
a number of clashes between the UK and other net contributors on sharing the 
financial burden. The purpose of this chapter is to propose a framework which can 
help explain the behaviour of the various British governments in the negotiations 
of the EU’s multi-annual budget plans over the years. 
This chapter consists of three main sections. The first section draws on the 
literature on the EU’s decision-making process, challenges the main tenets of 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) by stressing the importance of domestic 
political parties, norms and identity, and the presidency of the Council. The 
second section explores the role of the UK in the EU, emphasising the role of 
political parties in shaping Britain’s EU policies, and the identity of Britain’s EU 
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membership as an ‘awkward partner’ and a ‘constructive partner’. Finally, the 
third section sketches the EU’s budget policy process.  
 
 
2. Member states and decision-making in the EU 
The role of the member states in the EU has been the object of numerous studies 
(Kassim et al., 2001; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005; Zeff and Pirro, 2005; Piper, 
2005; Carbone, 2010). The starting point, generally, is Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) which sheds light on member states’ behaviour in 
inter-state bargaining but also investigates what factors and actors affect 
preference formation. However, LI does not pay adequate attention to the role of 
political parties, does not consider the (potential) effects that norms and identity 
have on member states’ behaviour in inter-state negotiations, and underplays the 
‘responsible’ behaviour of the rotating presidency of the Council. 
 
2.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
The core assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that member states are the 
main actors in EU integration. EU member states’ preferences are influenced and 
shaped by the demands of domestic economic groups. Governments bring 
national preferences to Brussels in order to shape EU policies towards their 
favoured outcomes. Andrew Moravcsik (1991, 1993a, 1995, 1998, – see also 
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999) identified three stages in the EU’s decision 
making process, the first two of which have more direct relevance for this thesis: 
(1) preference formation, (2) inter-state bargaining, and (3) delegation of authority 
to international institutions.1 
The first step concerns preference formation. Governments identify and 
aggregate national preferences, which are constrained by shifting pressure based 
on competition amongst dominant interest groups: economic producers put 
pressure on national governments to cooperate in the EU in order to obtain 
                                           
1 In line with the ‘two-level game’ metaphor, while negotiating at the international level 
governments take into account the domestic level and act in a way to gain further support when 
they return back at home. See Putnam (1988). 
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economic benefits in response to the international globalised economy. This 
however does not mean that they play an independent role, going beyond national 
governments. Moreover, LI does not ignore the role of partisan politics: ‘an 
understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the 
analysis of the strategic interaction among states’ (Moravcsik, 1993a: 481). In fact, 
the primary interest of governments is to remain in power and to do so they need 
the support of domestic voters. But, as argued by Quaglia (2010: 91), ‘Although 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism does not make this point explicitly, foreign and 
security policies largely remain the domain of core executives and, consequently, 
the formation of national preferences is unlikely to be the outcome of pluralistic 
politics’.  
The second stage concerns inter-state bargaining. Governments bring 
national preferences to the negotiating table in Brussels, and engage in hard 
bargaining in order to pursue their interests. Outcomes in intergovernmental 
negotiations are dependent on each member state’s bargaining power and 
strategies and are not influenced, or little influenced, by EU institutions. 
Outcomes are selected in the ‘bargaining space’, which is formed out of possible 
areas within issues for mutually beneficial exchanges in intergovernmental 
negotiations. EU member states often have different preference intensities on 
policies: some issues and agreements are more important to some than to others. 
As a result of asymmetric interdependence, agreements requiring unanimity 
depend upon recalcitrant states. Negotiations, thus, are a process of seeking 
possibilities for coalition-building through negotiation strategies. Decisions reflect 
the relative power of member states and integration proceeds mainly when there is 
a convergence of interests between the three most powerful member states, that is; 
France, Germany, and the UK. These countries can adopt various strategies – such 
as ‘issue linkages’, ‘threats of exclusion’, ‘package deals’ and ‘side-payments’ – 
to obtain concessions by other recalcitrant member states (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; 
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999; Schimmelfenning, 2007).  
The third stage concerns the choice of institutions. EU member states 
pool or delegate sovereignty to European institutions in order to reduce conflicts, 
to effectively achieve agreements in intergovernmental negotiations, and to 
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increase the credibility of their mutual commitments (Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack, 
2005; Schimmelfenning, 2007).  
 
2.2. Domestic politics and the role of political parties 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism has been criticised on many accounts. One of the 
central reasons for criticism is that it does not adequately acknowledge the role of 
domestic politics. In fact, beyond economic groups there are a number of other 
factors and actors that affect preference formation and decisions in the EU 
(Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim, 2004; Kassim, 2004; Forster, 1998). This thesis, in 
particular, points to the role of domestic political parties. 
In a democratic system, political elites who share similar ideas about 
political and economic issues get organised within a political party, and try to win 
elections so that they can turn their ideas into government policy. A political part 
sets out its position on the future direction of government in manifestos based on 
that party’s ideology.  A manifesto serves to inform voters of policies and to 
entice them to vote for that party. Political parties’ ideologies, thus, are not only 
lenses to see intra- and extra-phenomena but also a tool to design a party’s 
approach regarding those phenomena. At elections, voters consider all the parties 
and then votes for whichever party better represents their interests: politicians and 
voters, thus, have an interdependent relationship for mutual benefit. Following an 
election, the majority party provides elected officials to form a government and 
formulate policies (Caul and Gray, 2000; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Strøm, 
2000). 
With regard to the democratic system, there are two important factors: the 
roles of public opinion, and the role of political parties in shaping government 
policy. First, scholars, who emphasise upon the role of public opinion in member 
states’ EU policy-making, argue that policy-makers in member states paid close 
attention to public opinion in shaping their positions on European integration for 
their survival in power (Anderson and Kalternthaler, 1996; Trumbore, 1998; Hix, 
2005; Usherwood, 2002). Anderson and Kalternthaler (1996), and Trumbore 
(1998) argue that citizens consider their economic benefits/performance from the 
integration process when forming their views whether favourable or sceptical. In a 
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‘bottom-up’ approach, the citizens’ position has a distinct impact on member 
states’ policy-making through elections and ratifications. In general, elections are 
a prominent linkage between the public opinion and the member states’ policy-
making. Elections not only allow voters to choose the members of the Parliament 
(MPs) who will represent their opinions in shaping their member states’ EU 
policies, but also have the power to judge their MPs’ performances (Hix, 2005; 
Trumbore, 1998). 
Second, in the role of a political party in the democratic system, a number 
of scholars emphasise upon the role of a party ideology in shaping a political 
party’s attitudes and policies.  In particular, in the action-orientation model, 
ideology is an action-related idea which provides guidelines for the party’s 
direction towards achieving its political ideal (Budge, 1994; Nice, 1985; 
Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Entman, 1983; Sainsbury, 1981). Ideology shapes the 
party’s policies and attitudes, and constrains the scope of a party’s activity in 
choosing their political strategies from the motivations of increasing their 
popularity with voters (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003: 586). Ideology does not allow a 
party to form their political identity in line with only focusing on their political 
popularity to have power in domestic politics (Sainsbury, 1981: 284). The 
ideology’s constraint often results in conflicts with the party’s demand to alter its 
attitude and policies in a way that would appeal to voters in order to win a general 
election. 
Sainsbury (1981) points out endogenous and exogenous strains in 
analysing conflicts between ideology and a party. When a party is faced with these 
two strains, members of that party draw fierce resistance to their party’s 
incumbent position and policies which are shaped based on its ideology. First of 
all, an endogenous strain can be indicated by that party’s electoral defeats. 
Members of the party demand the leader group to re-consider its ideology, and to 
revise the party’s attitude and policies in accordance with voters’ preferences. 
Secondly, an exogenous strain explains disparities between the party’s ideology 
direction/expectation and external reality. When the unexpected happens, the 
leader group re-considers its ideology, attitude and policies: whether the party 
continues its position or changes its position with regard to a re-interpretation of 
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its ideology in response (Sainsbury, 1981: 274). Furthermore, if members of the 
party have a disagreement with the leader group’s decision on the party’s position 
and policies, the members use the party’s conferences and conventions to 
challenge the leader group’s decision. During party conferences and conventions, 
the members and the leader group have a serious debate on the leader group’s 
decision whether the leader group appropriately re-interpret the ideology in 
shaping the party’s policies and attitude, and which direction the party’s policies 
and attitude should take taking into account endogenous and exogenous strains. 
The challenge pressures the leader group to change the attitude. Sometimes the 
leader group has enough power to suppress the members’ opposition, and continue 
with their decision. Sometimes these challenges can drag a group down from a 
position of power within a party. A change of the leader or the leader group can 
come about with a new version of the party’s ideologies and a change of the 
party’s attitudes and policies (Budge, 1994: 455).  
There is another point of view regarding the change of a party’s attitude. 
Factionalists, more specifically, point out the clashes between the groups. They 
argue that the change of the party’s policies result from a division of a party 
between sub-groups whose aim is regarding structural incentives (power) (Hine, 
1982; Boucek, 2009; Duveger, 1964; Panebianco, 1988; Sartori, 1976, 2005). 
Endogenous and exogenous strains provide a chance for sub-groups to challenge 
the leader group’s leadership and policies which may have disagreements with 
sub-groups over the party’s attitudes, strategy and policies in response to the 
change of environment (Panebianco, 1998: 242-242; Harmel and Janda, 1994: 261, 
265; Deschouwer, 1992: 12). These disagreements bring about conflicts between 
the sub-groups and the leader group trying to gain power or representing their 
members in the party’s decision-making bodies and in the government for making 
their ideas determine the party’s attitude and policies (Boucek, 2009). Harmel and 
Janda (1994) analyse the change in a party such as policies and attitude, and argue 
that, as a result of the conflicts, the change of the party’s attitude and polices is 
primarily the result of clashing between the groups, and the leader and their 
respective followers in the party. 
European integration has become a salient issue in a party’s fight in 
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domestic politics and elections. It has encouraged the emergence of a new 
dimension that indicates that party’s position regarding anti- and pro-European 
approaches. A party’s attitudes can be an important issue to campaign during a 
general election (Hix, 1999). On the basis of its ideology, a political party takes its 
approach on European integration, which if successful in the election becomes the 
official position of their country (Gaffney, 1996; Hix, 1999; Mair, 2000; Marks 
and Wilson, 2000; Ladrech, 2002; Raunio, 2002). More generally, positions on 
European integration can be placed along a continuum, from anti- to pro-
European. However, the attitude of a party is flexible when faced with the 
emergence of EU issues that deviate from those they anticipated after electoral 
defeats or during the process of integration. The leader group in the party re-
considers their ideology and approach: whether the party continues with their 
existing position or changes its approach and decides a new approach for the party. 
Furthermore, the decision often brings about a conflict in the party. Both anti- and 
pro-Europeanists in the party disagree whatever the leader group decides and 
challenge the group’s decision which is based on a new interpretation of their 
ideologies in view of the new circumstances. Sometimes, these pressures can 
result in re-shaping or changing the party’s attitude on European integration in 
order to reinforce their appeal in domestic politics (Ladrech, 2002; Szczerbiak and 
Taggart, 2011).   
 
2.3. Inter-state negotiations, norms and identity 
One of the central tenets of Liberal Intergovernmentalism is that in inter-state 
bargaining, national governments have little flexibility to make concessions – the 
assumption, thus, is that preferences are fixed. This does not take into account that 
during negotiations, national governments can learn about other member states’ 
preferences and this information is a basis upon which to devise negotiation 
strategies for securing their interests or pursuing common interests. Having such 
information, thus, may require them to revise or re-order their preferences with 
the view to fostering coalition-building and achieving an agreement 
(Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim, 2004; Forster, 1998). 
The constructivist turn in international relations has also had an impact on 
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the study of the member states in the EU. Constructivism is an intersubjective 
approach which emphasises the mutual constitutiveness of structure and agency. 
Basically, humans do not exist independently from their social environment and 
their interactions generate the idea of community, a sense of ‘us’, which imposes 
restrictions of individuals’ behaviours. Interests are also socially constructed and 
membership of a community also implies responsibilities (Wendt, 1992; Adler, 
1997; Rosamond, 2000; Risse, 2007).   
More specifically to our study, constructivists emphasise EU membership 
identity and the role of norms. Preference formation is not exogenous but is 
affected by the interaction between actors and their environment. Norms, which 
can also be socially constructed, play an important role in inter-state negotiations 
by not only restricting EU member states’ behaviours but also facilitating the 
achievement of agreements. EU member states, therefore, do not necessarily act 
purely on the basis of strategic calculations for securing their preferences. Rather, 
they seek a consensus to produce or reproduce norms (Knutsen, 1997; 
Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim, 2004; Checkel, 2006; Rosamond, 2000). Checkel 
(2001: 53) talks of social learning, in which member states recognize and build up 
a common interest, ‘what should we do’, rather than simply pursuing their own 
interests.2 
This would therefore suggests that member states do not (always) adopt 
the ‘logic of expected consequentialism’ but may also adopt the ’logic of 
appropriateness’. The logic of expected consequentialism argues that member 
states take strategic behaviours to secure their preferences according to fixed, 
given preferences derived from domestic interests. The logic of appropriateness 
argues that EU member states behave with regard to the appropriate rule in a 
given social situation (March and Olsen, 1998). Marsussen et al., (2001) argue 
that member states’ EU identity affects their behaviour in choosing between the 
two logics. The level of member states’ EU membership identity depends upon 
member states’ approaches to European integration, falling between anti-and pro-
                                           
2 In discursive practices, there is a debate between advocates of the arguing-deliberation 
and persuasion perspectives. The former, drawn upon Habermas’ theory of communicative action, 
focuses on argumentative rationality (while the latter emphasises persuasion and social learning 
(Lynch, 1999, 2002; Risse, 2000; Johnston, 2001; Checkel, 2003, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). 
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European stances. A member state which takes a pro-European approach has a 
strong EU membership identity, and tends to adopt the logic of appropriateness. A 
member state which has an anti-European approach has a weak EU membership, 
and tends to adopt the logic of expected consequentialism. 
 
2.4. The Presidency of the Council 
Another important criticism of Liberal Intergovernmentalism is the limited role 
assigned to European institutions. Of particular interest for our analysis is the role 
of the ‘Presidency of the Council’; this role is able to significantly affect outcomes 
during inter-state negotiations. In this thesis, literature on the EU Presidency is 
divided into two categories. First, there are a number of studies that focus on 
important questions and issues regarding the role of the EU Presidency (Tallberg, 
2006; Brummer, 2011; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Metcalfe, 1998; 
Elgström, 2003b; Metcalf, 1998; Thomson, 2008; Schalk et al., 2007). Second, 
numbers of scholars point out the impact of (Presidency) norms on the 
Presidency’s ability in achieving outcomes (Wallace, 1985; Elgström, 2003b; 
Bercovitch, 1992; Hopmann, 1996; Stenelo, 1972; Niemann and Mak, 2010). 
The six-month rotating Council Presidency3 was established to solve 
collective-action problems, as member states conceal their true preferences. In 
order to avoid deadlocks and to introduce compromises between member states’ 
different preferences, it was given several tasks in order to identify areas of 
potential agreement (Lewis, 2007; Bache and George, 2006; Tallberg, 2006; 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). Drawing on general bargaining theory, 
there are the different views between a ‘responsibility with power’ and a 
‘responsibility without power’ in defining the role of the presidency and whether 
the role enables the Presidency to advocate the direction of the decision-outcomes 
in line with their national interests when they hold the Presidency. Advocates of 
the ‘responsibility with power’ argue that the Presidency has a power to affect the 
outcomes in negotiations for gaining its national interests by brokerage resources: 
                                           
           3 At the Paris summit in 1974, EU member states were concerned about possible 
failures of negotiations amongst themselves for further European integration and, thus, agreed to 
create the Council presidency with delegating powers to control EU decision-making to mitigate 
collective-action problems. See Tallberg (2006) and Nugent (2006). 
 20 
accessing information 4   and controlling the EU decision-making process 5 
(Thomson, 2008; Schalk et al., 2007; Tallberg, 2004, 2006; Stubb, 2000; Bjurulf 
and Elgaström, 2004). By contrast, advocates of the ‘responsibility without 
power’ view argue that the Presidency is heavily constrained in its power in 
shaping decision-outcomes in line with their national interests (Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace, 2006; Metcalfe, 1998; Elgström, 2003b). They not only point out 
structural constraints: the short time frame of six months, the inheritance of 
dossiers from previous Presidencies6, external and internal events7 and a lack of 
expertise or skill 8 ; but also focus on normative constraint: the norms of 
impartiality/ neutrality and effectiveness, on the Presidency’s behaviours to 
advance its national interests. 
In particular, a number of scholars emphasise upon normative constraint 
(norms) on the Presidency’s ability in EU decision-making (Wallace, 1985; 
Elgström, 2003b; Bercovitch, 1992; Hopmann, 1996; Stenelo, 1972; Niemann and 
Mak, 2010). Norms constrain the Presidency’s calculation of maximising its gains 
in negotiations. It guides the Presidency towards ‘appropriate behaviour’: 
impartiality/ neutrality and effectiveness which not only reduces the costs of 
                                           
4 ‘Confessionals’ are a privilege of the Presidency to obtain information about other 
member states’ preferences and how to gain acceptance during negotiations. Such information not 
only enbales the Presidency to prepare a compromise that is acceptable to other member states but 
also provides some room for manoeuvre to inflence decision-outcomes in linew with its own 
favoured positions. See Thomson (2008).  
5 Thomson (2008: 598) argues that Procedureal control is an influential factor which 
enhance the power of the Presidency. The Presidency can control negotiation pace, meeting 
schedules, and shaping the agenda which enables the Presidency to put pressure on other member 
states to draw concessions from other member states to achieve agreement and shape decision-
outcomes in accordance with their policy preferences.  
6 Term of the Presidency constrains the Presidency’s ability to set up a new agenda. 
Rather, the Presidency tends to deal with the inheritance of agendas from previous Presidencies. 
See Elgström (2003a). 
7 The Presidency is constrained by internal event, for example ratification failure of EU 
treaties, and external events, such as the outbreak of conflict or wars, in its control on the process 
of its original purposes. See Brummer (2011), and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006). 
8 Mctcalf (1998: 422) points out ‘expertise’ in constraining the Presidency’s behaviour. 
The Presidency depends on the Council Secretariat in outlining problems and sticking points in 
negotiations. Secretariat officials not only have a great deal of experience and professional skill 
but also take impartial position.  
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violation but also expands the range of other member states’ acceptable behaviour 
in negotiations (Niemann and Mak, 2010: 730; Tallberg, 2004: 1002; Metcalfe, 
1998: 420). In its role of broker, the Presidency concerns the norms of 
impartiality/ neutrality and effectiveness. The former has received most attention 
and has been emphasised by the Council secretariat’s handbook for Presidencies9. 
The impartiality norm intensely underlines evenhanded behaviour of the 
Presidency when the Presidency takes the Tour de Table and the Tour des 
Capitales to gather information. During the Tours, the Presidency has to listen 
patiently to the views of all member states in order to expand the Presidency’s 
room for manoeuvre in proposing its compromise which focuses on mediating 
conflicts between member states for achieving agreements and carrying any 
negative reputational consequences in order to avoid criticism from media 
attention, other member states and academics (Niemann and Mak, 2010: 731; 
Metcalfe, 1998: 420). The latter: norms of effectiveness emphasises upon the 
Presidency’s basic duty which significantly concentrates on achieving conclusion 
by using all the brokerage resources available to it (Westlak, 1999; Elgström, 
2003a). The norms of effectiveness very often bring about conflict with the 
impartiality norm. When this occurs, the Presidency tends to follow the majority 
position in proposing its compromise for effectively pushing negotiations towards 
the direction of the most favourable outcomes. Nevertheless the outcomes may be 
unfair (Metcalfe, 1998: 421; Niemann and Mak, 2010: 731; Tallberg, 2004; 1007). 
 Furthermore, the Presidency norms bridges between rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1998; 
Elgström, 2003b; Tallberg, 2003, 2004, 2006; Quaglia and Moxon-Browne, 2006; 
Warntjen, 2008). Rationalists argue that the Presidency takes advantage of its term 
to reach agreements which are as close as possible to its national preferences. For 
this, it tends to strategically use the brokerage resources to facilitate concessions 
and present compromises with time constraints, in order to better pursue its 
national interests (Tallberg, 2004: 1003-1005). By contrast, sociological 
institutionalists point to the appropriate behaviour of the Presidency which is 
                                           
9 The Council Secreariat’s handbook states that ‘the Presidency must, by definition, be 
neutral and impartial’ (General Secretarit of the Council, 1997: 5). 
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determined through its belief of appropriateness in a given situation with regard to 
the Presidency norms rather than by cost-benefit calculations (March and Olsen, 
1998: 951-952). The two logics argue that, depending on individual member 
states’ degree of awareness on the Presidency norms, member states take different 
behaviours. 
Scholars have begun to research conditions  under which the Presidency 
is constrained by the norms in playing the roles of the Presidency:as disinterested 
leadership (Metcalfe, 1998; Dür and Mateo, 2008), size of member states (Quaglia 
and Moxon-Browne, 2006), and the Presidency reputation (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998; Elgström and Tallberg, 2003; Manners, 2003; Schout and 
Vanhoonacker, 2006). First, the Presidency concerns the impartiality norm in 
playing its roles in negotiations if it does not have to secure particular interests 
(Metcalfe, 1998: 421). Second, due to a lack of bureaucracies and human 
resources, and a weakening of domestic constrain, small member states holding 
presidency tend to work closely with European institutions, in particular, the 
Council Secretariat which not only have professional skill but also takes an 
impartial position. Depending on the Council Secretariat’s position, the 
Presidency also concerns the impartiality norm. By constrast, big member states 
act differently to small member states when they hold the Presidency (Quaglia and 
Moxon-Browne, 2006: 352-354). Finally, when member states, which are 
insecure about their reputationand hold the Presidency, the Presidency is 
constrained by the impartiality norm. In particular, new member states or new 
governments tend to focus on making a good impression and on strengthening 
their European credentials (Elgström and Tallberg, 2003: 201). Furthermore, 
occasionally, it has been the case that big member states (France, Germany, and 
the UK) holding Presidency have also made extraordinary concessions to preserve 
their reputations: for this, they present their compromises through making 
extraordinary concessions to get deals in order to be perceived as the norm of 
effectiveness, especially when their own preferences are a central factor to block 
an agreement  (Dian, 1999; Kirchner, 1992; Christiansen, 2006). 
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3. The role of the UK in the EU 
This section proposes to explore the role of the UK in the EU, concentrating on 
the general attitudes of the various governments10 that have alternated in power 
since the end of the World War II. The aim is to challenge the view that the UK 
has been an ‘awkward partner’, and has taken an obstructive behaviour on the 
development of European integration beyond economic integration. The concept 
mainly refers to Britain’s traditional ideas on national sovereignty and the special 
relationship with the US and the Commonwealth countries, which not only 
hindered Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 
1950s but also became a basic consideration for political parties’ approaches on 
European integration. Based upon various analyses (Wallace, 1997; George, 1998; 
Forster and Blair, 2002; Piper, 2005; Geddes, 2008, 2004), it can be argued that 
since the terms of the British entry into the European Economic Community in 
1973 were set, Britain’s behaviour with regard to European integration have not 
been consistent. This inconsistent behaviour, one of the arguments of this thesis, is 
the result of the domestic political parties’ approach towards European integration. 
The two main parties, in fact, have their own ideologies as a lens through which 
they view European integration and which shape their (an anti- or a pro- 
European) approaches (Geddes, 2008).  
 
 
Table2.1 List of parties and Prime Ministers in the United Kingdom (1947-2007) 
 
Term of office Party in Government Prime Minister 
July, 1945-October, 1951 Labour Clement Attlee 
October, 1951-April, 1955 Conservative Sir Winston Churchill 
April, 1955-January, 1957 Conservative Sir Anthony Eden 
January, 1957-October, 1963 Conservative Harold Macmillan 
October, 1963-October, 1964 Conservative Alec Douglas-Home 
October, 1964-June, 1970 Labour Harold Wilson 
June, 1970-March, 1974 Conservative Edward Heath 
                                           
10 In Britain, from 1945 to 2010, the British political system can be characterised by 
‘two-party systems’ which describes a dominance of two political parites in the domestic politics, 
and a single government system. Both the Labour and Conservative parties alternatively won 
general election with a comfortable overall majority in the parliament and, thereby, formed a 
single party government. See. Leach et al., (2011) and Garner and Kelly (1993). 
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March, 1974-April, 1976 Labour Harold Wilson 
April, 1976-May, 1979 Labour James Callaghan 
May, 1979-November, 1990 Conservative Margaret Thatcher 
November, 1990-May, 1997 Conservative John Major 
May, 1997-June, 2007 Labour Tony Blair 
Source: George (1998); Piper (2005); Bulmer and Buch (2009) 
 
 
3.1. Shared views  
Between the 1950s and the late 1970s, Britain’s membership became a dominant 
issue not only in Britain but also in the European Community. Britain’s late 
membership has been to Britain’s geat cost and resulted from the setting of the 
rules of integration in line with the founding member states’ preferences. Many 
studies about Britain in Europe search for the cause of Britain’s late membership 
and look at Britain’s traditional idea of its national sovereignty, the remnants of its 
Empire, and its special relationship with Commonwealth countries and the US 
(Young, 1993; George, 1998; Ellison, 2000; Gamble, 2003). During this time, the 
Labour and Conservative parties shared a similar approach to European 
integration, which was enhanced with the concept of the ‘awkward partner’ 
(Young, 1993; George, 1998). Ellison (2000) and Gamble (2003) argue that, at 
that time, Britain concentrated on its special relationship due to perceived 
economic benefits which (it is thought) were greater than Europe that had suffered 
economically since World War II. This ‘special relationship’ also saw Britain 
ranked second in the league of world powers. This position of power strongly 
influenced Britain’s hostility to an initial stage of European integration. 
The Labour government, under Attlee (1945-1951), regarded the creation 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April 1951 as a 
supranational co-operation effort which would threaten Britain’s national 
sovereignty, its world power status, and ‘special relationships’. The six founder 
member states encouraged British membership of the ECSC, but the Labour 
government at the time was not of the same opinion (Geddes, 2004). The 
Conservative party also considered the traditional ideas of national sovereignty, 
world power status and ‘special relationships’ in shaping its approach to the 
creation of the EEC in 1957, and as a result took a hostile approach towards 
supranational integration in Europe. The Conservative government of Macmillan 
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government (1957-1963) not only declined membership of the EEC but also 
established an intergovernmental economic co-operation body, named the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) instead of joining the EEC (Young, 
1993; Young, 2000). 
In the 1960s, Britain’s hostility on membership was changed to a more 
positive position. Pilkington (1995) points out the economic success of the EEC 
and the weakened ‘special relationship’ to explain the change of Britain’s 
approach. Both political parties thought that Britain’s membership would replace 
the special relationship in securing Britain’s interests. Despite this, both parties 
continuously adhered the traditional ideas in shaping their attitudes on European 
integration. The Conservative government (1957-1963) led by Macmillan and the 
Labour government (1964-1970) headed by Wilson applied for membership but 
they favoured intergovernmental rather than supranational co-operation, in order 
to preserve Britain’s national soveriegnty (Geddes, 2004; Pilkington, 1995). The 
Conservative government (1970-74) under Heath secured membership in 1971, 
but was faced with a financial problem, which resulted from the establishment of 
the EEC’s ‘own resources’ system in 1970 before British accession to the EU in 
1973 (Preston, 1997; Kitzinger, 1973). 
The Labour governments under Wilson (1974-76) and Callaghan (1976-
1979) were dominated by the left wing which criticised the former Heath 
(Conservative) government’s decision on accession (and supranational European 
integration). Their concern was that EC would threaten the role of the government 
in the Labour party’s state-directed capitalism. Thus, the Wilson government not 
only called for the national referendum to decide whether the UK should 
withdraw from the EC but also required the renegotiation of Britain’s EC 
membership in the light of the financial problems. The British people, however, in 
the referendum supported British membership (Jowell and Hoinville, 1976; Bilski, 
1977; George, 1998). In March 1976, following Wilson’s resignation, James 
Callaghan, a left wing member of the Labour party, became Prime Minister. Since 
the outcome of the referendum meant that there was no question regarding 
membership, attention shifted to Britain’s financial problem and the ‘own 
resources system’ (George and Bache, 2001; Lindner, 2006). 
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3.2. The Conservative Party and the UK as an awkward partner 
The role of the Margaret Thatcher is particularly relevant for this thesis. During 
Margaret Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister, the ‘Awkward Partner’ was the 
academic interpretation of Britain’s relations with the European Union. George 
(1998) analyses Britain’s behaviour on European integration, and defines that the 
‘Awkward Partner’ characterises the Thatcher government’s Eurosceptical 
behaviours which obstructed the process of the integration. In Taggart’s study 
(1998), he states that Euroscepticism is the anti-integration position of those who 
totally oppose the idea of European integration, and have sceptical views on the 
integration because the integration is too inclusive or too exclusive. He 
emphasises the role of political parties in shaping member states’ Euroscepticism. 
Political parties’ ideologies clearly are a component in explaining their opposition. 
Ideologies lead or conduct the parties to shape anti-European attitude due to 
facing a difference with the direction of the integration (Taggart, 1998: 367, 378). 
Baker et al., (2002) introduces ‘hyperglobalism’ in order to identify the 
Conservative party’s ideology, under Thatcher’s leadership. They argue that the 
party’s ideology in shaping its attitude on the integration was built on 
‘hyperglobalism’. They identify that ‘hyperglobalism’ was derived from the 
emergence of globalisation, which has diminished national governments’ power in 
controlling capital mobility and commercial flows in a global economic context. A 
stream of globalisation pressured the governments to leave Keynesian economic 
management which emphasises the role of government in protecting and 
subsidising the national economy as well as increasing the level of employment. 
Globalisation provided the governments’ new priorities of controlling inflation 
and fiscal balance, and removing all forms of regulation in shaping their economic 
policies. However, ‘hyperglobalism’ grants national sovereignty which enables a 
government to design the economic programmes: low taxation, low government 
spending, deregulation and privatisation in line with globalisation. 
Since the Thatcher leadership in 1979, the Conservative party not only 
recognised the movement of globalisation but also used it to design ‘Thatcherism’. 
After victory in the 1979 general election, the Thatcher government adopted 
Thatcherism to shape its attitude on integration. Her approach to European 
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integration and EU policies, ‘Thatcherism’, was a combination of neo-liberalism, 
which stressed the central role of the free market in the economic, and neo-
conservatism, which emphasised national sovereignty. The Thatcher government 
mainly focused on two issues: liberalising the European market and defending 
British national sovereignty in shaping its approach on the integration (Norton, 
1990).  
The Thatcher government initially adopted a general pro-European 
approach and supported economic liberalism, particularly the project of Single 
European Market (SEM). Despite this, the government changed its approach from 
the pro- to an anti-European approach. Many scholars point out that the Single 
European Act (SEA), and the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the social 
chapter in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) were just too inclusive to the 
Thatcher government. As a consequence, the government not only had a sceptical 
view on the integration but also obstructed the pace of the integration (Norton, 
1990; George, 1998; Buller, 1995; Sowemimo, 1996; Baker, 2005; Nugent and 
Mather, 2006; Falkner, 2007; Garry, 1995; Phinnemore, 2007).  
First of all, the SEM project brought about institutional reforms through 
the SEA in order to effectively achieve the SEM by 1992. The SEA focused on the 
reform of the institutional system in the decision-making procedures, particularly 
the increase of the European Parliament (EP)’s involvement (Nugent, 2006: 80). 
Forster (2002: 66) argues that Thatcher hesitated to agree the SEA which would 
endanger Britain’s sovereignty. In particular, the EP would replace Britain’s 
sovereignty on the SEM measures. Secondly, the post-SEA issues: the EMU and 
the social chapter in the TEU focused on eliminating the cost of currency 
conversion and preventing ‘social dumping’ in the SEM respectively (Falkner, 
2007; Garry, 1995; Phinnemore, 2007). Hale (1999: 101) argues that Thatcher’s 
sceptical view was beyond just the economic integration. In Thatcher’s Bruges 
speech in 1988, Thatcher explicitly announced the change of the government’s 
approach on European integration. She asserted that the EMU would represent an 
erosion of national sovereignty in controlling currency, and that the social chapter 
would counter the Conservative government’s economic policy (Forster, 2002: 64; 
Geddes, 2006: 129-130). 
 28 
Although the change in the Thatcher government’s approach brought a 
challenge to the pro-Europeans within the Conservative party John Major became 
Prime Minister, Thatcherism continued to have its dominant role in the party in 
shaping Britain’s approach on the EMU and the social chapter (Gamble, 1993). 
During the Major government (1990-97) Britain’s approach to European 
integration did not change despite Major being a member of a pro-European group 
and supporting European integration.  This was due to strong criticism from the 
Thatcherite backbench MPs and the Labour party. Thus, it blocked British 
membership of the post-SEA issues (Gamble, 1993; George, 1998; Forster, 2002). 
Meanwhile, there was a substantial change within the Labour party in the late 
1980s, which shifted from an anti- to a pro-European approach on European 
integration. In the campaign for the EP election in June 1989, due to its change of 
its approach, the Labour party argued that the Conservative government’s 
European policies had undermined Britain’s social benefits (Daniels, 1998). 
 
3.3. The Labour Party and the UK as constructive partner 
In 1980s, Labour slowly changed its attitude on Britain’s EC membership from 
outright opposition towards an unenthusiastic acknowledgement that shifted away 
from its withdrawal argument. The change of the Labour party’s attitude provided 
a chance for the new Labour government11, under Blair, to take a positive attitude, 
characterised ‘constructive engagement’. This new approach broke away from 
‘awkward partner’ in an image of Britain’s EU membership (Baker, 2005; Fella, 
2006). Daniels (1998) points out four elements: the pressures of domestic political 
competition, the dynamic of the European integration process, a change in trade 
union attitudes on Europe, and a consideration of economic policy change, which 
were crucial factors to influence Labour’s conversion towards a pro-membership. 
The issues pressured the party to re-interpret their ideology in designing the 
party’s policies, particular its EU attitude. 
First, the Labour party considered domestic political situations: internal 
party politics and the domestic political context. Due to defeats in both the 1983 
                                           
11 In the 1997 general election, the Labour party, under Blair leaderhip, won 418 seats 
and took office. See Smith (2005). 
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and 1987 general elections12, the party needed to reform its programme to try and 
recover from those defeats. The party considered the change of its attitude on the 
membership that was symbolised by the party shifting away from its anti-
European approach. Furthermore, Thatcherites’ growing hostility to the European 
project brought about her successor, Major’s problems of party management 
overtaking his pro-European attitude. In the adversarial political system, the 
change of the Conservative party’s attitude offered a possibility for Labour to 
change (Daniels, 1998; Forster, 2002a). Second, the party recognized an 
ideological similarity between its socialism and the direction of European 
integration. In particular, the social chapter in the TEU represented the idea of a 
‘Social-Europe’(Jeffrys, 1993; Daniels, 1998; Geddes, 2003; Fella, 2006). Third, 
the party acknowledged Britain’s growing economic interdependence with 
European economies: the mobility of capital and trade (Daniels, 1998: 83). Fourth, 
the party recognised the extension of global market. It considered changing its 
economic policy that would focus on a stabilisation of deflation rather than a 
nationalisation for protecting national industries and Keynesian spending 
programmes in the direction of modernising the party (Daniels, 1998; Baker, 
2005). 
For these causes, members of the Labour party demanded the leader group 
(the left wing), to re-interpret their ideology in order to re-design their policies 
and their attitude on the membership. Between 1989 and 1991, the party, under 
the Kinnock leadership, presented the ‘policy review’ which focused on the 
modernisation of all of the Labour party’s policies (Fella, 2006; Redgrave, 2008; 
Forster, 2002a). In shaping its European policies, the review not only considered 
its new economic policies: acceptance of the market economy, deflationary 
policies, monetary and fiscal policies, and Britain’s full participation in global 
                                           
12 In the 1983 general election campaign, the Labour  party, under the left wing’s 
dominance, argued for a withdrawal of Britain’s EC membership. Subsequently, Labour faced its 
worst defeat in its history. Due to the defeat, Michael Foot, who was the leader of left-wing and 
the party, resigned his position. His successor, Neil Kinnock stood as leader in the 1987 general 
election  and slightly changed the party’s position from the withdrawal option to the reform of the 
EC, particularly reducing the role of the EP, the reform of the CAP and a reduction of Britain’s 
budgetary contributions. However, the party was defeated once again in the general election. See 
Daniels (1998) and Fella (2006).  
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economy but also focused on the post-SEA issues. The review took a positive 
position on the EMU13 and the social chapter in the TEU, and changed the 
Labour party’s stance to a pro-European stance. This review formed the 
foundation of the Blair government’s pro-European approach, named 
‘constructive engagement’ (Forster, 2002a: 707, 718; Redgrave, 2008: 424). 
Redgrave (2008) describes the new Labour government’s ‘constructive 
engagement’ which characterised its pro-European approach. The approach 
resulted from the government’s recognition of the growing synthesis between 
Britain’s national interests and the interests which would be maximised at the 
heart of European integration. To secure Britain’s national interests, the new 
Labour government started its engagement with the EU. Shortly after taking 
government, the new Labour government participated the Amsterdam European 
Council in 1997. It not only signed the Treaty of Amsterdam14 but also singed up 
to the social chapter of the TEU which the previous Conservative government 
refused to do (Baker, 2005: 25-26, Fella, 2006: 626). Furthermore, the 
government played a leading role on the enlargement of Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) and the setting up of the Lisbon strategy which was 
aimed at the modernisation of the EU economy toward the development of a 
knowledge-based economy in order to strengthen innovation and competition in a 
rapidly changing global economy (Begg, 2008; Dion, 2005; Jones, 2005; 
Collignon, 2008; Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). In 2005, the government also 
sacrificed its rebate in order to achieve the financial agreement on time which 
would financially support the Lisbon strategy (Whitman and Thomas, 2007: 71). 
Despite this, some scholars point out the limit of the new Labour 
                                           
           13 The review saw that the EMU would have  the rignt function on price stability in 
trade in the single market. In particular, Britain’s membership of the EMU would secure lower 
levels of inflation and interest rates, and the elimination of exhange rate uncertainty. See Gamble 
and Kelly (2000). 
14 The Treaty of Amsterdam stipulated the reform of the EU institutions: extension of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), further strengthening the role of the EP, new rules on 
transparency and new human rights, and anti-discrimination provisons which dealt with the 
enlargement of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The new Labour government’s 
agreement on the Treaty indicated its pro-European approach beyond just economic integration. 
See Smith (2005), Sherrington (2006), and Bulmer (2008). 
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government’s pro-European approach thanks to its traditional ideas of national 
sovereignty and the special relationship with the US, and the definition that 
Britain is ‘defensive engagement’ or a ‘semi-detached partner’. They focus on 
Britain’s non agreement on the EMU15, the creation of the European Defence 
Agency 16 , and the reform of the EU institutions 17  in the negotiation for 
establishing the Constitutional Treaty in 2003-4. However, they do acknowledge 
the change of Britain’s approach which shifted away from its image of ‘awkward 
partner’ (Oppermann, 2008; Bulmer, 2008; Baker, 2005; Smith, 2005; Redgrave, 
2008; Bach and Jordan, 2008).  
 
 
4. A note on the EU’s budgetary policy process  
Since its inception in 1951, the EC/EU budget has been seen as collective attempt 
to financially support European integration projects. Before the 1988 budgetary 
reform, it was implied that due to the size of the budget the development of EC 
policies was practically insignificant (Nugent, 2006: 430). During that time, 
                                           
15 In the first term of the Blair government (1997-2001), the government had a pro-
European approach regarding the membership of the EMU. However, Chancellor Gordon Brown 
moved from favouring the membership to being hostile towards it, Blair had to agree Brown’s 
suggestion which would take five economic tests. Due to fails of the tests in 1997 and 2003, the 
government postponed its membership and promised to have a Parliamentary vote and a 
referendum of the British people on the issue. See Smith (2005). 
16 After the war in Kosovo (1998-1999), the EU discussed an extension of the EU’s 
foreign and defence policy. The Blair government supported the extension in order to increase the 
EU’s military capabiliites in international conflicts. In December 1998,the Blair government 
engaged with France for the establishment of the St Malo Declaration for European defence. 
However, Britain’s special relationship with the US in the US military action in Afghanistan and 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003cast a shadow over the St Malo Declaration on the EU’s foreign 
security policy. See Baker (2005),  Smith (2005) and Nugent and Mather (2006). 
17 In the second term (2001-2005), the Blair government dealt with the institutional reform 
at the Nice Intergovernemntal Conference (IGC) in 2001, the convention on the future of Europe 
from 2002 until 2003 and the 2003-2004 IGC for establishing the Constitutional Treaty. The New 
Labour was very instrumental to safeguarding national sovereighty far more effectively than the 
previous Thatcher and Major (Conservative) governments in order to secure Britain’s national 
interests in responce to the enlargment of CEECs. In particular, it rejected the extension of QMV 
in the areas of taxation, criminal justice, foreign and security policy, social policy. This deciaion 
found Britain isolated from other EU member states. See Fella (2006) and Smith (2005). 
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budgetary politics concentrated on solving the problem which some member 
stated had concerning the imbalance between their contributions and their receipts. 
When the EC financial system was established in 1970 France benefited most and 
this had been to gain its support for the first enlargement. Agricultural subsidies 
accounted for over 70 per cent of the EC funds. But the political linkage between 
the new budget system and France’s acceptance of the enlargement is at the origin 
of Britain’s budget problem (Heath, 1998). For over 10 years the UK demanded a 
reduction of its contributions, which culminated in the agreement of the UK’s 
rebate system at the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984. The EU 
budget increased significantly with the acquisition of new competences and the 
accession of some poorer countries – the Mediterranean enlargement in the 1980s 
followed by the accession of 8 Countries of Central and Eastern European 
countries in 2004, and further countries in 2007.The aim of the enlargement was 
to reduce economic disparities across Europe and further complete the unification 
of Europe (Denton, 1984; Laffan, 1997). The agreement of the financial 
perspectives is a highly political issue – what Peterson and Bomberg (1999) term 
‘history-making’ decisions18 – and is dealt mainly by the European Council. 
Member states are pivotal players, but other institutions (the European 
Commission and the European Parliament) also play a role. 
The European Coal and Steel Community was created at the ‘Treaty of 
Paris’ 1951.  Also established at the Treaty was a type of financial system which 
gave budgetary power to the ECSC High Authority to impose levies on coal and 
steel products in order to finance housing, mobility and resettlement subsidies for 
coal and steel workers. The budget comprised mainly of the Member States’ 
financial contributions and as such their national parliaments wielded the most 
power regarding budgetary decision-making. After the Treaty of Rome in May 
1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) recognized the need to replace 
national contributions with a new system which would allow overcoming the 
national authorities’ approval process. In fact the parliaments had to consider their 
domestic situations rather than that of the EEC when they approved the size of 
                                           
18 Peterson and Bomberg (1999) identify three different types of EU decision-making: 
history-making decisions, systemic level decisions, and sub-systemic level decisions. 
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their contributions to the EEC. This meant that it was very difficult to increase the 
size of the EEC budget. At The Hague summit in December 1969, the six 
founders agreed to establish a new financial system before the first enlargement in 
order to shift the financial burden onto the new member states as a ‘charge’ for 
membership of the EC (Shackleton, 1990; Laffan, 1997). 
These considerations came to fruition in the Budget Treaties of 1970 and 
1975, which created the ‘own resources’ system. The Treaties stipulated 
autonomous ‘own resource’ base-customs duties on extra-EC trade, agricultural 
levies, Value Added Tax (VAT) which was limited to 1 per cent and an annual 
budgetary decision-making process. The ‘own resources’ system was significant 
in that it further shifted fiscal authority from national parliaments to the EC 
(Schreyer, 2001). In budgetary decision-making, the European Parliament was 
granted new power, and was able to reject, amend ‘non-compulsory’ expenditure, 
and discharge the budget (Shackleton, 1990; Laffan, 1997). The 1975 Treaty 
created the Court of Auditors, which was tasked to examine all EU revenue and 
expenditure accounts in the EU budget, and to correct significant irregular and 
unlawful transactions.19 
The Budget Treaties established the annual budget system and this has 
remained the decision-making process until now. The process is divided into three 
steps: a draft budget, a first reading, and a second reading. First, the European 
Commission initiates the financial decision-making process by presentation of a 
preliminary draft budget to the Council. Under the supervision of the Budget 
Commissioner, the draft is prepared by the Budget Directorate General 
(previously DG XIX) in consultation with the other services of the Commission 
by 1 September of each year. The Budget DG has a meeting with representatives 
of the Council and the European Parliament (EP) to discuss the draft. Once the 
Commission agrees the preliminary draft budget, the draft is sent to the Council of 
Ministers. Second, the Council and the European Parliament have a first reading 
of the budget. In this step, the Budget Committee of the Council, consisting of 
                                           
19 The Court of Auditors replaced the two existing Community audit bodies, the Audit 
Board of the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the ECSC auditor 
(Nugent, 2006). 
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representatives from financial ministries, does most of the detailed work. 
Furthermore, the Council informally meets with the Parliament’s Budget 
Committee in order to resolve problems at an early stage. The draft budget is then 
sent to the European Parliament for a first reading which has to be completed 
within forty-five days. The European Parliament can simply approve or propose 
modifications to the compulsory expenditure. However, it has the right to amend 
non-compulsory expenditure by an absolute majority vote. After a first reading, 
unless approved by the EP the draft budget goes back to the Council for the third 
step. Third, the Council has fifteen days to complete its second reading of the 
draft budget, which may be amended by the European Parliament on non-
compulsory expenditure. The Council has the final word on compulsory 
expenditure and also indicates its position on non-compulsory expenditure. The 
draft budget is then returned to the European Parliament, which has fifteen days to 
have the final word on non-compulsory expenditure. The European Parliament 
then adopts or rejects the draft budget. If adopted, the EP President signs it into 
law. If rejected by the beginning of January, the European Community is then 
operated by a system of month-to-month financing, known as ‘provisional 
twelfths’, until agreement between the two arms of the budgetary authority is 
reached (Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006; Laffan and Lindner, 2010). 
The multi annual budgetary plan was established during the 1988 reform 
rather that changing the process of annual budgetary decision making. This 
strengthened the heads of government and member states’ involvement in 
decision-making. Since the Budget Treaties, annual budgetary decision-making 
has required an institutional agreement rather than the agreement of the European 
Council. The European Council informally discussed and negotiated budget issues, 
particularly the size of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) expenditure in 
1980 and 1982, and the UK’s financial problem in 1984 (Peterson and Bomberg, 
1999). Following the 1988 reform, the European Council has become formally 
involved in budgetary decision-making. The financial perspective referred to a 
package between the Commission’s multi-annual financial plans for 5-7 years and 
European integration projects. The multi-annual financial plans not only focused 
on a balance between revenue and expenditure in the financial period in order to 
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avoid the EC budget falling short, but also proposed financial support to the 
European integration projects. The multi-annual budget has no treaty basis which 
requires political agreement between member states. The European Council 
formally negotiates the financial perspectives, which subsequently are translated 
into a binding structure for annual budgets. The multi-annual budget plan focuses 
on balancing the maximum amounts of total annual expenditure with the overall 
revenue ceiling (Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006).  
The European Council is the central actor in the negotiations of the financial 
perspectives, and is supported by the Council of Ministers and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper).20 Coreper II prepares upcoming Council 
meetings through pre-negotiations between them. Although Coreper II cannot 
formulate conclusions of financial perspectives, its discussions and outcomes are 
used in pre-negotiations to advise national governments at the European Council. 
Within the Council of Ministers, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(Ecofin) there are representatives from finance ministries. The Ecofin plays a 
central role in the negotiations of the EU’s expenditure policies and revenues. The 
Council of Ministers in other sectors focuses on securing the budget in their own 
areas. For example, the Agricultural Council concentrates on keeping agricultural 
spending high. The Council presidency plays a central role in that it generally 
proposes compromises between the Commission’s original proposal and member 
states’ complaints with the view to achieve a solution agreeable to everybody. The 
European Commission, whose most important role is that of initiating the process 
by proposing the initial draft, may be active also at the decision-making stage 
where it tries to defend its proposal. The achievement of comprise may be 
                                           
20 The European Council, which consists of the Heads of State or Government and the 
President of the European Commission, generally meets twice a year, at the end of each six month 
Council presidency in June and December, and is held over a two-day period. The Council of 
Ministers initially had over 20 formations in order to deal with different policy areas. At the 
Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the number of formations was reduced to 16 in 
order to improve consistency and coherence of the Council’s tasks. Since 2002, the number of 
Council formations has been reduced to 9. Coreper is split into two: Coreper I and II. Coreper I has 
a responsibility for the internal market and other more technical sectors. Coreper II prepares all 
meetings of the European Council, General Council Affairs, Development, Economic and 
Financial Affairs and Budget (Ecofin) and Budget Council meetings. 
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facilitated through the activities of the EC. Since the reform of budgetary 
decision-making in 1988, the European Parliament retains it power in the annual 
budgetary decision making but has no formal power in the negotiations of the 
financial perspectives (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Hayes-Renshaw, 2006; 
Lewis, 2006; De Schoutheete, 2006; Laffan and Lindner, 2010). 
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Chapter 3 
Securing the rebate: the road to Fontainebleau 
(from the 1950s to 1984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the origin of the British problem in relation to its 
contribution to the EC’s budget and points to the late membership as one of the 
central reasons. The six founder member states, in fact, agreed the Community’s 
own resources system in 1970, which gave them bargaining power to fix the size 
of the British contribution. This brought about an imbalance between the UK’s 
significant payment to the EC budget and the scanty benefits it received from it. 
In the following decade, several governments facing financial difficulties 
demanded a reduction of their contribution to the Community budget. This 
generated a number of conflicts between the UK and the other member states, 
which sought to prevent an increase of their contribution to the EC budget. 
Eventually, the Thatcher government secured the settlement of the UK’s rebate 
system at the Fontainebleau European Council on 25-26 June 1984 
 To explain all these events, this chapter is divided into four sections. The 
first section discusses the reasons behind the UK’s choice not to join the EEC in 
the 1950s and its change of approach in the 1960s. The second section explores 
the establishment of the own resources system and its penalizing effects on British 
accession negotiations, conducted by the Conservative government under Heath. 
The third section focuses on how two Labour governments – headed by Wilson 
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and by Callaghan – dealt with the issue. The fourth section concentrates on the 
approach taken by Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher, 
paying particular attention to the ‘May Mandate’, the initial failed attempts to 
reach an agreement, and the settlement of the UK’s rebate system at the 
Fontainebleau European Council. 
 
 
2. The UK and the European Community (1940s-1970s) 
This section focuses on defining the causes of the UK’s late joining of the EC: 
why the UK did not join the EC at it’s inception, subsequent change of position in 
the 1960s with two membership applications which were both rejected. 
Eventually the six founder member states embarked upon the negotiation of 
British membership, but required a high financial contribution from the UK as a 
cost of the membership under the ‘own resources’ system. 
 
2.1. Early steps in European integration 
After the Second World War, some countries in West Europe established a Council 
for European Economic Co-operation (CEEC) in Paris in July 1947 to co-operate 
in the restoration of the economy through the Marshall Plan.21 Initially, ’Marshall 
Aid’ was a strategy adopted by the US to support Europe to adopt capitalism and 
liberal-democratic political systems as a means to expand the US’s trade areas, 
and to defend against the expansion of Soviet communism in Europe. Eastern 
European countries rejected the offer of ‘Marshall Aid’, which effectively divided 
Europe into two blocks: Western liberal democratic countries and Eastern 
communist countries. In March 1948, with the Treaty of Brussels, the UK, the 
Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), and France 
pledged to organise mutual military and economic co-operation against the 
communist block in Europe. In April 1949, with the Treaty of Washington, they 
established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the US’s 
                                           
21 The Secretary of State of the US, George C. Marshall, proposed a economic plan to 
rebuild West European economies with around $ 13 billion of aid between 1948 and 1952. See 
Geddes (2004). 
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aegis.22  
In the early 1950s, there were movements toward further European 
integration: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then the 
European Defence Community (EDC). Firstly, the French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman proposed the creation of the ECSC in the Treaty of Paris in April 1951. 
The ECSC was a common market in the basic raw materials of coal and steel for 
the industrial community in Europe. Secondly, the proposal to cooperate in the 
field of defence policy was never ratified. As an alternative to this, in order to 
hamper the rearmament of Germany, the UK and the six ECSC members agreed 
to the establishment of the West European Union (WEU), which incorporated 
defence policy. At the Messina conference of ECSC in June 1955, the Belgian 
foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak proposed the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Spaak’s proposal was accepted and the agreement signed by six member 
states: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and West Germany in 
the two ‘Treaties of Rome’ in March 1957, which also saw the establishment of 
the European Atomic Energy Authority (Euratom).23 
 
2.2. Initial British approaches to European integration 
In the early movement towards European integration, the then Labour 
government’s ideas about British leadership in Europe played a central role in 
shaping the government’s behaviour. The Attlee government (1945-51) considered 
that after World War II, the UK was ranked second in the league of world powers, 
due to its relatively modest degree of damage incurred during World War II 
compared to continental Europe, and its special relationships with the 
Commonwealth and the US.24 The Attlee government initially supported and 
encouraged Western European unity. It understood its responsibilities were to 
build economic prosperity in Europe based on a liberal, capitalist order, and to 
defend Europe against the expansion of communism. For this, it played a leading 
role in establishing intergovernmental co-operation in the CEEC in 1947, as well 
                                           
22 For a thorough analysis of Europe in the post-war period, see Milward (1984). 
23 For an analysis of the the road to the Treaties of Rome, see Dinan (2007). 
24 For a different view, arguing that the views of British elites should be seen as a ‘delusion 
of grandeur’. See Porter (1987).  
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as in establishing NATO. However, it hesitated to support the development of 
European integration towards supranational co-operation. In fact, the Attlee 
government did not oppose the creation of the ECSC and the EDC, but did not 
support British membership of them. The government’s sceptical thinking on 
membership resulted from its ideologies of socialism and imperialism which 
strongly tied up with its view of national sovereignty, and the special relationship 
with the US and the Commonwealth countries for continuing its social policies 
and historical global power respectively (George and Haythorne, 1996: 112; 
Forster, 2002: 17). The government argued that supranational European 
integration would undermine national sovereignty, compromise British world 
leadership and damage its special relationships with the Commonwealth and the 
US (Jowell and Hoinville, 1976; Ellison, 2000; Gamble, 2003; Geddes, 2004).  
The Conservatives came to power in government from 1951 through until 
1964. They also had the opinion that Britain should be hostile towards the 
supranational integration of Europe, and preferred European security on an 
Atlantic basis. The Churchill government (1951-55), joined the six ECSC member 
states to agree on the WEU based on the intergovernmental pillar of NATO to 
establish a collective defence structure for Western Europe in 1954 (Young, 1993). 
It was another Conservative government, led by Macmillan (1957-63), which 
refused to join the EEC in 1957. The Macmillan government demanded trade 
liberalisation in intergovernmental structures of European integration without 
supranational pretensions: pooling sovereignty as part of political integration in 
the EEC was not acceptable in traditional British politics. This approach was also 
influenced by the Macmillan government’s preconceptions about Britain’s role 
and identity: in its view the UK was the third force between the US and European 
integration in the liberal democratic world (Frankel, 1975). The UK’s position was 
enhanced through its special relationship with the US and the Commonwealth. 
Economically, British trade with the Commonwealth and the US had brought 
about Britain’s economic prosperity and historical leadership (Northedge, 1983). 
Politically, the Anglo-American alliance allowed the UK to play a leading role in 
the international arena but was still dependent on the US (Carrington, 1988). The 
Macmillan government concentrated on its leadership of Europe rather than 
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membership in a supranational structure of European integration (Jowell and 
Hoinville, 1976). Thus, its decision to establish the EFTA was seen as a form of 
intergovernmental co-operation which preserved national sovereignty and its 
special relationship. With EFTA, the UK aimed to establish a free trade area in 
Europe to abate national trade barriers between member states and with the EEC 
(Young, 2000; Geddes, 2004; Lam, 1999; Gamble, 1990). 
Due to the weakening of special relationships out with Europe, and the 
economic success of the EEC, the Macmillan government, eventually, changed its 
opinion on European integration, with a view to keeping up Britain’s rank in the 
international arena and preserving its economic interests. The Suez crisis in 1956 
stood as testament to Britain’s dependency on the US in world affairs, which 
implied that Britain’s time as an imperial world power was over (Ramsden, 
1996).25 The Macmillan government assumed that the UK-US connection would 
ensure success of the EFTA, but actually the US demanded a stronger 
commitment to European integration for its own economic growth and security 
(George, 1998). In 1961, President Kennedy privately expressed the US 
disappointment on the division of Europe between the EEC and the EFTA, and 
decided to support the EEC (Pilkington, 1995). The Macmillan government was 
anxious about the potential success of the EC in political co-operation, which 
could pave the way to a new connection between the US and the EC, thus 
displacing Britain in Europe (George, 1998). Following the withdrawal of South 
Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961, the Conservative government also 
started recognising the dilution of the British leadership vis-à-vis the 
Commonwealth. Furthermore, the Conservative government faced up to the 
reality of EC economic success and felt that the UK’s EC membership was 
necessary for obtaining economic benefits and recovering its political influence in 
the world (Camps, 1964; Pilkington, 1995). At the end of July 1961, Macmillan 
announced that the British government would submit its first application for full 
membership. This application was rejected by de Gaulle, who arguing that he was 
                                           
25 In 1956, there was a Franco-British joint operation to repossess the Suez Canal from 
Egypt, which was met with US opposition. Due to US pressure, the UK disbanded the operation 
and bowed to the US position on the Suez.  
 42 
trying to prevent the expansion of Anglo-American dominance in Europe (Jowell 
and Hoinville, 1976; Young, 2000).  
The Labour party opposed Britain’s EC membership, which was regarded as 
sacrificing British imperial heritage (Pilkington, 1995). In particular, in 1962, 
Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour party, castigated the Macmillan 
application of 1961, arguing that it would end ‘a thousand years of British history’ 
(Young, 2003: 142).26 After Hugh Gaitskell’s death in 1963, Harold Wilson took 
the leadership of the Labour party and became the governing party after the 1964 
general election with a slim majority27. Wilson and his followers’ pro-European 
attitude brought about a major turning point in shaping the Labour government’s 
approach on European integration. Britain was confronted with an economic 
problem because of declining British trade with the Commonwealth and thus had 
to do something to improve Britain’s trade position. Although Britain’s economy 
depended upon US loans, the Labour party wanted to keep the US at distance. 
This dependency prevented the UK from articulating opposition to American’s 
military involvement in Vietnam. The party also acknowledged that although 
capitalism was dominant, it was weaker in the EC than in the US. Thus, it averted 
its eyes from the US to look towards the EC, to try and avoid any penalty of being 
excluded from the economic success of the EC (Jowell and Hoinville, 1976; 
Pilkington, 1995). The Labour party manifesto for the 1966 general election was 
clear: 
 
 
Britain is a member of the European Free Trade Association, which is 
a thriving organisation beneficial to us and to our partners. The 
Labour Government has taken the lead in promoting an approach by 
E.F.T.A. to the countries of the European Economic Community so 
that Western Europe shall not be sharply divided into two conflicting 
groups. Labour believes that Britain, in consultation with her E.F.T.A. 
                                           
26 The Labour party, under Hugh Gaitskell’s leadership, thought that the UK had a 
responsibility to support the development of the Commonwealth countries which owed allegiance 
to the Queen (Jowell and Hoinville, 1976). 
27 Under Wilson, the Labour party won two general elections. In 1964, it defeated the 
Conservative party but the size of majority in parliament was an unworkably small majority of 
only 4 MPs. The Wilson government returned to office with a larger majority after the general 
election in 1966. See Pilkington (1995). 
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partners, should be ready to enter the European Economic Community, 
provided essential British and Commonwealth interests are 
safeguarded (1966 Labour Party Election Manifesto ‘Time for 
Decision’ www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1966/1966-labour-
manifesto.shtml). 
 
In designing the manifesto, the Wilson’s government’s pro-European approach 
was confronted with anti-Marketeers’ position which argued that Britain’s 
membership would see them losing national sovereignty. After victory at the 1966 
general election, the Wilson government demoted anti-Marketeers from the 
government and persuaded anti-Marketeers in the party to change their position 
on Britain’s membership (Forster, 2002: 21; George and Haythorne, 1996; 114; 
Young, 2000: 85). On 2 May 1967 the Wilson government announced its 
application for EC membership (Central Office of Information 1983: 6). This 
second application was once again vetoed by De Gaulle in November 1967, for 
the same reason as the first application had. 
The Conservative party, under Heath’s leadership, won the general 
election in June 1970. Heath had been the chief negotiator in the Macmillan 
government’s application for EC membership and a member of Jean Monnet’s 
Action Committee for the United States of Europe. This meant that the Heath 
government inherited its ideas about EC membership from the Macmillan. The 
Heath government, thus, fully committed itself to EC membership and put the 
common market at the centre of British foreign policy. The six member states now 
looked at EC enlargement more favourably, arguing that the UK’s membership 
would make the EC stronger economically and politically. The negotiations were 
successfully with the conclusion that Britain had to trade off membership with an 
agreement over the own resources system (Young, 1973; Jowell and Hoinville, 
1976 George, 1994; Young, 2000).  
 
2.3. Member states’ initial responses to the UK’s accession 
The UK’s accession into the EC in the 1960s caused some disagreement amongst 
the six founding members. The ‘Friendly Five’ (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and Italy) welcomed the UK’s applications for EC membership, 
which would keep France’s dominance in European integration in check. France, 
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which was the chief instigator in the rejections of Britain’s EC membership 
applications in 1961 and 1967, had a more cautious attitude. In particular, 
President De Gaulle believed that Britain’s EC membership would imply a 
penetration of Anglo-American dominance into Europe. He also feared that the 
UK with its special relationships would become a rival to thwart his desire to 
place France at the centre of European integration (Macmillan, 1973; Castle, 
1984; Pilkington, 1995). 
The British application for EC membership went under a new phase after 
the resignation of President de Gaulle in April 1969. The government led by 
Georges Pompidou was less sceptical than his predecessor over the UK’s 
commitment to Europe. However, for Pompidou, the creation of the own 
resources system represented a turning point of his position on the British 
membership. The Pompidou government’s acceptance of the UK’s EC 
membership after the creation of the EC financial system implied that France 
wanted the UK to be a net contributor to the Community budget which was 
predominantly allotted to CAP expenditures (Heath, 1998).28 For this, it argued 
that the UK would have to accept the EC budget system as the acquis 
communautaire if it wanted to join the EC. Once the UK accepted to pay its 
contribution to the Community budget which would benefit the French national 
interest, the Pompidou government ended French opposition to Britain’s EC 
membership (Heath, 1998). 
 
 
3. The establishment of the own resources system 
This section reviews the negotiation of the Community’s own resources system, 
which affected the UK’s accession. The own resources system was designed by 
the European Commission to reduce the difficulty of securing national 
parliaments’ approval on the size of the EC budget, which was destined to 
                                           
28 The CAP, largely based on a French idea, worked by restricting agricultural imports and 
setting a common ‘target price’ for agricultural produce, so as to guarantee farmers’ income. Over 
80 per cent of the Community budget was allocated for spending on the CAP. See Fouilleux 
(2007).   
 45 
significantly increase with the upcoming enlargement. 
 
3.1. The Commission’s proposal for the Community own resources system 
In the initial stage of European integration, the European Coal and Steel 
Community decided to finance community activities and to raise loans to support 
coal and steel workers for resettlement and houses (Laffan, 1997). The ECSC’s 
financial scope was regulated by article 49 of the ECSC Treaty, which empowered 
the High Authority to directly procure financial resource through levies on the 
coal and steel industries (COM, 1969a: 13; Laffan, 1997: 2). The establishment of 
the EEC in 1957 brought about an increase of the EEC budget due to the creation 
of the European Social Fund (ESC) and the European Development Fund 
(EDF).29 The Treaties of Rome created a financial system which stood on the 
basis of the EEC member states’ contribution and also enacted Article 201 (EEC) 
to collect the revenue from customs duties and Article 173 (Euratom) to collect 
levies for the Euratom with the view to partially replacing the national 
contribution by ‘own resources’ of the communities (COM, 1969a: 13). 
In 1960, an agreement of the CAP framework affected the shaping of the 
community’s budget. The CAP was intended to establish a common agricultural 
market which required the Community’s financial support for single prices and for 
a Community farm policy. In April 1962, the Council agreed Council Regulation 
No. 25 which created the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) for the EEC’s financial responsibility regarding the CAP (Official 
Journal of the European Communities, 1962; COM, 1965a). For the 
implementation of Council Regulation No. 25, the Council required a 
Commission’s proposal to be made before 1 April 1965. On 31 March 1965, the 
Commission submitted its proposals to the Council, which consisted of two 
financial regulations: arrangements for replacing the financial contribution of the 
EEC member states with the Community’s own resources, and amendments to 
Article 203 of the EEC Treaty to increase the power of the European Parliament 
                                           
29 The European Social Fund was established for supporting coal and steel workers’ 
training and mobility. The European Development Fund aimed to finance development activities 
in European overseas territories and later former colonies in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). 
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on approval of the community budget (COM, 1965b). The Commission proposed 
that agricultural levies be added to the EC’s own resources. The EC budget would 
be collected from the agricultural levies and from customs duties (Official Journal 
of the European Communities, 1962; Ehlermann, 1982). The Commission’s 
proposal specified that the EC’s own resources – agricultural levies and custom 
duties under the Common External Tariff (CET) – should start from July 1967, 
which would be the completion date for the customs union for industrial products, 
and also the commencement date for financing common prices for agricultural 
products (COM, 1969a).30 National officials in the EC member states would 
collect custom duties under the CET and the levies on agricultural products in 
trade with countries outside of the EC, and then would hand these over to the EC, 
after the deduction of a 10 per cent service charge. Furthermore, the European 
Commission proposed an amendment of Article 203 to increase the European 
Parliament’s power over its approval of the EC budget procedure with the aim of 
removing national parliament’s control over the EC budget (Bache and George, 
2006). 
In its 1965 proposal, the European Commission linked the idea of the EC’s 
own resources with a proposal for an increase of the European Parliament’s 
powers over the EC budget. This package deal was confronted with opposition 
from the de Gaulle government, which did not want to strengthen the powers of 
the EP. On the issue of the amendments to Article 203 in the EEC Treaty, although 
on the surface France’s opposition was due to a weakening of national authority in 
accordance with the increase of supranational institutional power, in substance the 
French opposition was bound up with concerns over loss of control of the EEC 
expenditure plan. France’s position on the package deal was isolated given that 
other EEC member states consented to it (Lambert, 1966).31 When the package 
deal became deadlocked, President de Gaulle, and thus France, boycotted all 
                                           
30 On 12 May 1960, the Council agreed the Commission’s proposal on the procedure of the 
customs union which would progressively dismantle internal customs barriers and would erect a 
common external tariff from 1959 to 1967. See Egan (2007).    
31 The EEC member states, apart from France, advocated strengthening the budgetary 
power of the European Parliament in the Commission’s package deal to secure an overall fairness 
of community expenditure. See Lambert (1966). 
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‘Council of Ministers’ meetings from June 1965, a period subsequently termed the 
‘empty chair crisis’ (Bache and George, 2006). In a series of Special Council 
meetings in Luxembourg in May 1966, the EEC member states achieved an 
agreement on financing the CAP which stipulated that, from 1 January 1970, all 
agricultural expenditure would be financed by the Community budget (COM, 
1970e: 1).32  The six EC member states agreed to discuss the EC’s own resources 
system at The Hague summit of 1 and 2 December 1969 (COM, 1966: 5-11). 
Prior to The Hague summit, the Commission repeatedly proposed the 
communities’ own resources system and an increase in the EP’s budgetary power. 
For the own resources system, the proposal stipulated collecting three sources of 
revenue: two ‘traditional’ resources (agricultural levies and customs duties), and a 
maximum of 1 per cent of Value Added Tax (VAT) (COM, 1969a: 15). The 
European Commission proposed agricultural levies on import in agricultural and 
sugar trades immediately. On custom duties, it proposed a progressive allocation 
by which, under the CET on imports from outside of the communities, two-thirds 
of customs duties would transfer to the communities on January 1971, this would 
increase to three quarters of custom duties on January 1972, and full custom 
duties would be in effect before January 1973. The Commission perceived that the 
traditional resources would not be sufficient to finance the EC budget. Thus, it 
added a maximum of 1 percent of the VAT into the own resources system (COM, 
1969a: 14-15). 
 
3.2. The budget settlement at The Hague summit 
For The Hague summit on 1-2 December 1969, the European Commission, 
supported by the ‘Friendly Five’, proposed a package deal which included the 
Communities’ own resources system and the UK’s accession into the EC in order 
to induce French concession on the British membership (COM, 1969d: 488, 
1970a: 9, 1970b: 23, 1970d: 258; Financial Times, 11 November 1969). The 
                                           
32 From 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1965, the European Community stipulated that the EC 
budget covered one sixth of eligible agricultural expenditure for the common market and prices 
policies and then increased the size of expenditure to two sixths and finally three sixths. The 
agreement of 11 May 1966 stipulated full support of the CAP from EC expenditure from 1 January 
1970. See COM 1(1970e) and Ludlow (2006).  
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Friendly Five were more interested in British membership rather than in the own 
resources system. Their position on British accession was positive for three 
reasons (George and Bache, 2006). Firstly, they foresaw that with British net 
contributions to the Community budget there would be an easing of their own 
financial burden (Laffan, 1997). Secondly, they saw in the UK’s accession a 
potential counterweight to the French dominance of the pace of European 
integration – particularly in the light of the ‘empty chair’ crisis and France’s 
attempt to withdraw from NATO (Pilkington, 1995). Thirdly, they expected that 
the British membership would invigorate the EC economies against the economic 
recession of the late 1960s, through the opening of the British domestic market to 
the EC (George and Bache, 2006). On the contrary to this, France was more 
interested in the agreement of the EC’s own resources system than discussing 
British membership. The own resources system was designed to finance EC 
expenditures which heavily converged upon financing the CAP. France supported 
the agreement of the own resources system in order to become a net beneficiary 
(Financial Times, 10 and 11 November 1969; George and Bache, 2006). 
The Friendly Five, in particular The Netherlands and Italy, opposed the 
own resources system. The Dutch government argued that, since The Netherlands 
was a major importing state the own resources system would disproportionately 
increase the Dutch contribution to the EC budget through custom duties. The 
Italian government was displeased about its contribution because the EC 
expenditure on the CAP was not commensurate with financial benefits for the 
Italians (Financial Times, 9 December 1969).33 The Friendly Five threatened 
France and demanded a concession on the British membership for agreement on 
the own resources system (Financial Times, 2 December 1969).  
In the negotiation, the Pompidou government faced strong pressure from 
French farmers on the domestic front. France considered the merits of the 
Community’s financial support on the CAP and concentrated on achieving the 
agreement of the own resources system (Financial Times, 2 December 1969). 
After being threatened by the Friendly Five the Pompidou government saw that 
                                           
33 Italy had a plan to finance its agricultural industry. The Italians’ major products, wine 
and tobacco, were not supported by the CAP (Financial Times, 9 December 1969).  
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the British membership would increase the number of budget contributors for the 
EC’s budget and boost the European economies. Firstly, with the financial system 
the Community budget would increase by approximately 50 per cent vis-à-vis its 
level in the 1960s; this meant that the UK would become a budget contributor. 
Through the UK becoming a budget contributor the financial burden of the 
Friendly Five would be lowered (the Friendly Five’s views on financial burden 
sharing). Secondly, France believed that British membership could potentially 
lead to the creation of a large European economic entity which due to a better 
division of labour and a greater economic scale would bring significant benefits to 
its own economy also (Financial Times, 20 December 1969).   
Consequently, France made a deal with the Friendly Five regarding British 
membership in exchange for an agreement of the own resources system. The 
agreement reflected the six founder member states’ common position on British 
membership which would involve sharing the financial burden of the EC budget. 
Therefore, the six states agreed to adopt a financial treaty for the Community’s 
own resources system to replace national contributions on 21 April 1970 before 
negotiations began with the candidates for the first EC enlargement in 1971: 
Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway (Young, 1973: 28). Due to this the new 
member states’ contributions was regarded as a cost of their EC membership. The 
agreement clearly stated that the new member states’ inclusion in the first 
enlargement must be on the basis of acceptance of the complete acquis 
communautaire (Financial Times, 2 December 1969; Preston 1995).  
 
 
4. Negotiations of the UK’s membership 
This section focuses on the accession negotiations between the UK and the six EC 
member states. Britain’s contribution to the budget was a main point of conflict: 
the UK tried to keep her contributions as low as possible, whilst the six founding 
members sought to impose higher level contribution on the UK in order to 
maximize their benefits from the British membership. 
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4.1. The UK’s financial problems 
An imbalance between the UK’s contributions and benefits was generated through 
the agreement at the Hague summit (December 1969) and the creation of the own 
resources system (1970). Firstly, Britain’s trade structure for industrial goods was 
heavily linked to non-EC countries, particularly Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
rather than the EC member states. The British trade structure would result in a 
large payment for custom duties under the CET (Young, 1973). Secondly, the UK 
was a relatively large agricultural importer of cheap foodstuffs from outside of the 
EC. In particular, the UK’s trade in butter and sugar would cause a large 
contribution into the EC budget through agricultural import levies (Denton, 
1984).34 Finally, the VAT contribution was related to the EC member states’ GNP. 
The Commission expected that high-GNP member states would have a high rate 
of VAT which was charged only on goods sold for the purposes of consumption. 
The VAT instrument was such that rich EC member states would contribute more 
than poor member states (Young, 1973). However, Britain had a relatively high 
ratio of private consumption compared to its GNP rate. This would mean that the 
British would contribute relatively high VAT payments compared to other member 
states (Denton, 1981). 
Although under the own resource system Britain would expect to become 
the second-largest contributor after West Germany; due to the British trade 
dependency on non-EC countries and its consumption pattern on the expenditure 
side it would receive few benefits (Laffan and Lindner, 2005). Under the 
agreements of Council Regulation No. 25, about three-quarters of the EC budget 
would be allocated for financing the CAP in order to increase agricultural 
productivity, to support the living standards of the agricultural community, and to 
support farm prices (Young, 1973: 64-65; Godley, 1980: 74). However, Britain’s 
small agricultural sector, and the small numbers employed in agricultural 
industries, would bring about British problems in terms of too few benefits from 
                                           
34 Since 1962, the UK had guaranteed the British butter import quota to New Zealand. The 
quota represented roughly 440,000 tons of butter, about 85 per cent of New Zealand’s products in 
a year (Pisani, 1969; O’Neill, 2000). Moreover, under a Sugar Agreement with the 
Commonwealth countries, the UK had promised to purchase a specific quantity of sugar at a 
special price which was fixed over a three-year period (Pisani, 1969). 
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CAP expenditure. In Britain, in 1967 the total size of agricultural holdings was 
about 17,500,000 hectares (about 1 per cent of total UK land area) and only 3 per 
cent of the total British population (about 750,000 people) were employed in 
agricultural industries. This would mean that Britain was a long way from being a 
net beneficiary of CAP expenditure (Pisani, 1969). 
 
Table 3.1  The expectation of the British net balance in 1978, million of £ 
 
 Britain The Six Other Three 
Applicants 
Total 
Total payment 572.9  1,202  100 1,875 
Levies 
Duties 
VAT 
183.3 208.3 50 990 
291.6 545.8 130 2,140 
97.9 447.9 25  570.8 
The Community 
repayment 
104.1 1,597.9 89.5 1,791.6 
Net balance -468.7 +395.8 -10.4 +83.3 
Source: White Paper 1970: Britain and the European Communities. An Economic Assessment 
(H.M.S.O) 
 
 
The British government’s White Paper in 1970, as shown in Table 3.1, clearly set 
out the expectation that there would be a UK imbalance between contribution and 
benefits in 1978. 35 With regard to British contributions, due to imports of 
agricultural products from non-EC countries, the British government presumed 
that agricultural levies in the UK would be £ 183.3 million despite the six founder 
EC member states paying £ 208.3 million. The paper expected that although the 
British trade structure with the outside of the Community on industrial products 
would progressively diminish, and the UK’s intra-EC trade would increase, 
British trade with non-EC countries would still be retained. Thus, the paper 
                                           
35 The financial treaty in April 1970 stipulated a schedule for the EC’s own resources 
system. Agricultural levies and custom duties would start from 1975 and during 1970-1975 the 
national contribution would finance a shortage in the Community budget.  From 1975, the 
national contribution would be progressively replaced by VAT and, in 1978, the own resources 
system would completely replace the national contribution. See COM (1970f). 
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expected that Britain’s payments on custom duties would be £ 291.6 million 
compared with ‘the Six’s’ payment of about £ 545.8 million. Furthermore, the 
paper considered the British consumption pattern and predicted that on VAT, 
Britain would contribute £ 97.0 million compared to ‘the Six’s’ £ 447.9 million, 
approximately. The total of the British contribution to the EC budget would be 
£572.9 million whilst the contribution of the six founder EC member states would 
be £ 1, 202 million, that of other applicants would be £ 100 million, and the total 
of the Community budget would be £ 1, 875 million. The figures in the White 
Paper distinctly indicated that, under the own resources system, Britain’s 
contribution would be much higher than that of other EC member states (Young, 
1973; Begg and Grimwade, 1998; Gowland and Turner, 2000).  
On the Community expenditure side, the EC would allocate £ 1, 562.5 
million for CAP expenditure and would add £ 104.1 million to cover the wine 
policy. £ 208.3 million would be due for non-agricultural expenditures. Regarding 
the Community’s expenditure plan, Britain would receive £ 104.1 million, whilst 
the six founder member states would obtain £ 1, 597.9 million and other 
applicants would be supported to the tune of £ 89.5 million. Thus, the UK’s net 
balance would be £ - 468.7 million while ‘the Six’s’ would be £ 395.8 million and 
‘other applicants’ would be -£10.4 million (Young, 1973: 38-40). The White Paper 
clearly envisaged that there would be little benefit from the Community budget 
expenditure while it would pay a high proportion of the Community budget 
contribution under the own resources system. Therefore, the UK had a problem 
with the imbalance between net contributions and receipts in the EC budget. 
 
4.2. Negotiations of the British membership 
Negotiation for British membership between Britain and the six founder EC 
member states opened in June 1970 and an agreement was reached regarding 
British accession in June 1971. In negotiations, the Heath government 
concentrated on the UK’s large payment to the EC budget, the length of 
transitional period and the Commonwealth question (Preston, 1997; Kitzinger, 
1973). 
In the opening negotiation in June 1970, the Heath government 
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complained about the British financial contribution. The government argued that 
the UK would contribute about 21.5 per cent (or up to 25 per cent) of the total EC 
budget based on the 1970 White Paper, and required a lightening of its 
contribution. The six founder member states, particularly France, specifically 
argued that the British contribution was not negotiable (Preston, 1997). After the 
rejection of the reduction of the overall British contribution, Britain changed its 
approach which paid attention to the issues of the transitional period and questions 
about the Commonwealth for reducing its contribution instead of directly focusing 
on the size of the contribution.  
First of all, in the autumn of 1970, the Heath government issued an 
extension of the length of the transition period in order to have sufficient time to 
change the British trade structure to fit into the own resources system and to delay 
full payment of its contribution (Lord, 1993). Initially, the Council stipulated a 5-
year transitional period for all the applicants to adopt the new rules of the EC 
(COM, 1970b; COM, 1970d). During the transitional period, Britain’s 
contribution would be 10-15 per cent of the EC budget in the first year and would 
steadily increase by 2.5 per cent each year. The UK’s full payment would reach 
about 20-25 per cent of the EC budget at the end of the transitional period. The 
Heath government, however, demanded an 8-year transitional period, comprising 
a 3 years for the introduction of industrial free trade and 5 years for the adoption 
of the CAP. The government also argued that Britain wanted to contribute just 3 
per cent of the EC budget for the initial British payment during the transitional 
period. At the end of an 8-year transitional period, the full British payment would 
be achieved but it would be smaller than the Commission’s expectation (Lord, 
1993; Preston, 1997). 
Secondly, during negotiations in January 1971, the Heath government 
required a concession from the six founder member states on its special 
relationship with the Commonwealth countries in agricultural trade in order to 
stabilize agricultural prices in the British domestic market and to reduce its 
contribution under the own resources system. The government argued that 
Britain’s disproportionate payment for the EC budget derived from the British 
trade structure with non-Community countries. In particular, over 40 per cent of 
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British trade depended on cheap agricultural imports from Commonwealth 
countries (Northedge, 1983). Even though Britain’s importing of agricultural 
products caused the increasing of the UK’s contribution through agricultural 
levies, it would be difficult to change the British trade with the Commonwealth 
countries to stabilise the agricultural price in the domestic market (Young, 1973). 
The Heath government, particularly, demanded a special agreement to exclude its 
trade in dairy products with New Zealand and in sugar with the Commonwealth 
countries from inclusion in agricultural levies (Lord, 1993). 
For the six founder EC member states, it was very difficult to accept the 
British demands, because that would dilute the purpose of the six founding 
member states’ acceptance of the British membership, that of imposing the British 
financial contribution. The six founder member states had different opinions 
regarding the large imbalance between the UK’s contributions and benefits. On 
the extension of transitional period, the European Commission and France defined 
the purpose of the transitional period as giving time to new applicants to adjust to 
the new Community rules, but time was limited. Thus, they argued that they 
would not accept any extension of the length of the transition period for the UK 
beyond a 5-year span and that the length of the transition period must be the same 
for all the applicants (COM, 1970b; COM, 1970; Lord, 1993). By contrast, the 
Friendly Five, in particular Italy and the Netherlands, understood the British 
financial problems and supported the 8-year transitional period (Preston, 1997). 
Furthermore, on the issue of the rate of the British payment during the transitional 
period, France’s position was that the UK would have to immediately pay its full 
contribution as soon as it became a full member of the EC. Belgium, Italy and the 
Netherlands were agreeable to a low starting-point. In particular, the Netherlands 
suggested a starting rate at 5 per cent of the EC budget and increasing to 17.5 per 
cent. Belgium suggested starting at 7.5-9.5 per cent and increasing to 17.5-19.5 
per cent. Finally, the Friendly Five agreed on a suggested starting rate of 5-10 per 
cent (Young, 1973). 
On the British demand for a special agreement on trade, the six founder 
member states did not allow any concession on dairy products and sugar. They 
pressured Britain to change the structure of Britain’s trade from non-EC countries 
 55 
to the EC member states. The European Commission shared the opinion of the six 
EC founders and argued that the UK should progressively reduce its special 
arrangement with the Commonwealth countries during the transitional period if it 
wanted to reduce its contribution (Lord, 1993). 
It was difficult to achieve an agreement in the negotiation of the British 
membership without concession by Britain or the six founder member states over 
the British contribution. In particular, Britain and France’s positions brought about 
anxiety that the negotiation of the British membership might fail as it had done 
twice before. The two governments agreed to arrange a bilateral summit between 
Heath and Pompidou on 11-12 May 1971. During the bilateral summit, the Heath 
government made a significant concession by accepting to immediately open the 
British domestic market to EC agricultural products if the negotiation of the 
British membership successfully came to an agreement. The Pompidou 
government also agreed to reduce the starting rate of the UK’s contribution to 
around 10 per cent of the EC budget (Kitzinger, 1973; Lord, 1993).  
Finally, on 23 June 1971, after marathon negotiations, the new applicants 
and the six founder EC member states announced the increase in number of EC 
member states from 1973 through the first enlargement: Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland. The agreement stipulated that all new member states were to be given a 5-
year transitional period in order to adopt the Community rules and financial 
system. During the transitional period, the UK would pay 8.64 per cent of the EC 
budget in 1973 and the British contribution would gradually increase to 18.92 per 
cent in 1978. Moreover, Britain agreed to reduce its agricultural trade with non-
Community countries during the transitional period (Paxton, 1976). Regarding the 
outcomes of the negotiation of the British membership, it could be said that the 
Heath government reduced the British contribution but the contribution was much 
higher than the level of British benefits. The British problem still remained due to 
Britain’s imbalance between its large payment to the EC and few benefits from 
EC expenditure. In the negotiations over the UK’s imbalance, the Heath 
government concentrated on its membership for his political ambition36 rather 
                                           
        36 The Heath government’s political ambition consisted of two factors: seeking a new 
market and finshing a political debate on Britain’s membership. First of all, the government’s pro-
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than reducing Britain’s financial imbalance contribution, as confirmed by Sir Con 
O’Neill (cited in Lindner, 2006: 117), who was the senior official in the 
negotiating term:  
 
 
The British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who had been chief 
negotiator during Britain’s failed bid for EEC membership in the early 
1960, put British accession high on the political agenda of the 
Conservative government that took office in 1970. He attached mush 
personal political capital to this mission and was determined to 
complete the negotiation rapidly. He believed that Britain’s bargaining 
position would be much improved once it became a full member. He 
was willing to accept temporary agreements and to defer problems to 
later negotiations. 
 
 
At the time, most of the EC budget was used to finance the CAP and could be said 
that there were no EC expenditure policies to visibly support the UK. However, at 
The Hague summit in 1969, the European Commission had proposed the creation 
of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), but this was not actually 
created until 1973. The expectation was that the UK would receive financial 
benefits from the ERDF, but there was some uncertainty regarding this. 
 
 
5. The British financial problem under Labour governments 
Although Edward Heath considered Britain’s EC membership a political success, 
the British financial problem continued to cause political conflicts between the 
UK and other EC member states. This section sheds light on the behaviour of the 
two Labour governments that followed the Heath government. The Wilson and 
Callaghan governments concentrated on the British financial problem through a 
renegotiation of Britain’s EC membership terms, which constituted an initial stage 
of the settlement of the subsequent UK rebate (Baker and Seawrigth, 1998). 
                                                                                                                   
European approach was based on its economic liberalism which sout a new market of Europe. 
Secondly, the government demanded to finish a long political debate on the membership. Due to 
the political amibition, Heath said that the membership was the party’s goal which could change 
with any political price. See Morris (1996). 
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5.1. Renegotiation in the Wilson Government (1974-1976) 
The Labour party, under Harold Wilson’s leadership, won two general elections in 
February and October and 1974.37 Ironically, although in the first term (1964-
1970) as Prime Minister Wilson was a strong supporter of European integration 
and had attempted to apply for Britain’s EC membership in 1967; in his second 
term of government he was lukewarm towards European integration (George, 
1998; Geddes, 2004). This change of attitude was mainly due to the left wing’s 
dominance in the Labour party of the government.38 The dominance of the left 
wing had been evident since the defeat of the 1970 general election. The left wing, 
which consisted of anti-Marketeers, held pro-Marketeers to account on losing the 
government and entered the leadership group of the party (George and Haythorne, 
1996: 114; Forster, 2002: 28-29). The left wing criticised membership of the EC 
as being an implicit retreat from socialism, which was the Labour party’s main 
ideology. The common market, and further supranational European integration on 
economic and monetary issues, would threaten the British government’s power 
over the economy, which was seen as an essential condition of the Left’s state-
directed capitalism. The members of the left wing occupied many leading 
positions in the Wilson government and contributed to Britain’s EC policies.39 
They opposed British membership and criticized Wilson and the right-wing’s 
ideas about European policies within Labour (Bilski, 1977; George, 1998).  The 
Wilson government saw in the left wing an attempt to politically ally with the 
Conservative anti-Marketeers, who aimed to pressure the Wilson government to 
change its EC policies (Forster, 2002b).  
                                           
37 There were two general elections, in February and October 1974. On 28 February 1974, 
the Labour party won 301 seats which was 17 seats fewer than an overall majority. The Labour 
party joined up with the Liberals under Jeremy Thorpe to form a coalition government. Wilson 
returned for a second term as Prime Minister. The Wilson government called the general election 
on 10 October 1974 and won a tiny majority of three.  
38 In the 1960s and 1970s, on the issue of Britain’s EC membership, the Labour party was 
divided along left-right lines. The left wing consisted of the anti-Marketeers who opposed 
membership and the right wing was a group of pro-Marketeers who supported membership. See 
Bilski (1977).  
39 The left-wingers Callaghan and Shore were appointed Foreign Secretary and Secretary 
of State for Trade respectively (George, 1998).   
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The Wilson government called a national referendum on Britain’s EC 
membership: a successful referendum would imply not only a clear endorsement 
of British membership of the EC but would also represent a method to prevent a 
division of the Labour party between right wing and left wing regarding Britain’s 
EC policies. Furthermore, it attempted to use the national referendum to pressure 
the EC to arrange a renegotiation of Britain’s financial contribution to the EC 
budget whilst at the same time planned to use the renegotiation as a part of the 
referendum campaign. It assumed that if the renegotiation failed, the British 
people would vote for a withdrawal of the UK from the EC, which in turn would 
put significant pressure on the EC to resolve Britain’s financial problem. If other 
EC member states conceded to reducing the Britain’s imbalance on the budget, the 
renegotiation would help persuade the public and eurosceptic members of the left 
wing in the Labour party and anti-Marketeers in the Conservative party (Bilski, 
1977; Ørstrøm, 1982; George, 1998; Forster, 2002; Gowland et al., 2010). 
The Wilson government appointed the Foreign Secretary, James 
Callaghan, to play a leading role in the renegotiation. Callaghan was a left-winger 
who supported Atlanticism and criticised European integration. He identified 
several issues which generated discussions on the UK’s EC membership within 
the Labour party, the most important of which was the size of British contribution 
to the EC budget.40  In June 1974, the Wilson government argued that the British 
financial contribution would become unacceptably high at the end of the 
transitional period, and proposed to reduce its budget contribution (Denton, 1982). 
This argument was based on a paper which was produced by the British Treasury 
in May 1974. Although the left wing demanded emphasis on the British financial 
imbalance in the Community budget, the Treasury only calculated the UK’s 
contribution compared to Britain’s percentage share of GNP in the Community in 
order to avoid difficulties in the renegotiation with other EC member states 
(Command paper, 1975: 14; Emerson and Scott, 1977; George, 1998). The paper 
envisaged that, under the own resource system, the British contribution would 
                                           
40 The four issues were: allowing accession of Commonwealth countries’ products, the 
freedom for the British government’s to provide aid to national industry and to the regions without 
any ‘interference’ from Brussels, reform of the CAP, and the size of British contribution. 
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increase from 11 per cent of the Community budget in 1974 to around 18.92 per 
cent in the transitional period, at the end of the period in 1978, and then would be 
increased to 21 per cent by 1979, and further increase to 24 per cent in 1980, even 
though Britain would share only 14 per cent of the Community’s GNP (see Table 
3.2.). The conclusion was that the UK’s contribution was too high with regard to 
Britain’s economy (Emerson and Scott, 1977: 212). 
Both the European Commission and France openly opposed the Wilson 
government’s argument on the British contribution. In November 1974, in 
response to the UK’s argument, the European Commission presented its own 
paper, arguing that the Wilson government’s predictions, based on data from 1973 
or 1974, could not provide accurate figures of the British contribution in 1979-
1980 (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). France, under President Giscard d’Estaing, argued 
that the British calculation was flawed because it counted all Community 
resources including agricultural levies, customs tariffs and VAT as part of the 
British contribution. He said that agricultural levies and customs tariffs were the 
Community’s own resources, and thus, the national contribution was only 
represented by VAT revenues (Dodsworth, 1975; Emerson and Scott, 1977; 
Jenkins, 1980). 
 
 
Table 3.2 Simulated breakdown of the financing of the budget under the definitive 
own resources system, 1973 and 1974  
 
                           Agricultural levies    Customs duties       VAT          Total       
                         and sugar contributions  
                        ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           million    %        million     %     million  %       million   % 
                           u.a.                 u.a.              u.a. 
Denmark 1973 5 0.9 39 1.9 65 2.8 109 2.2 
1974 7 2.0 50 2.0 64 2.9 120 2.4 
Germany 1973 144 26.6 621 30.7 749 32.4 1514 31.0 
1974 118 35.4 711 29.0 679 30.8 1509 30.2 
France 1973 87 16.1 329 16.3 481 20.8 897 18.4 
1974 72 21.5 371 15.1 466 21.1 908 18.2 
Ireland 1973 3 0.7 10 0.5 18 0.8 32 0.7 
1974 3 1.0 8 0.4 18 0.8 30 0.6 
Italy 1973 127 23.4 236 11.7 305 13.2 668 13.7 
1974 53 16.0 307 12.5 302 13.7 662 13.2 
Netherlands 1973 94 17.4 197 9.7 134 5.8 425 8.7 
1974 22 6.7 239 9.7 128 5.8 389 7.8 
Belgium- 
Luxembourg 
1973 30 5.5 130 6.4 104 4.5 264 5.4 
1974 17 5.2 164 6.6 97 4.4 278 5.6 
United Kingdom 1973 51 9.4 461 22.8 456 19.7 968 19.9 
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1974 41 12.2 606 24.7 452 20.5 1099 22.0 
Community 1973 541 100 2023 100 2312 100 4877 100 
1974 333 100 2456 100 2206 100 4995 100 
<Source: the Command of Her Majesty ‘Membership of the European Community: Report on Renegotiation’ 
Her Majesty’s stationery office (March 1975)> 
 
 
Table 3.3 Simulated distribution of relative shares in the Community budget  
   and GDP, 1973 and 1974 
 
 Total budget contribution 
In million u.a. 
Relative share 
In budget  % 
Relative share 
in Community (GDP) 
1973 1974 1973 1974 1973 1974 
Denmark 109 120 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 
Germany 1514 1509 31.0 30.2 33.0 33.6 
France 897 908 18.4 18.2 23.9 23.2 
Ireland 32 30 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Italy 668 662 13.7 13.2 13.2 13.2 
Netherlands 425 389 8.7 7.8 5.8 6.0 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
264 278 5.4 5.6 4.5 4.7 
United Kingdom 968 1099 19.9 22.0 16.4 15.9 
Community 4877 4995 100 100 100 100 
Source: Commission ‘inventory of the Community’s economic and financial situation since enlargement and 
survey of future developments’ Bulletin of the European Communities (supplement 7/74)> 
 
Table 3.4 Relative shares in resources derived from VAT, 1973 and 1974 
 
Year Denmark Germany France Ireland Italy Netherlands Belgium- 
Luxembourg 
United 
Kingdom 
1973 2.8 32.4 20.8 0.8 13.2 .8 4.5 19.7 
1974 2.9 30.8 21.1 0.8 13.7 5.8 4.4 20.5 
<Source: Commission ‘inventory of the Community’s economic and financial situation since enlargement and 
survey of future developments’ Bulletin of the European Communities (supplement 7/74)> 
 
The corrective mechanism 
At the Paris summit in December 1974, the UK tried to negotiate a solution to its 
financial problem with other EC member states. The Wilson government argued 
that the UK might have to withdraw from the EC, unless other EC member states 
engaged in the renegotiation of its contribution to the budget – in fact, this was an 
important issue in influencing the British public about EC membership in the 
national referendum (Emerson and Scott, 1977). While France strongly opposed 
reducing the British contribution, other EC member states seemed more 
sympathetic and appreciated the political difficulties that the Wilson government 
had to face on the domestic front. In particular, the Chancellor of Germany, 
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Helmut Schmidt, was seriously concerned about withdrawal of the Labour 
government’s EC membership, which would imply losing one of his socialist 
allies in the EC (George, 1998). Schmidt not only argued that Britain’s demand on 
a balance between its contribution and receipts was reasonable but also attempted 
to persuade other member states to agree devising a ‘corrective mechanism’ in 
order to mitigate the financial burden of member states which were struggling 
with high budgetary contributions. This was a difficult task, particularly with 
France, but he was eventually successful. The Council, therefore, asked the 
Commission to produce a paper before the Dublin summit in March 1975 (Laffan, 
1997). 
In February 1975 the European Commission published a complex formula 
for a ‘corrective mechanism’, in which it stipulated three conditions to qualify for 
a rebate. First of all, the rebate would apply only to net contributors – Ireland and 
the Netherlands did not fulfil this condition because both were net beneficiaries 
through the CAP. Secondly, the rebate would apply to member states whose GNP 
growth rate was below 120 per cent of the Community average. Thirdly, the rebate 
would apply to member states which experienced a deficit on their balance of 
payments – a reference point was designed in which a gap between a member 
state’s percentage share of budgetary payments and the Community average GNP 
would have to exceed 10 per cent of the share of the Community average GNP 
(COM, 1975). The Commission designed the second and third conditions in order 
to prevent prosperous member states from applying for a rebate. If a member state 
qualified on the three conditions, its rebate would be calculated with reference to 
the gap between its total payments and its percentage share of the EC’s average 
GNP, but would not exceed the member state’s VAT contributions (Denton, 1982; 
George, 1998). 
At the Dublin summit on 10-11 March 1975, the EC member states agreed 
the ‘corrective mechanism’, which for most implied an increase of their 
contributions. The member states made financial sacrifices in order to prevent the 
withdrawal of the British membership (George, 1998: 86; Emerson and Scott, 
1977: 217). The UK met the three conditions of the ‘corrective mechanism’ and 
obtained its rebate. It was a net contributor and the British growth rate of GNP 
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was below 120 per cent of the Community average. It contributed 21 per cent of 
the Community budget, but represented 15.9 per cent of the EC’s GNP. The gap 
between the British percentage share of budgetary payments (21 per cent) and the 
Community average GNP (15.9 per cent) exceeded 10 per cent of the British 
percentage share of the EC’s GNP. Therefore, the British rebate was accounted at 
£125 million, considering the size of the gap between the British percentage share 
of budgetary payments and the community average GNP in 1975 (Emerson and 
Scott, 1977; Strasser, 1981). The corrective mechanism had a positive effect on 
the referendum held on 5 June 1975: 17,378,581 people voted for continued 
British membership (67.2 per cent) against those who voted for a ‘withdrawal’ 
8,470,073 (32.8 per cent). 
 
5.2. Britain’s budget deficit in the Callaghan Government (1976-1979) 
James Callaghan, who was the Foreign Secretary in the Wilson government, 
became Prime Minister when Wilson resigned in March 1976. Although 
Callaghan was a member of the left wing in the Labour party, due to the outcome 
of the British referendum in 1975, it was politically difficult to repeatedly 
question Britain’s EC membership. However, the Callaghan government could not 
overlook the problem of Britain’s financial contribution: the Wilson government 
had obtained a cash rebate which reduced Britain’s sizeable payment to the EC 
budget, yet the Callaghan government experienced a significant budget deficit in 
the late 1970s. In 1976 and 1977, even though the UK received about £125 
million of cash rebate per year, Britain’s budget deficit amounted to about £423 
million per year. The Economic Policy Committee of the EC envisaged that in 
1980, the UK would have a deficit of around £800 million, in spite of the cash 
rebate of about £160 million (George, 1998; Forster, 2002; Geddes, 2004). 
The Callaghan government argued that one of the causes of the UK’s budget 
deficit was the imbalance between its GNP and its payments to the EC budget, 
which was still considered to be too great, despite the fact that the UK now 
received a cash rebate (Lindner, 2006: 119). At the annual Lord Mayor’s banquet 
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in the Guildhall in London41 on 13 November 1978, Callaghan stated that under 
the own resource system, the UK’s percentage share of the Community budgetary 
payment showed the third highest figure behind West Germany and Belgium in 
1976 and the second highest figure just behind West Germany in 1977, and that by 
1980 the UK would become the largest net contributor to the EC budget. By 
contrast, the UK was ranked seventh of the nine EC member states in terms of 
economic growth. These figures indicated the size of Britain’s financial imbalance, 
which caused the significant budget deficit (The Times, 14 November 1978).  
The reasons behind Britain’s large contribution to the EC budget were 
mainly two: its trade relationship with Commonwealth countries and the high 
ratio of VAT revenue. Firstly, the UK continued to depend on the Commonwealth 
countries for its agricultural products. Although Britain’s trade with EC member 
states was predicted to increase from 25 per cent of British total trade in 1973 to 
about 43 per cent in 1979, the percentage of Britain’s trade had been consistently 
below the average percentage (about 50.8 per cent) of the founding member states 
(Vanden Abeele, 1982). The high percentage of British trade with Commonwealth 
countries caused an increase in the UK’s contribution through agricultural levies 
(Young, 2004; Donoughue, 1987). Secondly, the high ratio of VAT revenue was 
another reason for the high British contribution to the EC budget. The existence of 
North Sea oil in the UK not only provided a windfall profit to the British Treasury, 
which maintained a low level of personal direct taxation, but also kept the pound’s 
value high, which caused low prices for imports entering the British domestic 
market. These factors led to high expenditure by British consumers, which in turn 
increased Britain’s contribution through VAT revenues. In comparison, the UK’s 
economic growth was not enough to support Britain’s large payment (The Times, 
14 November 1978; George, 1998; Forster, 2002; Young, 2004).  
When the Labour party won the general election in February 1974, the UK 
was still experiencing economic difficulties in recovering from the recession 
which resulted from the increase in oil prices since 1973, despite the existence of 
                                           
41 The annual Lord Mayor’s Banquet at the Guildhall is a traditional location for the Prime 
Minister to make a speech about a major foreign policy initiative. It is also an opportunity for the 
Lord Mayor of London to plan the city’s policies following Britain’s foreign policy. 
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North Sea oil. Under the Wilson government, in March 1974, the Treasury 
believed that the devaluation of the pound would boost the competitiveness of 
British products in the international market. The Treasury initially planned to 
devalue the pound by 5 per cent, but the devaluation not only boosted price 
competition in the international market, but also brought about an economic 
recession which in turn necessitated Britain’s application to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan of £3.9 billion in December 1976. The Callaghan 
government struggled to overcome Britain’s economic recession (Harmon, 1997; 
George, 1998). On 14 November 1978, it was the Foreign Secretary David Owen 
who described the Callaghan government’s position on Britain’s financial problem. 
He said that Britain was already the second highest net contributor even though it 
had the third lowest economic growth in the Community. For this, the UK’s 
contribution was unacceptable (The Times, 14 November 1978).  
At the Paris summit in March 1979, the Callaghan government focused on 
the change of existing rules to correct Britain’s financial imbalance. The 
agreement in 1975 was a correction of the UK’s imbalance in the gross-
contribution,42 but did not solve the UK’s large payment to the EC budget, which 
ultimately generated a budget deficit. Hence, in order to reduce the UK’s 
contribution, the Callaghan government asked for a correction of Britain’s 
imbalance between its sizeable contribution and few receipts from the EC budget, 
i.e. the net-contribution (Lindner, 2006: 120). The government particularly 
pointed at CAP expenditure, which in 1979 accounted for two-thirds of the EC 
budget. Although British farmers also received benefits from the CAP, the 
numbers of farmers benefitting from it in the UK were smaller than in other 
member states (Jenkins, 1980: 496). Furthermore, because Britain was not an 
exporter of agricultural products to the international market, the UK could not 
receive large benefits from the export subsidies in the CAP which aimed to 
compensate farmers for the difference between the international market price and 
the guaranteed price (Donoughue, 1987: 63). The Callaghan government argued 
                                           
42 The gross-contribution is the gap between EC member states’ GNP and contribution. 
The net-contribution is the gap between contributions and receipts from the EC budget (Lindner, 
2006). 
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that the reduction of the CAP expenditure in the EC budget would be able to 
satisfy Britain’s demands (Werts, 1992: 268). 
These proposals met with opposition from the other EC member states, 
which ultimately wanted to prevent an increase in their financial contribution to 
the EC. France argued that the British deficit had nothing to do with the EC, but 
actually resulted from Britain importing products from the Commonwealth 
instead of from the European Community. Furthermore, the British VAT payment 
was caused by the UK government’s poor financial control. Therefore, France 
argued, if the UK wanted to reduce its contribution, it would have to change its 
trade patterns and pay more attention to its finances rather than demanding a 
reduction of its financial contribution to the EC (George, 1998: 134). 
Although the Callaghan government had threatened to block the price-
setting of the CAP, this never reached the EC negotiating table due to his defeat at 
the 1979 general election. In the election campaign, both the Labour and 
Conservative parties had some provisions on the Britain’s financial problem and 
the creation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)43 in their manifestos. Both 
parties had a similar approach, sharing the view that the UK’s financial 
contribution needed to be cut (Gowland et al., 2010: 88-89).  However, while the 
Conservative party supported the ERM in line with its economic liberalisation 
approach, the Labour party was much more sceptical, arguing that the ERM 
would threaten Britain’s national economic sovereignty and ultimately lead to the 
creation of a ‘federal Europe’ (Gamble, 1998). In the election, the Labour 
government was beaten and the EC budgetary problem was handed over to the 
new Conservative government (Denis and Derbyshire, 1988). 
 
 
6. The settlement of the UK’s rebate in the Thatcher government 
This section proposes to examine the progress of the settlement of the UK’s 
                                           
43 The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 resulted in the EC’s design of the 
EMS for promoting monetary stability within the EC. At the Copenhagen European Council in 
April 1978, the Commission proposed the floating exchange rate arrangements. See Gowland 
(2010). 
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budget rebate under the Thatcher government. In the early stages of Thatcher’s 
premiership, this was a very prominent issue, which was raised in several 
European summits. At the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984, a rebate 
mechanism was introduced through agreement with the member states. This 
section concentrates on the Thatcher government’s negotiations on the settlement 
of the UK’s rebate in terms of political dynamics rather than providing a technical 
explanation of the rebate mechanism. 
 
6.1. Economic recession and financial imbalance  
Margaret Thatcher became the leader of the Conservative party in January 1975. 
Under her party leadership (1975-1979), the Conservative party opposed the then 
Labour government’s EC policies, particularly the renegotiation of Britain’s EC 
membership (Heffernan, 2000). 44  These views were clearly expressed by 
Thatcher (cited in Wall, 2008: 5) during their electoral campaign for the 1979 
general election:  
  
It is wrong to argue, as Labour do, that Europe has failed us …what 
has happened is that under Labour our country has been prevented 
from taking advantage of the opportunities which membership offers. 
 
 
When the Conservative party won the general election in May 1979, the heads of 
the EC member states expected that the new government would adopt more pro-
European policies than its predecessor and that it would not raise the issue of 
Britain’s financial contribution to the EC budget (Lindner, 2006: 120). However, 
Thatcher’s European approach was different from that of her Conservative 
predecessor Heath, who had accepted a budgetary imbalance in 1971 in order for 
                                           
44 Under the Wilson government, political parties had a chance to express their positions 
about Britain’s EC membership in a vote in Parliament on 9 April 1975 prior to the national 
referendum on 5 June 1975. The outcome of the vote was that a 396 majority voted in favour of 
acceptance of membership against 172 voting for a withdrawal of Britain from the EC. Under the 
Thatcher leadership, eight out of 275 Conservative MPs voted in favour of acceptance. The 
Conservative party’s vote was the result of its opposition to the Wilson government, in line with 
the adversarial British political system, and general attitudes of the party’s pro-European appraoch 
which was based on its neo-liberalism. See George (1998) and Norton (1990). 
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the UK to become a member of the EC, and from that of the Labour Party; and 
she expressed this very clearly (cited in Wall, 2008: 10): 
 
 
That is our money which the previous government would have left us 
to pay to Europe but for our negotiations. They talked a lot about it 
but did absolutely nothing… We regard it as urgent to achieve a full 
and satisfactory solution. 
  
 
The UK’s financial problem was soon raised to the EC and they were left in no 
doubt as to the new government’s attitude. The Thatcher government had to 
urgently solve Britain’s financial problems in the EC for two main reasons. First 
of all, there was criticism on the Thatcher government’s pro-European approach 
from anti-Marketeers in the Conservative party, as well as the Labour party. In 
particular, anti-Marketeers in the Conservative party challenged the Thatcher 
government’s pro-European approach and argued that the Conservative 
government should find a new way to implement their economic policies (Forster, 
2002). This argument had already been made clear during the 1975 referendum 
campaign: the Conservative party’s support for a ‘yes’ vote was criticised and 
there were even attempts to collaborate with the left wing of the Labour party. 
Then in the 1979 election campaign, they opposed the Conservative party’s 
manifesto pledging Britain’s membership of the Exchange Rate mechanism 
(ERM), which in their view threatened Britain’s national sovereignty on monetary 
policy (King, 1977). Furthermore, they pressured the Thatcher government to pay 
attention to the economic costs of EC membership, which was highlighted by an 
increase in food prices and of the unemployment rate, and a negative impact on 
Britain’s financial imbalance (Forster, 2002). Whilst, in the Labour party, the new 
leader Michael Foot43 continued to lead the party’s anti-European stance which 
was based on the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES)45. The party continually 
argued for the withdrawal of Britain’s membership. To the anti-Marketeers in the 
Conservative party and the Labour party, Britain’s financial problem was an ideal 
                                           
           45The Alternative Economic Strategy presented that Britain’s membership would 
prevent the party’s policies on import controls and public ownership. See Forster (2002). 
 68 
opportunity for both opponents to criticise the Thatcher government’s pro-
European approach. In order to avoid the criticism, the Thatcher government paid 
attention to solving its financial imbalance (Forster, 2002: 72). 
Secondly, the failure of the Conservative government’s economic policies 
made the financial problem even more salient. When the Thatcher government 
started its mandate in 1979, the British economy was hit by the world recession 
which had been sparked off in 1979 by the oil crisis. The new government 
immediately introduced a number of deflationary measures: the reduction of 
personal income tax, an increase in VAT from 8 per cent to 15 per cent, and an 
increase of interest rates from 12 per cent to 17 per cent, in order to smoothly 
manage monetary flow in the domestic market. However, the new government’s 
deflationary policies ran into the world recession and the high value of the pound, 
producing adverse effects which brought about a serious depression of British 
economic activities; in particular increased bankruptcies of companies and a high 
rate of unemployment (George, 1998). The depression of British economic 
activity saw low government popularity in the opinion polls. The Thatcher 
government faced serious problems in implementing its policy of reducing public 
expenditures, which aimed to reduce the intervention of the government in accord 
with market liberalism in its economic programmes. The government decided to 
gradually reduce public expenditure and simultaneously started to reduce its 
expenditure in every possible area. This domestic political situation forced the 
Thatcher government to concentrate on its contribution to the EC budget 
(Heffernan, 2000: 29; George, 1998: 145). 
When the government examined the issue of the British contribution to the 
Community’s budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe was 
‘shocked’ by the size of Britain’s contribution, which was far greater than he had 
expected (George, 1998: 137). Margaret Thatcher argued that, while the British 
public shared the financial burden in the form of reduction of public spending, the 
size of the British financial contribution to the Community expenditure 
programmes was an unacceptable waste of British taxpayers’ money. The UK 
would concentrate on solving the problem through the settlement of the rebate 
system and an increase in the size of the UK’s rebate (Thatcher, 1993: 79, 81). 
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The Thatcher government, thus, put the problem of the British financial 
contribution at the top of its European agenda and engaged in negotiation for the 
next five years (Thatcher, 1993: 79, 81; Lindner, 2006: 120). 
 
 
   Table 3.5 UK contribution to and receipts from the EC budget, 1981-84 
 
                                              Million ECUs                               £ million 
                                  -----------------------------------------------------------         ---------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    1981     1982      1983    1984              1981       1982        1983      1984  
Harmonized VAT Bases 
EEC 1,152,602 1,291,259 1,372,710 N/A     
UK 194,180 298,386 292,560 N/A     
Community VAT Rate (%) .8667 .9248 .9980 N/A     
GROSS CONTRIBUTION 
Agricultural and sugar levies 395.5 548.3 394.9 491.6 218.2 307.3 231.7 284.2 
Customs duties 1,550.9 1,784.5 1,832.5 1,920.0 860.5 1,001.0 1,075.1 1,109.8 
VAT 1,930.8 2,782.7 2,844.6 2,918.5 1,095.2 1,554.4 1,668.9 1,687.0 
TOTAL 3,877.2 5,115.5 5,072.0 5,330.1 2,173.9 2,862.7 2,975.7 3,081.0 
RECEIPTS 
Own resources refund 190.2 236.3 221.2 241.0 113.5 133.7 129.5 139.3 
EMS interest rate subsidies 
compensation 
39.3 48.2 36.6 - 21.2 32.5 21.5 - 
UK refunds 1,248.4 1,819.2 1,399.6 991.0 693.0 1,019.4 807.2 572.8 
Other receipts 1,716.9 1,913.4 2,270.7 2,855.0 948.8 1,071.9 1,332.2 1,650.3 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 3,194.8 4,017.1 3,928.1 4,087.0 1,776.5 2,257.5 2,290.4 2,362.4 
NET CONTRIBUTION -682.4 -1,098.4 -1,143.9 -1,243.1 -397.4 -605.2 -685.3 -718.6 
<Source: House of Common ‘Seventh Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 1983-
84’ (9 July 1984) (London: HMSO)> 
 
 
6.2. The ‘May Mandate’ 
At her first summit in Strasbourg in June 1979, Mrs Thatcher brought Britain’s 
financial problem to the negotiating table. Following a brief discussion, an 
agreement was achieved to further discuss it at the European Council in Dublin in 
November 1979, on the basis of a report that the European Commission would 
prepare by September 1979 which would be first scrutinised by the Finance 
Ministers of the EC member states (George, 1998; Lindner, 2006). The 
Commission proposed to revise the 1975 rebate mechanism in order to increase 
the British cash rebate to the level of £ 350 million and to increase the share of EC 
expenditure to Britain by means of regional aid (Vandan Abeele, 1982).46 The 
                                           
46 Regional aid proposed to reduce regional disparities between the member states in the 
European Community and was established by the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. In the two Paris 
summits of 1972 and 1974, the member states agreed to establish the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). In 1975-1978, the EC member states set out national quotas for the 
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Thatcher government welcomed this general approach, but was not satisfied with 
the size of the cash rebate. In fact, they demanded a cash rebate of £ 1 billion and 
that a permanent solution to Britain’s budgetary problem be found. These requests 
met with strong opposition from France, who’s President, Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, argued that the UK’s rebate should not exceed £ 350 million (Jenkin, 
1980: 497). Mrs Thatcher’s response was clear: ‘We want our money back’ 
(Thatcher, 1993: 79). The other heads of state and government regarded Mrs 
Thatcher’s statement as a direct attack upon the own-resource system. The conflict 
between the UK and the other member states resulted in deadlock. At the 
Luxembourg European Council in April 1980, the European Commission 
proposed various formulas for calculating Britain’s rebate, but none of them could 
satisfy Britain’s demand for £ 1 billion. The negotiations at the Luxembourg 
European Council, inevitably, failed again (Lindner, 2006; George, 1998). 
Although it was proving to be difficult to achieve agreement between the 
EC member states, the Thatcher government got a chance to overcome the 
deadlock at the Agricultural Council in May 1980. At the meeting, national 
Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Agriculture discussed the Commission’s 
proposal for the prices of agricultural products for 1980-1981. In the proposal, the 
prices were lower than what some member states demanded,47 which in fact 
asked for Britain’s support to set prices48 at a higher level than what the European 
Commission had proposed (Butler, 1986). The Thatcher government initially 
opposed the increase of agricultural prices: firstly, the Thatcher government’s 
ideology of market liberalisation opposed agricultural protectionism, which meant 
that the EC would intervene in agricultural prices to protect farmers’ incomes; 
secondly, the increase in prices would probably lead to an increase of Britain’s 
                                                                                                                   
allocation of the ERDF. The Commission’s proposal in 1979 indicated the increase of British 
national quotas in the allocation of the ERDF. See Allen (2005) and Conzelmann (2006). 
47 France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands were beneficiaries from the 
CAP and supported high prices for agricultural products in 1980. See Fouilleux (2007).  
48 In the decision-making over agricultural prices in 1980, EC member states could use 
Qualified Majority Voting in order to decide the price if member states satisfied the price 
recommendations of the Commission. However, member states desired higher prices than the 
Commission’s proposal. The decision over prices required a unanimous decision. See Lindner 
(2006).  
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financial contributions to the EC budget (Butler, 1986). 
The Thatcher government held that its consent on the increase of 
agricultural prices and the other member states consent on the increase of the 
UK’s rebate were connected. This was meant to coerce Britain’s partners at the 
negotiation table to make concessions for the increase of the UK’s rebate (Lindner, 
2006: 121). When faced with these threats from Britain, the other member states 
were divided. In particular, France was concerned about strong domestic pressure 
from the national farmers’ union, which demanded a significant increase in 
agricultural products’ prices in order to relieve farmers’ struggling with the high 
rate of inflation (Jenkins, 1980). The Thatcher government insisted that Britain 
would not agree a decision on the CAP until the UK’s financial problem was 
solved by a concession from its negotiating partners. Eventually, the EC member 
states reached agreement on a formula for the reduction of the UK’s contribution 
in 1980 and 1981 on 30 May 1980, also known as the ‘May Mandate’. Although 
the size of the rebate was less than the £ 1 billion which had been the initial 
demand from the Thatcher government, the UK obtained about £ 0.6 billion and 
£ 0.7 billion in 1980 and 1981 respectively under ad hoc shadow spending 
programmes. The EC member states, however, did not come to an agreement on a 
permanent solution to Britain’s financial problem (Jenkins, 1980; Lindner, 2006). 
 
6.3. An attempt to reach settlement of the UK’s rebate mechanism 
In June 1981 the European Commission presented a report on how to revitalise 
the Community, suggesting the development of new policies: economic, monetary, 
energy, industrial, research, regional, and social policies. It suggested the 
establishment of a new corrective financial mechanism to solve the UK’s financial 
problem. In a more detailed plan presented to the Council in October 1981, the 
European Commission proposed a limit on CAP spending (by reducing 
subsidising agricultural prices for 1982-1983), and a corrective financial 
mechanism for solving the UK’s problem. The proposal sparked off; once again, a 
disagreement between the UK and the other member states (Vanden Abeele, 1982). 
At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in January 1982, France and Italy 
strongly opposed the changes to the CAP, whereas the other member states agreed 
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with the Commission’s view. In particular, the UK saw the reform of the CAP as a 
possible solution to reduce the UK’s imbalance between contributions and receipts, 
but also argued that for the overall development of the EC it was essential to 
reduce CAP spending (Taylor, 1983). Regarding the settlement of the rebate 
mechanism for solving the UK’s financial problem, a number of the member 
states, most notably France, continued to argue that the UK itself bore 
responsibility for its financial problem (Vanden Abeele, 1982). The overall 
position of the EC member states (except the UK, of course) was that the 
Commission’s proposal for the new direction of EC spending policies would 
significantly benefit the UK rather than all member states, and for this reason they 
were unwilling to accept the Commission’s proposal. The Thatcher government, 
thus, tried to make a linkage between the settlement of the rebate mechanism and 
the reform of the CAP to achieve reduction of the agricultural price subsidy in 
1982-1983 in order to overcome the other member states’ resistance to the 
Commission’s proposal, as the Conservative government had done in the 1980 
negotiation (Neville-Rolfe, 1984; Lindner, 2006).  
This time the EC member states did not accept Britain’s linkage. Actually, 
they expected that the UK’s would ask their support to impose a trade ban against 
Argentina, with whom they had started a war over the Falkland Islands.49 They 
had planned to use Britain’s demand to exchange for Britain’s agreement on 
agriculture prices for 1982-1983 (George, 1998; Taylor, 1983). However, 
unexpectedly Britain did not ask for the EC’s help. In May 1982, the UK 
agricultural minister continued to block agreement on agriculture prices in order 
to draw a concession from other member states on the settlement of the rebate 
mechanism. On 18 May 1982, in the Council of Agricultural Ministers, the 
Belgian presidency, instead of keeping to the tradition of consensual decision-
making, called for a majority vote on the decision of the price levels in order to 
                                           
49  On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, which are located 
approximately 250 miles from the coast of Argentina, and represented a small remnant of the 
British Empire. In order to divert public attention from the deteriorating domestic economic and 
political situation and shift it to foreign affairs the UK decided to send an expeditionary force to 
the area in order to retake the island. The Argentine military forces finally surrendered on 14 June 
1982. See George (1998) and Taylor (1983). 
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overcome Britain’s block (Lindner, 2006). 
The British government argued that the presidency decision to call a 
majority vote disregarded the principle of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’.50 Only 
two member states, Denmark and Greece (which meanwhile had become member 
of the EC), sided with the Thatcher government and argued that member states 
should be able to use the Luxembourg compromise to preserve their national 
interests. However, the other member states agreed with the Belgian presidency’s 
decision, and voted against the UK. In particular, France insisted that the 
Luxembourg compromise was meant to protect member states when their vital 
national interests were threatened, but since Britain’s vital interests were not 
involved in the setting of agricultural prices, there was no reason to apply the 
Luxembourg compromise (Lindner, 2006). 
The attempt made by the Thatcher government to link the settlement of the 
rebate system for solving Britain’s financial problem and Britain’s agreement on 
the increase of agricultural price subsidies in 1982-1983 had been successful in 
1980 but this time failed. This was because the Thatcher government had 
underestimated the other member states’ position, and in this case they wanted to 
avoid an increase of their financial burden (Butler, 1986; Taylor, 1983). A week 
later, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the member states agreed to give the UK 
£ 500 million for 1982, but that amount was still lower than the £ 1 billion the UK 
had hoped for (Lindner, 2006). Thatcher seemed inclined to reject the compromise, 
but the Foreign Secretary, Peter Carrington urged her to accept it. The Labour 
party publicly blamed the government for its inability to find a solution, and even 
urged it to act tougher in the EC (Gowland et al., 2010). 
 
6.4. A successful negotiation on the settlement of the UK’s rebate mechanism 
In June 1983, the Thatcher government had another chance to take the settlement 
                                           
50 In 1966, under the Luxembourg Council presidency, the founder six member states 
agreed the Luxembourg compromise. The Luxembourg compromise mandated that, under QMV 
decision-making, if any member states argued that a decision would threaten their ‘vital national 
interests’, the Council would postpone a decision. The EC member states would not be  able to 
take a decision unless the member states reached a unanimous agreement. See Peterson and 
Bomberg (1999). 
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of the UK’s rebate mechanism to the EC negotiation table. At the European 
Council in Stuttgart on 19 June 1983, heads of government and state discussed the 
new direction of the European Community in response to the return to the Cold 
War in international affairs set in motion by the Reagan Administration.51 This 
raised concerns among the member states about the EC’s foreign and defence 
policies and the EC’s relations with the Soviet block, particularly the EC’s export 
in high-technology goods and the dependence on Russian gas by several EC 
countries (George, 1998).52 At the Stuttgart European Council, the heads of 
government and state planned to ‘re-launch’ the Community and to tackle the 
problems that had prevented further European integration. The heads of 
government and state planned to engage in ‘major negotiations’ over the following 
six-month period to deal with all those issues, and committed their ministers to 
present the outcomes of the negotiations to the European Council in Athens in 
December 1983 (COM, 1984: 7-8; George, 1998; Lindner, 2006). 
The EC’s budgetary reform was certainly one of the most important issues 
in these negotiations. This was because, by 1983, the member states recognised 
that the Community budget was almost exhausted by the CAP and that there was a 
need to increase the EC’s budget to ensure adequate funding for other policy areas 
and prepare for Spain and Portugal’s accession in 1986. To increase the budget, 
the Community needed to reform the own resources system, particularly raising 
the ceiling percentage rate of VAT, and for this the agreement of all member states 
was required. At the Stuttgart summit, the Thatcher government had argued that 
the UK was not prepared to accept any change of the own revenues system unless 
member states agreed the settlement of the rebate system (Howe, 1994). Under the 
Germany presidency, member states decided to include the financial reforms with 
other important issues in a major negotiation round. The financial reform 
                                           
51 The Reagan Administration in the United States which took office in January 1981 
triggered a competition with the Soviet Union over a massive increase in armaments. The 
competition cooled down relations with the Soviet Union and signalled a return to the rhetoric of 
the Cold War. 
52 In response to the change in international circumstances, the member states adopted a 
‘Solemn Declaration’ which proposed political and economic unification of Europe in order to 
speak with a single voice on economic matters in international affairs (Bache and George, 2006). 
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consisted of the settlement of the rebate system, preparations for the enlargement 
in 1986, and a reform of the CAP. Due to Britain’s threats, a solution of the British 
budgetary problem was central to the reform of EC finances (George, 1998; 
Lindner, 2006). 
The EC Finance ministers were not able to achieve a compromise on the 
reform of the EC budget; hence, the issue was handed over to the European 
Council in Athens in December 1983. In that context, Thatcher spelt out the 
British position: 
 
 
When we in the United Kingdom look at the problem, we ask 
ourselves what would be a fair net contribution for a country in the 
position of the UK, still below average in relative prosperity now and 
only just above it in a community of twelve. I have the impression that 
many of your governments are briefing you to look at it in terms of 
what it will allegedly cost you to reduce the burden on us; that is to 
say, in seven cases, how much your net benefits will fall. Since we are 
trying to devise a fair system for the longer term, we have to look at 
the likely outcome for all member states, ensuring that the least 
prosperous receive appropriate benefits and that those who will bear 
the burden of net contributions do so in relation to their ability to pay 
… I made it clear at Stuttgart that I could only concede an increase in 
the Community’s own resources if arrangements were agreed for a fair 
sharing of the budgetary burden and for effective control of 
agricultural and other expenditure. (Wall, 2008: 29). 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, no agreement was achieved at the Athens European Council. 
President Mitterrand opposed the reform of the CAP in order to secure subsidies 
for his nation’s farmers, who played an important role in French politics. He also 
rejected an agreement of the UK’s rebate settlement because any reduction of the 
British contribution would mean an increase in the other member states’ 
contributions. Mitterrand, thus, suggested an ad hoc payment rather than making a 
permanent agreement, but this proposal was not accepted by the UK. The heads of 
government and state decided to postpone the negotiation to the Brussels 
European Council on 19-20 March 1984. This decision was meant to put pressure 
on the French government to make concessions when France held the presidency 
of the Council of Ministers in the first half of 1984 (Ardy, 1988; George, 1998).  
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The French presidency valued its reputation as a leader in Europe, and 
announced that it would endeavour to reach an agreement on financial reform. At 
the March 1984 European Council, the member states agreed the reform of the 
CAP through the reduction of milk production and subsidies on exports of 
agricultural products (George, 1998).53 Furthermore, the member states reached 
an agreement on the increase of VAT which would rise from a ceiling of 1.4 per 
cent in 1984 to 1.6 per cent in 1986 (COM 1985: 12). Due to the link between the 
settlement of the rebate system and the reform of the EC budget, although 
member states agreed the reduction of the CAP and the increase of VAT, these 
agreements were not valid until settlement had been reached (George 1998: 154). 
Regarding settlement of the rebate system, there was a dispute between 
the UK and the other member states on how to calculate the British contribution to 
the budget. The Thatcher government argued that it should be calculated 
considering all its payments to the EC budget under the own resources system: 
VAT, tariffs, and agricultural levies. This was confronted with opposition from the 
other member states, which argued that tariffs and agricultural levies were not part 
of national contributions and asked that only VAT payment be used to calculate 
the size of the UK’s rebate (George, 1998). In order to solve the conflict, the 
French presidency devised a formula which would calculate the rebate as a 
difference between the UK’s VAT contribution and receipts. According to these 
calculations, in 1984, the UK’s rebate would be approximately £ 600 million 
(Ardy, 1988). Chancellor Kohl of West Germany proposed to amend the 
presidency proposal and suggested a flat-rate of £600 million in each of the 
following three years: 1984, 1985, and 1986. The West German proposal was 
rejected by the Thatcher government and agreement was blocked again (Denton, 
1982).  
Three months later, at the Fontainebleau European Council on 25-26 June 
1984, the Thatcher government agreed on a calculation which would only 
consider the UK’s VAT contribution in order to secure the other member states’ 
                                           
53 The Irish government opposed curbing Irish dairy products which accounted for 9 per 
cent of its GNP. The Irish government threatened to veto the proposal, and obtained an exemption 
on reducing milk production. 
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concession on an automatic and permanent formula for the rebate system. Thus, it 
agreed the UK’s rebate mechanism which amounted to about £ 600 million for 
1984 and then, from 1985, 66 per cent of the difference between its VAT 
contribution and receipts from the budget (Denton, 1984; George, 1998; Laffan, 
1997; Lindner, 2006). 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The UK’s traditional conception of its special relationship with the US and the 
Commonwealth countries affected the British government’s progress regarding 
European integration in the 1950s. The special relationship led the UK to think 
about its leadership in the world rather than European integration. In the 1960s 
when the British government realized it’s economic interests in the EC as well as 
the weakening of it’s special relationship, they attempted to apply for membership 
but were stymied by de Gaulle’s veto. At The Hague summit, the six founder 
member states agreed on the own resources system, which required a high British 
contribution under the own resources system as a cost of membership. The 
negotiations of the British membership in 1970-1971 could be defined as partially 
successful. Despite not being able to solve its imbalance regarding the EC budget, 
Britain had become a member of the EC after failing on her previous two attempts. 
On the British contribution side, Britain paid too much for its contribution, whilst 
it had few benefits from Community expenditure. The British imbalance in the 
outcome of the negotiations in 1970-1971 brought about a political conflict in 
budgetary decision-making in the European Community. 
This chapter has analysed the attempt that the various UK governments have 
made between 1974 and 1984 to address the problem caused by its high 
contribution to the EC budget. The Labour governments headed by Wilson and 
Callaghan and the Conservative government headed by Thatcher used different 
approaches in line with their party stance on European integration and more 
generally on economic and social policies, but they all shared the view that the 
UK had been significantly penalized by the accession agreement and that a way to 
correct this situation needed to be found. This question generated a number of 
 78 
political conflicts between the UK and the other member states, which resisted 
any cut in the size of the UK’s financial contribution in order to prevent an 
increase in their contribution. To secure its preferences, the UK governments used 
several tactics in the negotiations, linking various issues and the same time 
threatening to veto any progress in European integration and even to withdraw 
from the EC. This strategy worked and led the other member states first to accept 
the introduction of a ‘corrective mechanism’ at the Dublin summit in 1975, and 
then to the introduction of the UK’s rebate system at the Fontainebleau European 
Council in June 1984. 
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Chapter 4 
Defending the rebate: the UK’s successful 
resistance in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the British rebate negotiations specifically across the 1980s 
and 1990s during which time Britain succeeded in retaining its rebate. During this 
period, there were three financial negotiations: in 1988, for the financial 
perspective for 1988-1993; in 1992 for the financial perspective for 1993-1999, 
and in 1999 negotiation for the financial perspective for 2000-2006. In 1988, the 
institutions of the EC established an Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) which 
proposed a multi-annual budget plan. The IIA affected the shaping of the 
Commission’s financial proposal style which started to be characterised by a 
political linkage between European integration projects and the multi-annual 
budget plan in order to financially support projects.  
This chapter analyses each of these three negotiation rounds, with the view 
to discuss how the UK managed to defend its rebate. For each negotiation, there 
are three sub-sections, with an analysis of the Commission’s proposal, the 
domestic debate in the UK about the proposal, and the British behaviour at the EU 
negotiating table. In the Commission’s financial proposal for 1988-1993, named 
the Delors I package, the Commission, under Delors’ presidency, proposed a 
political linkage between ‘deepening’ (the Single European Market and the Single 
European Act) and ‘widening’ (the enlargement of Mediterranean countries), and 
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the financial proposal. The Delors II package proposed a political linkage between 
the EMU in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the financial proposal for 
1993-1999. The Agenda 2000 package consisted of two projects: preparing the 
enlargement of the Central and Eastern European Countries, and the financial 
perspective for 2000-2006. In the political package, net contributors not only 
focused on minimising their contribution but also concentrated on achieving the 
financial agreement for the implement of the integration projects while net 
beneficiaries converged on maximising their financial benefits in the negotiation 
table. The negotiation styles pressured Britain to accept the reduction of its rebate. 
    
 
2. The financial perspective negotiations for 1988-1993 
This section explores the UK’s negotiation on the 1988-1993 financial perspective 
against two types of threats. First, the initial proposal of the European 
Commission, linking the Single European Market (SEM) and the Single European 
Act (SEA), and the financial perspectives, threatened the UK’s budget rebate. 
Second, in the negotiations member states pressured each other in order to secure 
their desired financial benefits. In spite of these difficult circumstances, the UK 
managed to retain its rebate.  
  
2.1. Analysis of the Commission’s proposal  
The accession of three Mediterranean countries (Greece in 1981, and Portugal and 
Spain in 1986), which brought about wide economic disparities within the EC, 
risked jeopardising the achievement of the SEM. To reduce these economic 
disparities, not only was an economic and social policy introduced in the SEA, but 
the European Commission proposed the Delors I financial package on 18 
February 1987. The Delors I package was the first multi-annual financial proposal 
in the EC. 
 
2.1.1. Deepening of the Community: the SEM and the SEA 
In the early 1980s, the European Community experienced an economic crisis 
because of the second oil crisis in 1979, and large trade deficits which derived 
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from the poor competitiveness of European firms in the international market in 
comparison with their trade partners in the US and Japan (Pelkmans and Winters, 
1988). While economic difficulties were being experienced in several countries, 
particularly the UK, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, political parties 
which advocated the idea of the neo-liberal economy came to power and proposed 
devising a collective response at EC level to the economic crisis.54 The other 
governments also started to seek a European solution to the economic recession. 
Member states’ economic ideas converged to revitalise the single market 
programme (Young, 2005). 
The project of revitalising the single market inherited ideas found in the 
Rome Treaties of 1957, which stood on the basis of the Spaak Report.55 Article 2 
of the Treaty in the EEC stipulated establishing a common market (single market) 
which consisted of four elements: removing national tariffs, creating a ‘custom 
union’, completing free movement, and adopting single legislation at the 
European level (Young, 2005). Removing national tariffs between member states 
aimed to establish a free trade area in the Community. The creation of a customs 
union proposed the erection of a Common External Tariff (CET) on member 
states’ trade with non-EC countries in order to prevent member states from 
gaining a competitive advantage and distorting fair competitiveness in the internal 
market. Free movement was intended to promote the ‘four freedoms’: goods, 
labour, services, and capital. The aim behind the creation of single legislation was 
to regulate internal trade liberalisation through the harmonisation of national laws 
(Young, 2005; Egan, 2007).  
Lack of progress in the creation of a single market in the 1970s and 1980s 
was hindered by the member states, which in order to secure their domestic 
interests frequently protected the status quo. The solution, therefore, seemed that 
                                           
54  Neo-liberal economic ideas advocate a liberalisation of the market from state 
intervention to bring about economic growth. Such ideas support removing national regulations or 
rules, and the privatisation of state-owned industries in economic policies (Young, 2005). 
55 The Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak presented a blueprint for the SEM which 
consisted of three main elements: the elimination of national protective barriers in order to 
establish normal standards of competition in Western Europe; the elimination of state intervention 
and the curtailing of monopolistic conditions; and the harmonization of legislation at the European 
level (Egan, 2007). 
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of accelerating the pace of harmonisation (Dashwood, 1977; Armstrong and 
Bulmer, 1998; Egan, 2007). The European Commission proposed a new approach, 
advancing the idea of ‘standards harmonisation’ as an essential requirement for 
completing the common market (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). By early 1985, 
the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors and Internal Market 
Commissioner Lord Cockfield, presented a White paper entitled Completing the 
Internal Market which proposed a number of legislative measures to be adopted 
by December 1992 (COM, 1985).56 
 At the Milan European Council in June 1985, member states agreed the 
‘1992 programme’ which proposed completion of the SEM by 1992 and 282 
legislative measures on harmonisation (Egan, 2007; Young, 2005). Furthermore, 
member states recognised that the ‘1992 programme’ would have little chance to 
be implemented unless there was a significant reform of the decision-making 
procedures that addressed the issue of unanimity (Nugent, 2006: 80). At the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)57 convened in Luxembourg in December 
1985, member states adopted the Dooge report 58 and agreed on the Single 
European Act (SEA), with the view ensure completion of the SEM by 1992 
(Nugent, 2010). 
 The SEA not only strengthened the institutional system,  but also 
introduced new policies, particularly ‘economic and social cohesion’.59 Member 
                                           
56 Initially, Internal Market Commissioner Lord Cockfield proposed 300 measures on 
harmonisation in the White paper, but then member states reduced the number of measures to 282 
at the Milan European Council. See Egan (2007). 
57 An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), composed of representatives of the member 
states, the Commission, and the European Parliament, is convened to revise and amend the treaties 
in the European Community. The key actors are representative of the member states, and an 
agreement for treaty changes requires a unanimous decision. 
58 At Fontainebleau in June 1984, member states agreed an establishment of an ad hoc 
committee, under a Commissioner James Dooge, which conducted institutional reform, 
particularly expanding Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers and increasing the 
power of the European Parliament in EC decision-making (McNamara, 2005; Young, 2005). 
59 The SEA provided the following institutional reforms: the extension of QMV on internal 
market decisions; a ‘cooperation procedure’; a new ‘assent procedure’; enhancing the role of the 
Court of Justice. In particular, the SEA enhanced the decision-making capacity of the Council of 
Ministers through altering the decision-making rule from unanimity to QMV in order to prevent 
member states’ veto power from effectively achieving single legislation, and the power of the 
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states expected that the completion of the SEM would create new competitive 
threats to peripheral economic regions and member states in the internal market. 
For this, they enacted article 130s which emphasised economic and social 
cohesion.60 The reduction of economic disparities would not only strengthen 
economic and social cohesion within the Community but would also promote 
economic convergence. In the completion of the SEM, if the Community 
concentrated on the reduction of economic disparities, poorer member states 
would more rapidly develop their economies and contribute towards the 
strengthening and expansion of the SEM (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998). 
 
2.1.2. Widening of the Community: The enlargement of Mediterranean 
countries 
The enlargement involving first Greece (1981) and then Portugal and Spain 
(1986) overrode economic considerations. Greece applied for membership in 1961, 
but due to the underdeveloped nature of its economy, a transitional period was 
necessary before accession. But following a military coup (April 1967), the 
Community suspended its decision on the Greek membership. Once democracy 
was established (June 1974), the new Greek government re-applied for 
membership in November 1974, arguing that being part of the EC would help 
consolidation of democratic practises. While the Commission argued that Greece 
was not economically prepared and proposed an unlimited pre-accession period 
until Greece undertook economic reforms, member states rejected the 
Commission’s proposal. In July 1976, negotiations restarted and in 1981 Greece 
became the 10th member state of the EC (Nugent, 2006; Barnes and Barnes, 
2007). 
                                                                                                                   
European Parliament by introducing the ‘cooperation procedure’ and the ‘assent procedure’ in the 
legislative decision-making procedure. The SEA introduced a number of new policy areas: 
environment, research and technological development, ‘economic and social cohesion’, and 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998). 
60 Allen (2005:214) defines ‘cohesion’ as the removal of various disparities within the 
Community. Initially, the major focus in the idea of cohesion was the reduction of economic and 
social disparities between member states. After the Constitutional Treaty in October 2004, 
‘cohesion’ refers to the reduction of economic and social disparities, and solidarity amongst 
member states. 
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Spain and Portugal made a first attempt for membership in 1962, but this 
was blocked due to these member states’ authoritarian dictatorships until the mid-
1970s and their underdeveloped economies. After overthrowing their dictatorships, 
Portugal and Spain applied for full membership of the EC in March 1977 and July 
1977 respectively. Although the two Mediterranean countries’ economies were not 
high enough to enter the EC, the Community agreed both countries’ membership. 
The two countries became members of the EC in 1986 (Nugent, 2006; Barnes and 
Barnes, 2007).  
Clearly, on the Mediterranean enlargement political considerations prevailed, 
as Greece, Portugal, and Spain entered the EC despite their underdeveloped 
economic condition (see Table 4.1). The enlargement brought about wide 
economic disparities between member states which not only became the cause of 
the Community’s focus on reducing economic disparities within the Community 
and introducing ‘economic and social cohesion’ but also increased other member 
states’ financial burden which derived from the new member countries’ demands 
on the EC’s redistributive policies and obtaining financial benefits (Bache and 
George, 2006: 543).  
 
Table 4.1  Impact of the enlargement, 1973-1986  
 
Enlargement New members Additional 
population (%) 
Added 
GDP (%) 
GDP per capita of new 
members (% of existing) 
1973 Denmark, 
Ireland, UK 
33.4 31.9 95.5  
1981 Greece 3.7 1.8 48.4 
1986 Portugal, 
Spain 
17.8 11.0 n.a. 
<Source: Barnes and Barnes (2007)>  
 
 
2.1.3. Establishment of the financial perspective 
In the mid-1980s the European Community went through a serious budgetary 
crisis, mainly for three reasons. First of all, even though the Community had 
diversified and increased its expenditure on more policy areas, expenditures on 
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the CAP was still very high, accounting for over 70 per cent of total EC budgetary 
expenditures. Secondly, budgetary resources (i.e. common customs tariff duties, 
agricultural levies, and a limited percentage of VAT) were not enough to fulfil the 
Community’s financial obligations. Thirdly, following the decision on the British 
rebate at the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council, member states agreed to 
increase the percentage of VAT from 1 per cent ceiling to a 1.4 per cent ceiling. 
This decision, which came into effect from 1986, was too little and too late to 
stave off exhausting the Community budget in 1987 (Nugent, 2006). 
The European Commission, under the Delors leadership, focused on seeking 
a solution, paying particular attention to how to fund the ‘economic and social 
dimension’ of the SEA. For this, it proposed an interinstitutional framework 
‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the 
Budgetary Procedure’, which consisted of the financial perspective and an 
Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA). The financial perspective proposed a multi-
annual budget plan for 5-7 years, which imposed the balance between revenue and 
expenditure in order to avoid the EC budget falling short, and a financial plan, 
which pre-allocated the budget into different headings of EC expenditure policies 
in order to constrain CAP expenditure (Lindner, 2006; Laffan, 1997).  
The IIA was intended to solve the persistent struggle between the ‘twin 
arms’ of the budgetary authority, the Council and the Parliament, in order to 
prevent a delay in the annual budgetary decision. The EC had experienced delays 
in agreeing the annual budget in 1980 and 1985 when the European Parliament 
blocked annual financial agreements to strengthen its power in budgetary 
decision-making.61 The IIA, therefore, represented strengthening the role of the 
European Parliament in non-compulsory expenditure in the Community budget. 
The Council conceded the increase of the EP’s power to avoid any tension which 
                                           
61 The European Parliament blocked actions on annual budgetary decision-making in 1980 
and 1985 with the view to increasing its role in budgetary decision-making.  In 1980, after its 
first direct election in 1979, the EP exercised its power of rejection in decision-making, which was 
granted by the 1975 Budget Treaty, as a test of its role against the Council’s. In 1985, the EP 
inserted several amendments on the compulsory items, in particular agricultural expenditure, 
which ignored the Treaty. The Council removed the amendments, but the EP reinstated the 
amendments and declared the budget passed. The Council took the EP to the European Court of 
Justice (Lindner, 2006). 
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could have blocked an agreement of the Delors I package on time as the EP did 
(Laffan, 1997; Laffan and Lindner, 2005; Bache and George, 2006). 
 
2.1.4. The Commission’s financial proposal 
In its proposal for the 1988-1992 financial perspective (see Table 4.2), the 
European Commission packaged together the reform of the UK’s rebate, the 
increase of regional aid, the reform of the own resources system, and the reform 
of the CAP. With regard to ‘economic and social cohesion’ and the enlargement of 
the Mediterranean countries, the Commission proposed an increase of regional aid 
from 16 per cent of the Community budget to about 25 per cent. To support this 
increase, the Commission decided to combine two methods: diverting the EC 
budget away from existing beneficiaries and increasing the size of the budget 
(COM, 1987a; COM, 1987b; Financial Times, 5 February 1987; Laffan and 
Shakleton, 2000; Bache and George, 2006). 
On the one hand, the Commission, which believed that the UK’s rebate was 
one reason behind the deficit of the Community budget in 1987, proposed to cut it 
down by about 50 per cent (Boyle, 2006: 147; Ross, 1995: 260). It also proposed 
reducing CAP expenditure from 75 per cent to 50 per cent of the Community 
budget (Financial Times, 5 February 1987; Boyle, 2006), arguing that a reform of 
the CAP would not only rescue the EC budget, but also help reduce the UK’s 
rebate by eliminating one of the sources of disequilibria in the EC (COM, 1987a: 
34). On the other hand, the Commission proposed the reform of the own resources 
system by creating an additional resource of the GDP which took into account 
member states’ capacity to make payment into the budget. The Commission 
proposed the 1.4 per cent of the GDP and the reduction of the VAT rate from 1.4 
to 1.25 per cent (COM, 1987a: 24; Financial Times, 5 February 1987). 
 
 
Table 4.2 Financial perspective 1988-1992 (in EUR million-1988 prices) 
 
 1988 1989 1900 1991 1992 
Appropriations for commitment: 
1. EAGG GUARANTEE SECTION 
27500 27700 28400 29000 29600 
2. STRUTURAL FUNDS 7790 9200 10600 12100 13450 
3. POLICIES WITH 
MULTIANNUAL ALLOCATIONS 
1210 1650 1900 2150 2400 
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4. OTHER POLICIES 2103 2385 2500 2700 2800 
of which: non-compulsory 
expenditure 
1646 1801 1860 1910 1970 
5. REPAYMENTS AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
5700 4650 4500 4000 3550 
of which stock disposal 1240 1400 1400 1400 1400 
6. MONETARY RESERVE 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
TOTAL of appropriations for 
commitments 
45303 46885 48900 50950 52800 
TOTAL of appropriations for 
payments 
43779 45300 46900 48600 50100 
Appropriations for payments as % 
GNP 
1.12 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 
Margin 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Own-resources ceiling(% of GNP) 1.15 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 
<Source: Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and Parliament: on the financing of the 
Community budget’ COM(87) 101 final> 
 
 
 
2.2. The UK’s attitudes to the Delors I package 
On the Delors I package, the UK had mixed reactions. It broadly supported the 
SEM, manifested some concerns on the SEA, and opposed the increase of 
regional aid. Its main priority, however, remained that of maintaining its rebate.  
 
2.2.1. European projects: the SEM and the SEA 
When the Conservative party took power in 1979, the UK was facing major 
economic problems.62 Going against the Labour government’s economic policies 
(1974-79) which had been based on Keynesianism and which stressed the role of 
government and public sector in economic policies (Evans, 1997), the Thatcher 
government took a new approach to deal with Britain’s economic problems. The 
new approach combined neo-liberalism, by stressing the central role of the market 
in economic policy, and neo-conservatism, by emphasising the concept of national 
sovereignty. In economics, the new approach proposed privatisation, low levels of 
taxation, and the reduction of the trade unions’ power in order to restructure the 
British economy and improve the UK’s economic performance (Gamble, 1993; 
Norton, 1990; Geddes, 2004; Heffernan, 2000; Baker, Gamble, and Seawright, 
                                           
62 During the Labour governments under Wilson and Callaghan, Britain’s economic 
growth was slower than that of other EC member states. The UK’s annual rate of GDP was 2.79 
per cent while the average of EC member states was 4.63 per cent. Furthermore, Britain applied to 
the IMF for a loan in December 1976. See Evans (1997) and Harmon (1997). 
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2002; Evans, 1997; Sowemimo, 1996).   
In 1980, Michael Foot challenged Mr James Callaghan’s leadership of the 
Labour party and became the leader.63 The Foot leadership brought about the left 
wing’s dominance on European issues in the Labour party. The left wing, under 
Foot’s leadership, adopted the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) in order to 
shape the Labour party’s European policies. The AES emphasised the role of the 
UK government in domestic economic policies, notably controlling imports, 
public ownership and the government’s planning which opposed the Conservative 
government’s market-based approach to economic policies. The Labour party 
criticised the Conservative government’s economic ideas for creation of a single 
market as part of European integration, and argued that the single market formed 
part of capitalist objectives which would restrict the government’s capacity to plan 
and to manage its own economy. The Labour party argued for withdrawal of the 
UK’s membership as it obstructed the Labour party’s economic policy objectives 
(Seyd, 1987; Forster, 2002).  
During the 1983 general election campaign, the Conservative party’s 
manifesto clearly stressed that their free market approach would reduce 
government intervention in order to boost competition in the domestic market. 
Their manifesto plan was accused by the Labour party of ignoring the public 
standard of living, but a sound victory in the June 1983 election confirmed that 
people liked this free market approach by Thatcher (Evans, 1997; George, 
1998).64 
In its second term, the Thatcher government not only accelerated its 
domestic economic policies, particularly privatisation, openness, and deregulation, 
but also attempted a transposition of its free-market approach into the EC with the 
view to solving the large trade deficits with the US and Japan and addressing the 
                                           
63 In the election of the Labour party leadership, three candidates – Michael Foot, Peter 
Shore, and John Silkin – challenged Callaghan’s approach to the EC and totally opposed the UK’s 
membership. Denis Healey took a less sceptical approach compared to the other three candidates. 
See Forster (2002). 
64 On 9 June 1983, the Conservative party won 397 seats in the Parliament while Labour 
obtained 209 seats. The Conservative party had won 68 seats more than at the 1979 general 
election (George, 1998). 
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economic recession in Europe (George, 1998). The government proposed a 
revitalisation of the single market project and submitted a document to the 
Fontainebleau European Council in 1984. The document pointed to the economic 
problems of the EC: the growing technological gap with the US and Japan and a 
high level of unemployment across the EC (Sowemimo, 1996; Geddes, 2004).  It 
did not, at least according to other member states, adequately address the issue of 
institutional reforms, which were central to the implementation of the SEM 
project. In response to this criticism, the Thatcher government re-emphasised the 
importance of national veto power for protecting member states’ interests. The 
heads of state and government, nevertheless, agreed to set up the Dooge 
Committee to investigate the question of institutional reforms and required the 
Committee to submit its report to the European Council in March 1985 (George, 
1998). 
The outcome was inconclusive because the committee was divided between 
two groups: a majority group which demanded major institutional reforms and a 
minority group which opposed any significant institutional reform. This debate 
continued between member states. On the one hand, a large group of member 
states argued that major institutional reforms were a necessary condition for 
accelerating the procedure of decision-making. They proposed dismantling 
national veto power in decision-making, except for special policy areas which 
involved sensitive national interests. They also supported the majority’s opinion in 
the Committee on the increase of the European Parliament’s decision-making 
powers. On the other hand, a smaller group of countries (UK, Denmark, Greece 
and Ireland) argued that member states’ veto was essential to protect national 
interests and reacted in a hostile way to the increase of the Parliament’s power in 
decision-making, which would imply an erosion of national sovereignty. In the 
debate, the Thatcher government recognised that the direction of the European 
integration was moving away from what Thatcherism had intended (Sowemimo, 
1996; George, 1998), and this was displayed during an interview with the Sunday 
Express (cited in Wall, 2008: 46): 
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They all talk about political union and people like me say “well now, 
what do you mean by political union?” That’s as far as we get. I 
believe in a Europe of separate countries, each with their distinctive 
character and identity, cooperating together in a common market. We 
haven’t yet got a common market … and we’re a very long way from 
it. I do not believe in what I would call a united states of Europe [the 
very objective Chancellor Kohl had called for publicly earlier in the 
year]. I do not believe in a federal Europe and I think to compare it to 
the United States is absolutely ridiculous. They talk about things like a 
two-speed Europe and people like me say: all right; if you mean a two 
speed Europe, let me tell you what I mean: those who pay more are in 
the top group and those who pay less are not. It is absolutely 
ridiculous to expect a change in the treaty … You might get one or 
two amendments for which there is a need. Just to sit down to create a 
new treaty is ridiculous. 
 
 
The UK used an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers at Stresa in Italy on 8-9 
June 1985 to persuade member states to agree to the British position, but its 
efforts were unsuccessful (Geddes, 2004; George, 1998). At the Milan European 
Council on 28-29 June 1985, it successively wrested an agreement from the other 
member states for the completion of the SEM by 1992, but could not prevent 
further European integration towards institutional reforms (George, 1998).  
       In domestic politics, the SEA resulted in a faction between Thatcherites 
and pro-Marketeers in the Conservative party, and a political conflict with the 
Labour party. First of all, in the faction in the Conservative party, Thatcher and 
her followers argued that the SEA indicated removing Britain’s influence in the 
decision-making on the SEM measure through the extension of majority voting 
system, and the increase of the EP’s involvement on EU decision-making. The 
removal would bring about the danger of losing Britain’s sovereignty in 
preserving its national interests in the SEM. Thus, they were unwilling to go 
beyond economic integration. In contrast to Thatcherites’ opposition, pro-
Marketeers argued that for achieving the Thatcher government’s economic goal of 
the SEM, the SEA would be a prerequisite condition in completing the free market 
and boosting trade liberalisation (Forster, 2002: 71).  
Secondly, in the Labour party, after defeat of the 1983 general election, 
Foot and the left wing’s dominance were challenged by Neil Kinnock and his 
followers who were members of the ‘soft left’ in political spectrum, and who 
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demanded the re-shape of its European approach. This was because the 
challengers saw that the defeat resulted from the party leader group’s 
misunderstanding on public opinion. Finally, Kinnock65 replaced Foot and the left 
wing’s power and took a starting position to dilute the party’s anti-European 
image. Despite this, on the SEA, the party threatened the Thatcher government’s 
decision-making considering losing national parliamentary power (Jefferys, 1993; 
Daniels, 1998; Geddes, 2003).  
At the IGC in Luxembourg in December 1985, Thatcher and her followers 
continued its hostility to institutional reforms and argued that agreement of the 
SEA would significantly challenge the ability of nation-states in decision-making, 
particularly parliamentary sovereignty (Baker, Gamble and Seawright, 2002; 
Geddes, 2004). 66 However, pro-marketers such as the Foreign Secretary Sir 
Geoffrey Howe and Mrs Thatcher’s personal adviser on EC affairs, David 
Williamson, persuaded Mrs Thatcher to make the concession of agreeing to the 
SEA in order to bring about the other member states’ co-operation in completing 
the SEM by 1992. Finally, in December 1985, the Thatcher government 
reluctantly agreed the SEA which stipulated the extension of QMV in the area of 
internal market policies, but specifically excluded QMV in the areas of ‘taxation, 
free movement of persons, health controls, and employees’ rights’. Although the 
outcome of the faction between Thatcherites and pro-Marketeers in the 
Conservative party, and the Labour party’s opposition in shaping Britain’s 
approach on the SEA was the Britain’s acceptance, the SEA became a turning 
point of diluting the Thatcher government’s pro-European approach and of 
                                           
           65 After the failure of the 1983 general election, Foot’s leadership and the left wing’s 
dominance in the Labour party were challenged by Neil Kinnock and followers who were the ‘soft 
left’ in political spectrum on European integration. In the leadership election in 1983, Kinnock 
became the leader of the Labour party. The Labour party’s anti-European appraoch was diluted. 
See Jefferys (1993) and Daniels (1998). 
66 The Thatcher government, which had a Eurosceptical ‘zero-sum’ understanding of 
sovereignty, was concerned that the SEA would undermine British national sovereignty. By 
contrast, pro-European stance’s ‘non-zero-sum’ concept held that strengthening the EEC’s 
institutions would be the best way to solve political difficulties in decision-making among the 
member states in order to consolidate the advantages of European integration for its citizens. See 
Geddes (2004). 
 92 
growing Thatcherites’ hostility on European integration (Forster, 2002; George, 
1998). 
 
2.2.2. The financial perspective 
With regard to the Delors I financial proposal, the UK’s main priority was to 
retain its rebate. The Thatcher government argued that the UK had struggled with 
its financial burden since its entry in 1973 and that this problem was only 
mitigated by the agreement at Fontainebleau. Thus, it could not even think of the 
reduction of its rebate in just 3 years from the agreement in 1984, because it 
would simply encounter the same financial problem again (Boyle, 2006; Financial 
Times, 5 and 19 February 1987; Agence Europe, 25 February 1987; Laffan and 
Shackleton, 2000). Furthermore, in an interview in The Times, Thatcher explicitly 
argued that although the Conservative party supported the SEM project and 
understood British economic interest groups’ wholehearted support to the SEM 
and the SEA, and the enlargement of Mediterranean countries for the benefit of 
their own interests; its view on the EC had slightly changed because of the SEA 
which not only introduced the reform of the institution but also damaged the 
direction of single market from her neo-liberal idea thanks to the introduction of 
‘economic and social cohesion’ in the SEA. She said that the Conservative party 
suspected the direction of the EC and whether it would secure Britain’s national 
interests. Regarding the financial perspective which was a package between the 
SEM, the SEA and the financial plan, she pointed out that the increase of regional 
aid resulted in the introduction of ‘economic and social cohesion’ in the SEA, and 
the size of regional aid caused the size of the budget to increase which pressured 
Britain into reducing its rebate; and said that, due to the introduction of the SEA, 
Britain was less interested in a corrupt single market. Thus its position on the 
integration was not enough to reduce its rebate to pay for the increase of the 
regional aid (The Times, 11 May 1987). 
These views on the rebate shaped the UK’s positions on other issues. The 
Thatcher government was against the Commission’s proposal for the reform of the 
own resources system to add 1.4 per cent of GDP into Community revenue, 
because this reform would be over the financial agreement of the Fontainebleau 
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European Council and would put the UK’s abatement at risk (Young, 2000). 
Furthermore, the UK opposed any increase-related elements of the EC budget, 
particularly the increase of regional aid, even though the UK agreed the 
enlargement of the Mediterranean countries because it was seen as another 
possibility to question the UK’s rebate (Financial Times, 11 May 1987; Agence 
Europe, 25 February 1987; Thatcher, 1993: 729). The only item in the 
Commission’s package which the British government supported, unsurprisingly, 
was the reform of the CAP (Boyle, 2006). 
 
2.3. The UK and the negotiation on the Delors I package 
In the financial negotiations for the Delors I package, heads of government or 
state agreed to delay the European Council after Britain’s general election which 
was scheduled for 11 June 1987 (Financial Times, 29 June 1987). Shortly after the 
election, the financial negotiations were initiated at the Brussels European 
Council on 29-30 June 1987. The Delors I package was discussed at the three 
European Councils – two regular meetings in June 1987 in Brussels and in 
December 1987 in Copenhagen, and a special summit in February 1988 in 
Brussels. The UK struggled to retain its rebate because it was structurally 
intertwined with the issues of increasing regional aid and reforming the CAP. In 
doing this, it was involved in two negotiations: between net contributors and 
beneficiaries on the size of the Community budget, and amongst net contributors 
on sharing the financial burden.  
 
2.3.1. Net contributors versus net beneficiaries 
Regarding the Delors I package, the European Commission proposed the reform 
of the own resources system for the increase of the Community budget in order to 
prevent a budget crisis caused by the increase in regional aid (COM, 1987a: 24; 
Bache and George, 2006). The member states were divided into two groups: net 
contributors, or those who would increase net contribution, and net beneficiaries, 
or those who would increase financial receipts (Laffan and Lindner, 2005). The 
European Commission designated four member states – Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain – which were the most suitable member states on the basis of five 
 94 
objectives67 of regional aid and would become net beneficiaries, and proposed 
that regional aid would concentrate spending on the four member states in order to 
reinforce the effect of the small amount of regional aid in the Community’s 
expenditure (Allen, 2000). 
After the British general election on 11 June 1987, the European Council in 
Brussels on 29-30 June undertook the first negotiation for the financial 
perspective for 1988-1993. At the summit, member states could not have an in-
depth discussion of the financial perspective because of a conflict between net 
contributors and beneficiaries on the formation of a package with regard to the 
Commission’s proposal (Financial Times, 29 June 1987 and 2 August 1987). Net 
contributors wanted to break the package. They wanted to pay attention to 
securing issues related to their own interests rather than on taking on a 
complicated package deal. However, net beneficiaries pressured the Presidency of 
the Council Wilfried Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister, to maintain this form of 
the package in order to pressure net contributors to concede the increase in 
regional aid. Net beneficiaries threatened that if net contributors secured their 
preferences in the package, they would need to agree the increase of regional aid 
in order to keep the net beneficiaries on side (Financial Times, 30 June 1987). All 
net contributors agreed the package, except the UK, which was displeased since 
the package contained the reform of the UK’s rebate. The European Council 
ended in failure and the financial negotiation was held over to the next European 
Council in Copenhagen on 4-5 December 1987 (Financial Times, 30 June 1987; 
George, 1998). 
Before this, there was a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 24 
November 1987 with the aim of achieving a compromise. In the meeting, there 
was a division between the UK and other contributors on the increase of regional 
                                           
67 The European Commission proposed five objectives which would become a criterion for 
choosing beneficiary regions and member states. Objective 1 would propose structural funds going 
to regions and member states which had less than 75 per cent of the EEC’s GDP average. 
Objective 2 would focus on regions and member states which had high levels of unemployment 
over the EEC average. Objective 3 would propose regions and member states which were 
struggling to combat long-term unemployment. Objective 5 was subdivided between 5a, which 
would focus on agricultural and forestry assistance, and 5b, which would concentrate on the 
development of rural areas (Allen, 2005). 
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aid. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe argued that net beneficiaries 
should not expect any concession from the UK on its rebate, because the UK’s 
relative prosperity had not changed since the Fontainebleau summit. Furthermore, 
Britain remained the second-largest contributor to the EC budget even though it 
had its rebate. Thus, he said that Britain could not agree the increase of regional 
aid which pressured Britain to reduce its rebate (Agence Europe, 25 November 
1987; Financial Times, 27 November 1987). The other net contributors, 
particularly Jean-Bernard Raimond, Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, said 
that they were ready to agree the increase of regional aid, however, he suggested 
that the amount of regional aid should be reduced in order to easily hammer out 
concessions from net contributors; and Ireland should be one of the four net 
beneficiaries instead of Italy (Agence Europe, 25 November 1987). In response, 
Attilio Ruffini, Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued the threat that if France 
questioned the Commission’s proposal on regional aid, Italy would question 
agricultural expenditure. The debate on the increase of regional aid could not 
reach a satisfactory conclusion and was handed over to the European Council 
(Agence Europe, 25 and 27 November 1987; Financial Times, 27 November 
1987). 
At the Copenhagen European Council on 4-5 December 1987, member 
states discussed a Presidency compromise presented on 30 November which 
proposed retaining the UK’s rebate, stabilising the CAP, and increasing GDP 
contribution to 1.6 per cent from 1.4 per cent with regard to the Commission’s 
proposal. The percentages of regional aid and of VAT were not changed from the 
Commission’s initial proposal (Agence Europe, 1 December 1987). Net 
contributors maintained that the compromise was an unrealistic proposal and 
argued for a reduction of regional aid in order to prevent the budgetary crisis. In 
particular, Thatcher strongly argued that the UK could not accept a boost of 
regional aid which would increase the size of the EC budget and threaten the UK’s 
rebate (Financial Times, 4 December 1987).  The net beneficiaries rejected these 
arguments and argued that the introduction of the ‘economic and social cohesion’ 
policy was meant to strengthen and expand the SEM, which net contributors had 
agreed in Luxembourg in December 1985. They threatened not to cooperate with 
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completing the ‘1992 programme’ if net contributors did not change their position 
on the increase of regional aid (Agence Europe, 5 December 1987; Financial 
Times, 15 December 1987). The threat was highly effective in changing the net 
contributors’ position: the latter agreed the increase in regional aid as a side-
payment. In particular, the UK was far more strongly focussed on completing the 
‘1992 programme’ rather than preventing the increase of regional aid. The change 
of the UK’s and other net contributors’ position brought about a complex 
negotiation on sharing of the financial burden due to the increase in regional aid 
and the size of the EC’s budget. This meant that the European Council ended in 
failure to achieving a financial agreement once again. The member states 
convened a special summit on 11-13 February 1988 (Agence Europe, 5 and 28 
December 1987; Financial Times, 7 December 1987). 
 
2.3.2. The negotiation between net contributors on sharing the financial 
burden 
Negotiation between net contributors on sharing the financial burden resulted in 
the increase of both regional aid and the EC budget. The negotiation effectively 
began when net contributors accepted the increase of regional aid at the 
Copenhagen European Council in December 1987. Although in the Brussels 
European Council in June and the Council meeting in November net contributors 
mainly paid attention to negotiations with net beneficiaries on the increase of 
regional aid, there was also a brief discussion on the reduction of the UK’s rebate 
and the reform of the CAP (Financial Times, 29 June and 2 August 1987; Agence 
Europe, 25 November 1987). 
In the meeting of the Council of Ministers in November, the UK pointed out 
three reasons for its support of reform of the CAP. Firstly, high expenditures for 
agricultural subsidies in the Community (see Table 4.3) were a serious 
contributory factor in Britain’s financial problems, and therefore the reform of the 
CAP would contribute to lightening the UK’s financial imbalance (Agence Europe, 
25 November 1987; Financial Times, 27 November 1987). Secondly, the CAP was 
based on interventionist ideas which went against liberalisation of the internal 
market and strengthening competition of the EC in trade with its US partners 
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(Heffernan, 2000; Norton, 1990; Agence Europe, 25 November 1987; Rieger, 
2005).68 Thirdly, a reduction of agricultural subsidies, estimated at about 60 per 
cent of the EC’s budget, would mean more focus on high-technology areas, which 
could reduce the gap between the EC, the US and Japan (Agence Europe, 25 
November 1987; George, 1998).  
 
 
Table 4.3  EC Expenditure, 1987-1992, in % and at 1987 prices   
                                                       
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
EAGGF Guarantee 60.1 58.8 57.1 55.6 53.7 51.5 
Other intervention policies 22.9 24.3 29.7 32.7 36.0 38.9 
Refunds and administration 17.0 16.9 13.2 11.7 10.3 9.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
<Source: Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and Parliament: on the 
financing of the Community budget’ COM (87) 101 final> 
 
 
This proposal to reform the CAP was confronted with opposition from Germany 
and France. Oskar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Germany, stated that 
Germany did not want to cut agricultural spending, in order to maintain Franco-
German cooperation (Laffan, 1997; Linder, 2006).69  Raimond approached the 
reform of the CAP politically. Due to the Presidential election on 24 April 1988 in 
France, President Mitterrand could not overlook French farmers’ support and 
argued that the CAP was a non-negotiable issue (Cole, 1994). The other member 
states in the net contributor group were not significantly involved in the debate on 
the reduction of the UK’s abatement and the reform of the CAP (Financial Time, 
                                           
68 Since the 1950s, the US has used the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
to force the European Community to open its agricultural market. If the Community wanted to 
actively trade with the US, it would need to liberalise the agricultural market. See Rieger (2005). 
69 In the negotiation of the common market in the Rome Treaty, there was a political deal 
between Germany and France on the free trade of agricultural products and industrial goods. 
France sought Germany’s agreement on free trade in agricultural products as a counterbalance of 
the French agreement on free trade in industrial goods. From that time onward, they maintained a 
common interest in agricultural policy in the EC. See Rieger (2005) and Laffan (1997). 
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27 November 1987). 
After the net contributors agreed the increase of regional aid at the European 
Council in December 1987, during the negotiations regarding the sharing of the 
financial burden, the UK, Germany and France took on an aggressive negotiation 
style in order to secure financial benefits. The UK argued that the increase of the 
EC’s budget should be met out of agricultural subsidies instead of being met by 
reducing its rebate in the package (Financial Times, 3 December 1987). France 
and Germany argued that the reduction of the UK’s rebate was acceptable to cover 
the increase of the Community budget in order to secure agricultural subsidies. 
The debate resulted in the failure of the European Council and led to a special 
summit in Brussels on 11-13 February 1988 being hurriedly convened (Financial 
Times, 13 February 1988; Cole, 1994). 
At the special summit under the German Presidency, France and Germany 
did not have an appropriate card to force Britain’s concession in the negotiation. 
They could not use the ‘1992 programme’ to threaten the UK as the net 
beneficiaries did in December 1987 because the ‘1992 programme’ was also their 
preference as well as Britain’s (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Young, 2005). They 
could not use the SEA as a bargaining chip, because Britain was not interested in 
the SEA (George, 1998). In contrast, although Britain demanded the financial 
agreement for completing the SEM by 1992 be achieved, it did not think about 
compromise. Thatcher knew that her negotiation partners could not threaten her 
by blocking the SEM, and she was no longer interested in further European 
integration towards the SEA. Thus, she paid more attention to retaining the UK’s 
rebate rather than to increasing the UK’s contribution for the SEA, and thus 
unilaterally argued for the reform of the CAP and retaining the UK’s rebate 
(Boyle, 2006). Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, sought to end the difficult 
negotiation under the Germany Presidency, attempting to preserve a leadership 
role in the EC (Seldon and Collings, 2000).  Mitterrand was struggling for time, 
considering there was to be a Presidential election in April 1988. He needed to 
achieve agreement in order to secure agricultural funds from European 
expenditure to support French farm subsidies. He decided to make a concession to 
the UK in order to avoid farmers’ anger in the election. Thanks to the French and 
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German concessions, a financial agreement was achieved at the Brussels 
European Council in February 1988 (Seldon and Gollings, 2000; Boyle, 2006; 
Thatcher, 1993).  
 
2.4. Outcome 
The Delors I package, agreed in February 1988, contained the reform of the CAP 
at the Commission’s proposal level, which provided some degree of financial 
burden upon France. Furthermore, agricultural subsidies were constrained by 
‘tighter and binding budgetary discipline’ which provided a guideline 70  for 
severely restricting agricultural expenditure. Germany’s contribution to the EC’s 
budget increased based on its GDP. Regional aid was increased from 16 per cent 
to 25 per cent of the EC’s budget, and the UK’s rebate was retained. Member 
states agreed the introduction of the new budgetary resource pegged against GDP, 
which was agreed at 1.15 per cent in 1988 and gradually increased to 1.20 per 
cent by 1992. The rate of VAT resources became 1.25 per cent (Laffan, 1997; 
Laffan and Lindner, 2005).  
 
 
3. The financial perspective negotiations for 1993-1999 
The financial perspective for 1993-1999 presented a new threat to UK’s rebate. In 
line with what had happened with the Delors I package, the European 
Commission made a political linkage between the Delors II financial package and 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Moreover, the UK held the Presidency of 
the Council at a crucial time, but managed to achieve a compromise to solve 
conflicts between member states and retain its rebate.  
 
3.1. Analysis of the Commission’s proposal 
With regard to successively increasing the EC’s budget in the Delors II financial 
package, the Commission adopted a similar style to the Delors I financial 
                                           
70 In the financial agreement, the guideline stipulated the CAP expenditure could not be 
over 74 per cent of the growth of the EC’s GNP. See Laffan and Lindner (2005). 
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proposal: a political linkage was made between the European integration project 
and a financial proposal package. In February 1992, the European Commission 
proposed the financial perspective for 1993-1999 with political linkage made 
between the Treaty on European Union and the Delors II financial package (COM, 
1992a: 14).  
 
 
    Table 4.4  Financial perspective 1992-1999 (in EUR million -1992 prices) 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Appropriations for commitments: 
1. COMMON AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY 
35230 35095 35722 36364 37023 37697 38389 
2. STRUCTURAL FUNDS 21277 21885 23480 24990 26526 28240 30000 
3. INTERNAL POLICIES 3940 4084 4323 4520 4710 4910 5100 
4. EXTERNAL ACTION 3950 4000 4280 4560 4830 5180 5600 
5 ADMINISTRATIVE 
EXPENDITURE 
3280 3380 3580 3690 3800 3850 3900 
6. RESERVES 1500 1500 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
TOTAL of appropriations for 
commitments 
69177 669944 72485 75224 77989 80977 84089 
TOTAL of appropriations for 
payments 
65908 67036 69150 71290 74491 77249 80114 
Appropriations for payment as % 
GNP 
1.20 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.23 1.25 1.26 
Margin 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Own-resources ceiling (% of GNP) 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.27 
<Source: Commission ‘From the Single Act to Maastricht and beyond: The means to match our ambitions’  
         COM   (92) 2000> 
 
 
3.1.1. The European integration project: the TEU 
It could be argued that the establishment of the TEU resulted from spillover 
effects71 of the ‘1992 programme’ and the SEA. Spillover effects began with the 
revival of the single currency project.72 The European Community saw that a 
                                           
71 For neo-functionalists, spillover means that integration in one sector would lead to 
further integration in other sectors. See Tranhom-Mikkelsen (1991).   
72 At the Hague summit, the Werner plan produced the ‘snake in the tunnel’ which fixed 
the exchange-rate in the ‘Deutsch mark zone’, consisting of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and was scheduled to begin in 1973. A new exchange-rate 
regime, named the European Monetary System (EMS) began in March 1979, with Germany, the 
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single currency would be a necessary economic condition to eliminate the cost of 
currency conversion in trade between member states in the SEM, and would be 
the last part of the puzzle in completing the SEM (Phinnemore, 2007). 
At the Hanover European Council in June 1988, member states agreed to set 
up a committee under Delors’ Presidency in order to develop a plan for Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU).  The ensuing ‘Delors Report’, presented to the 
Madrid European Council in June 1989, proposed a three-stage process for the 
EMU: a period of convergence in policy, the creation of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), and adoption of the single currency by 1999 (McNamara, 2005). At 
the Madrid European Council, member states undertook majority voting – eleven 
member states agreed to convene an IGC in 1991 while only the UK voted against 
– to decide convening an IGC in 1991 which would prepare proposals to change 
treaties in preparation for a monetary union (Bache and George, 2006).  
At the IGC in Luxembourg on 28-29 June 1991, the member states not only 
concentrated on achieving an agreement for EMU but also considered further 
European integration on social policy, institutional reform, border controls, and 
foreign and security policy which was affected by the spillover effect and a 
dramatic change in European affairs: the collapse of the communist block in 
Central and Eastern Europe, weakening of the power of the Soviet Union, and the 
unification of Germany in October 1990 (Geddes, 2004). First of all, the member 
states concerned themselves with the establishment of a ‘social charter’ in order to 
regulate a standard ‘social dimension’ at the European level. The issue was to 
prevent ‘social dumping’ 73  and to enhance stabilisation of member states’ 
competition in the free market (Falkner, 2007). Secondly, the member states 
institutional reform to address the ‘democratic deficit’ in Community decision-
making, though the SEA had enhanced the European Parliament’s powers. Thirdly, 
the successful agreements of the SEM and SEA were attractive to the members of 
                                                                                                                   
Benelux countries, Denmark, France, Ireland, and Italy. The agreement of the ‘1992 programme’ 
was a significant driver towards EMU. See Dyson and Featherstone (1999) and McNamara (2005). 
73 ‘Social dumping’ refers to member states’ social policy which restrains social provision 
in order to gain advantage in producing low price products in the SEM (Falkner, 2007: 272). 
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the EFTA74 as well as countries in the Central and Eastern Europe. Member states 
discussed the Community’s state of preparation to deal with possible problems 
from potential enlargements. In particular, they were concerned with improving 
border control mechanisms at the EC level in order to deal with the movement of 
people 75  and cross-border crime. Finally, the member states considered 
developing European Political Cooperation (EPC) towards a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), in the light of the end of the Cold War and a 
weakening Soviet Union. Furthermore, the unification of Germany brought about 
concern in other member states about a possible resurgence of German 
nationalism. The CFSP was to tie up Germany with the Community to hold 
Germany in check (Bache and George, 2006).   
At the Luxembourg summit, there were conflicts between member states on 
a number of issues, which disrupted agreement on advancing European 
integration.76  At the subsequent Maastricht summit in December of that year in 
order to try and achieve agreement, member states agreed to establish the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), which was signed the TEU in February 1992 and 
entered into force in November 1993 (Stefanou, 2007). 
The TEU produced a new organisation of the European Union which 
consisted of three pillars: the European Communities (EC), a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Under the 
Treaty, the EEC changed its name to the European Community (EC) and became 
                                           
74 In the early 1990s, the EFTA countries were Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
75 The agreement of the SEM forced dismantling of national border controls for the ‘four 
freedoms’: goods, labour, services and capital. With regard to the potential enlargements, the 
European Community wanted to deal with ‘cross-border crime, drug trafficking, international 
terrorism, and the movement of people. In particular, member states considered controlling mass 
migration from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe to be an issue of border control 
(Uçarer, 2005).  
76 Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were held a positive position on EMU 
and the issues involved in further integration. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Denmark were 
willing to support these issues. In particular, the least prosperous member states in the group 
concentrated on strengthening economic and social cohesion. France supported EMU, but 
disagreed on strengthening the EC’s institutions. Germany supported the development of the CFSP 
but was cautious on EMU. The UK adopted a minimalist position on the issues. See Nugent 
(2006).  
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the first pillar of the EU. The TEU contained the reform of institutions: enhancing 
the European Parliament’s power in the legislative decision-making process, 
extending the term of office of Commissioners from 4 to 5 years, and established 
a Committee of the Regions and Local Authorities (CoR) and an Ombudsman for 
dealing with civil complaints about maladministration in the Community 
institutions’ activities (Bache and George, 2006: 171, 237, 243-244: Dehousse and 
Magnette, 2006: 24; Nugent, 2006: 88; Wallace, 2005: 67).77 
In the first pillar of the EC, the Treaty also introduced a new policy of EMU 
and strengthened the EC’s policy competences. The Treaty agreed the introduction 
of EMU which proposed a fixed exchange rate through the introduction of a 
single currency, and the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB). EMU 
was scheduled to follow a timetable in order for a single currency to be adopted 
by 1 January 1999 (McNamara, 2005). The EC enhanced existing competences: 
social policy, the environment, and economic and social cohesion (Phinnemore, 
2007). In particular, the TEU stipulated a ‘social charter’ for regulating ‘social 
provision’ in the EU (Falkner, 2007).  
As for pillar two, the objectives of the CFSP were ‘to safeguard the common 
values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union’ (Nugent, 2006: 90; 
Bache and George, 2006: 170). For pillar three, the establishment of JHA was to 
provide legal powers of control to the Union in order to solve matters of common 
interest: asylum policy, immigration policy, and police-judicial cooperation 
(Uçarer, 2007).78 
 
                                           
77 The TEU introduced two important principles. The principle of subsidiarity was to 
reduce over-centralisation of power in member states. In so far as member states could not 
sufficiently achieve agreements, the Community would take action. The principle of Union 
citizenship proposed that citizens in the EU would be given the rights to live and work in the 
territory of member states and vote in the European Parliament and local elections (Phinnemore, 
2007). 
78 The TEU identified and detailed nine areas of ‘common interest’: asylum policy in order 
to regulate governing area in member states; immigration policy; combating drug addiction and 
trafficking, and international fraud; judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters; customs 
cooperation; police cooperation to combat terrorism and international organised crime. See Uçarer 
(2007). 
 104 
3.1.2. The Commission’s financial proposal for 1993-1999 
At the Hanover European Council in June 1988, member states reached agreement 
on establishing an ad hoc committee, under the Delors chairmanship, for 
developing a plan for EMU. The ‘Delors Report’ was discussed by member states 
in two European Councils: in Madrid in 1989 and in Luxembourg in June 1991. 
Finally, at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991, member states 
agreed the introduction of EMU in TEU. In the Treaty, EMU was to follow a 
three-stage process: setting up of convergence criteria, establishment of the 
European Central Bank, and adoption of a single currency. The Treaty stipulated 
five convergence criteria which were an essential economic condition upon those 
member states which wanted to join EMU. Applicants were not only required to 
have a low inflation rate which was an average of the three best-performing 
member states but were also called upon to have a low interest rate which was an 
average of the top three countries. Applicants were also required to have an annual 
budget deficit of less than 3 per cent of their GDP, and their total government debt 
was to be no more than 60 per cent of their GDP. Finally, it was required that their 
national currency’s exchange rate be stable in exchange markets (McNamara, 
2005; Dyson, 2008; Jones, 2006). 
The TEU not only retained the economic and social cohesion objective but 
also created a new Cohesion Fund in order to help member states’ economies to 
meet the economic convergence criteria of EMU. The Cohesion Fund 
concentrated on four member states – Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland – 
which had per capita GNP less than 90 per cent of the Community average. The 
Cohesion Fund proved to be the determining factor in the increase of the 
Commission’s proposal for 1993-1999 (Allen, 2005).  
In February 1992, the Commission proposed the Delors II financial 
perspective for 1993-1999 which packaged together the increase of regional aid, 
the reform of the UK’s rebate, and the CAP (COM, 1992a; Laffan, 1997; Barbour, 
1996). For the increase of the EU budget, the Commission adopted the style of the 
Delors I package, and, thus, proposed an increased ceiling of national GDP from 
1.2 per cent to 1.37 per cent, the reduction of agricultural subsidies from about 60 
per cent to 45 per cent of the EU’s expenditure, and sharply cutting the UK’s 
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abatement by about 50 per cent (Ross, 1995; Laffan and Shackleton, 2000).  
 
3.2. The UK’s attitude towards the Delors II package 
The UK not only opposed (most of the provisions included in) the TEU but was 
also against the financial perspective for 1993-1999. For the Conservative 
government, the TEU threatened British national sovereignty, which was one of 
the main features of Thatcherism. When John Major replaced Mrs Thatcher as 
Prime Minister, the Conservative government approach did not change. The Major 
government opposed the EMU and the Social Charter in the TEU, as well as their 
implications in the 1993-1999 financial perspective. Thus, there was no incentive 
for the UK to reduce its rebate, even though the Commission’s proposal strongly 
pressured Britain to make a concession. 
  
3.2.1. European project: the TEU 
The victory of the Conservative party in the June 1987 general election was not 
expected to change the Thatcher government’s pragmatic approach to European 
integration.79 This meant supporting the ‘1992 programme’ in order to secure 
Britain’s economic benefits from the liberalisation of the internal market in the EC, 
even though the direction of European integration diverged from the Thatcher 
governments’ idea about the internal market. However, a turning point to the UK’s 
approach to European integration was the Hanover European Council in June 
1988 and the Delors’ speech in the European Parliament in July of that year 
(Forster, 1999).    
At the Hanover European Council, member states excluding Britain 
engaged in an in-depth discussion of the EMU and supported the establishment of 
                                           
79 From the mid-1980s, the stabilisation of the oil price not only reduced the UK’s 
revenues from North Sea oil exports but also depreciated the value of sterling. The depreciation of 
sterling resulted in boosting Britain’s export growth which in turn contributed to reducing the rate 
of unemployment, increasing wages, and bringing the rate of inflation down. This economic 
growth brought about the Conservative government’s victory in the 1987 general election. The 
Conservatives won 376 seats while the Labour party and the other parties won 229 and 22 seats 
respectively (George, 1998). 
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a European Central Bank which would control the single currency (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1993). The Thatcher government was more concerned about losing 
British national sovereignty on controlling monetary policy rather than its 
domestic economic interest groups’ support on the EMU and, thus, opposed 
movement towards EMU. This opposition found no counterpart in other member 
states and the UK was isolated from them. The agreement of the Hanover 
European Council on setting up the ad hoc committee for EMU without Britain’s 
consent caused Britain to reconsider its approach on the European integration 
(Forster, 1999). 
Similarly, Delors’ speech in the European Parliament in July 1988 
stimulated a change of British attitude because the speech attacked Thatcherism. 
He particularly emphasised a new social dimension and proposed to create 
European guidelines on the area. He considered three principles in the guidelines: 
securing the existing levels of member states’ social policies, improving health 
and safety standards, and guaranteeing workers’ rights (George, 1998). The 
speech infuriated the Thatcher government (Forster, 2002). At the College of 
Europe in Bruges in September 1988, Thatcher condemned Delors’ speech and 
argued that, for her and the Conservative party, social policy could be considered 
a socialist attack on Thatcherism and neo-liberalism, which were respectively 
sources of the Conservative government’s economic policies and the EC’s free-
market policy (Forster, 2002: 64; Geddes, 2006: 129-130):  
 
 
My first guiding principle is this: willing and active co-operation 
between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a 
successful European Community. To try to suppress nationhood and 
concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be 
highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to 
achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as 
France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain each with its own customs, 
traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some 
sort of identikit European personality (Financial Times, 20 September 
1988). 
 
 
At the end of her speech, Thatcher proclaimed that the UK would take anti-
European attitudes on the European integration. Thatcher’s Bruges speech not 
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only explicitly proclaimed the change of the Thatcher government’s attitudes but 
also brought about a division of the Conservative government into two groups, 
pro-Europeanists and ‘the Bruges friends’,80 which had frequent conflicts over 
shaping the Thatcher government’s EC policies (George, 1998; Forster, 1999; 
Baker et al., 2002).  
In May 1989, the Commission launched the first draft of the ‘social charter’ 
on workers’ rights.81 The Pro-Europeanist group did not push its argument on the 
issue. On the contrary, the ‘Bruges friends’ – particularly the Secretary of State for 
Industry, Lord Young and the Employment Secretary, Norman Fowler – argued 
that the Commission’s proposals threatened the Conservative government’s social 
policies which concentrated on the reduction of trade union power in order to 
boost privatisation for the revitalisation of the UK’s economy, and employment 
policies which proposed flexibility over working time and limitation of part-time 
workers (Sowemimo, 1996). They argued that an agreement of the ‘social charter’ 
would restore the influence of trade unions. Eventually, the Thatcher government 
opposed the Commission’s proposal on the social charter (George, 1998; Forster, 
1999). 
Meanwhile, after the disastrous 1987 general election, the Labour party, 
under the Kinnock leadership, substantially changed its approach from anti-to pro-
European attitude in the late 1980. In particular, in 1988, the Labour party adopted 
the ‘Policy Review’, which not only focused on the idea of a ‘social-Europe’: 
welfare and social protection in the post-SEA project (the social chapter in the 
TEU), which was in line with the party’s socialism; but also underlined Britain’s 
                                           
80 Pro-Europeanists, particularly the Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, MP Michael Heseltine, the Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, and 
the Commissioner Lord Cockfield, opposed the change of Thatcher’s approach to an anti-
European stance, and pressured the government to accept EMU and the social charter in order to 
continue good relations with the EC and secure economic benefits from the internal market. The 
‘Bruges friends’, mainly the Secretary of State for Industry Lord Young, the Employment 
Secretary Norman Fowler, and Mrs Thatcher’s personal adviser Sir Alan Walters, supported Mrs 
Thatcher’s approach which aimed to preserve British national sovereignty. See George (1998) and 
Garry (1995).  
81  The social policy question was initiated by France, and faced with the growing 
enthusiasm of other member states, excluded Britain. See Forster (1999).  
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economic co-operation with the European partners with a view to reviving the 
British economic performance and to enhancing economic competitiveness in 
global market, and left Keynesian spending programme for the purpose of 
modernising the party’s economic policies. The review’s idea on European 
integration became a primary source in shaping the party’s pro-European 
approach which supported the EMU and the social chapter (Gamble and Kelly, 
2000; Geddes, 2004; Heath et al., 2001). In addition, Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 
1988 affected the Labour party’s approach. Given the adversarial nature of the 
UK’s domestic politics, the Thatcher government’s anti-European stance on the 
‘social dimension’ and on the EMU provided an opportunity to the Labour party 
to criticise the Thatcher government’s European policies, and to take a pro-
European approach. The Labour party also proposed an alliance with the pro-EC 
Liberal party in order to effectively deal with the Conservative government in 
Parliament (Gowland et al., 2010; Geddes, 2004). 
Before the Madrid meeting of the European Council in June 1989, when the 
proposals of the Delors Committee were discussed, there was a new clash 
between the two groups within the Conservative party. Both Chancellor Nigel 
Lawson and Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe in the pro-Europeanist group 
supported Britain’s full membership of EMU, and threatened to resign if the 
Thatcher government did not agree to the UK’s full membership of the EMU 
project.  Sir Alan Walters, who was Mrs Thatcher’s personal adviser on 
economics and a member of the ‘Bruges friends’ (Wallace, 1997; Garry, 1995; 
George, 1998; Garry, 1995), pointed out that the Delors Committee’s report 
proposed a key role for the German Bundesbank in controlling the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) and the creation of a European Central Bank (ECB) for 
managing a single currency. For this, he opposed full membership in that the 
EMU project would infringe upon British national sovereignty on currency 
control, which was seen as a necessity in fighting against inflation as the top 
priority in the Conservative government’s economic policies (Baker et al., 2002; 
Sowemimo, 1996; George, 1998). Nevertheless the government faced with the 
threat of Chancellor Nigel Lawson and Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe’s 
resignations and the Conservative party’s election defeat in the election of the 
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European Parliament on 15 June 1989, Thatcher did not change her hostility on 
the EMU and finally declined Britain’s EMU membership (George, 1998).82 
Due to the Thatcher government’s continued anti-European approach, 
Lawson and Howe resigned from the cabinet in October 1989 and November 
1990 respectively. These resignations boosted the pro-Europeanists’ challenge to 
Mrs Thatcher’s leadership in the Conservative party. Michael Heseltine (pro-
Europeanist) called on Mrs Thatcher to account for the Conservative party’s 
defeat in the European Parliament election. In subsequent ballot for the 
Conservative party leadership, Mr John Major was elected to succeed Mrs 
Thatcher as new Prime Minister (George, 1998; Gamble, 1993).83 
Major, who had been the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Thatcher 
government after the resignation of Lawson in October 1989, was a member of 
the pro-Europeanist group in the Conservative party. His new government 
changed the tone on the EC, agreeing a part of the social charter on health and 
safety at work and supporting early entry for the UK to the EMU. In the House of 
Commons in November 1991, this new approach was attacked by backbench 
                                           
82 In the campaign for the European Parliament election in June 1989, the Conservative 
government continued to take an anti-European stance, while the Labour party changed its position 
from anti- to pro-European. In particular, the UK’s opposition on the social charter caused the 
trade unions to support the Labour party. The Labour party won 45 seats while the Conservative 
government won 32 seats. See George (1998), and Forster (1999). 
83 The statute of the Conservative party leadership stipulates that the leader must be elected 
by party members. A candidate must obtain more than 50 per cent of the votes. In the first ballot 
on 20 November 1990, Mrs Thatcher won 204 votes to her challenger Michael Heseltine’s 152 
votes, but she needed 4 more votes to win outright. This was because there were 15 per cent of 
abstentions which included spoilt ballots. A second ballot was required. However, Mrs Thatcher’s 
cabinet members advised her to resign. Due to Mrs Thatcher’s resignation from the Premiership 
and the leadership of the Conservative party after the first ballot, the Conservative party organised 
the second ballot for electing the leader of the Conservative party, who would become the Prime 
Minister, on 27 November 1990. In the second round of voting, there were three candidates: John 
Major, Michael Heseltine, and Douglas Hurd. Major obtained 185 votes while Heseltine and Hurd 
secured 131 and 56 votes respectively. Although Major won this election, his majority was less 
than 50 per cent of total votes. The party planned to have a third round on 29 November 1990. Due 
to the withdrawals of Heseltine and Hurd from the contest, Major became the leader of the 
Conservative party, and then Prime Minister, without the third round. See George (1998), Gamble 
(1993) and House of Common ‘Leadership Election: Conservative Party 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-01366.pdf. 
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Thatcherite MPs as well as the Labour party. In particular, the Thatcherite MPs 
demanded a referendum on monetary union before the UK agreed to participate. 
The Major government was faced with the intra-party faction, and uncertainty 
regarding the Labour party’s support on the government’s pro-European approach 
in Britain’s adversarial political system. There was demands from British 
economic interest groups regarding Britain’s membership of the EMU and Major 
was concerned about these divisions and thus decided on an ‘opt-out’ clause on 
the EMU and the social charter in order to gain the support of Thatcherite MPs for 
British membership of the TEU at the Maastricht summit in December 1991 
(George, 1998; Forster, 2002). This view was eventually clearly spelt out in the 
Conservative party manifesto for the 1992 general elections: 
 
 
I believe that Britain’s destiny does lie in the European Community. But it must be a 
Community that remains true to the ideals of its founders: open and free. That is why 
we have been in the forefront of the campaign to complete the Single Market 
programme which will benefit all European citizens by liberalising their economies, 
and why we have persistently, and successfully, argued for reform of the CAP … But  
Britain refused to accept the damaging Social Chapter proposed by other Europeans 
and it was excluded from the Maastricht treaty…(1992 Conservative Party General 
Election Manifesto ‘The Best Future for Britain’ 
www.conservativemanifesto.com/1992/1992-conservative-manifesto.shtml). 
 
 
In the general election on 9 April 1992, the Labour party criticised the Major 
government’s decision on opting-out from the social charter in the TEU. Although 
the Labour party won 271 seats84 which was an increase of 42 seats from the 
1987 general election, the party lost the election again. Electoral defeat caused 
Kinnock to step down as leader of the Labour party (Heath et al., 2001). On 18 
July 1992, Mr John Smith succeeded Kinnock and became the leader. However, 2 
years later, the death of Smith caused a leadership election. Mr Tony Blair became 
leader of the Labour party on 12 May 1994. Although Kinnock had left the 
leadership of the Labour party, his approach towards the European Community 
was inherited by Blair (George, 1998). 
 
                                           
84 The Conservative party won 336 seats which represented a reduction of 40 seats from 
the 1987 general election (George, 1998). 
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3.2.2. The financial perspectives  
The discussion on the financial perspectives for 1993-1999 was scheduled for the 
Edinburgh European Council on 11-12 December 1992. For the negotiation, the 
Major government focused on two points: achieving a financial agreement during 
its Presidency and retaining its budget rebate (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). First 
of all, the Major government wanted its pro-European approach to be recognized 
by other member states, which still considered the UK to be an ‘awkward partner’. 
Thus, achieving an agreement under the British Presidency was important to the 
Major government in order to gain credibility with other member states (Ludlow, 
1993; George, 1998). Secondly, retaining the UK’s rebate was an important issue 
to the Major government to reduce opposition from Thatcherite MPs and the 
Labour party in the Parliamentary ratification of the TEU (Laffan and Shackleton, 
2000). 85  In fact, in the general election on 13 February 1992, the Major 
government had lost its ability to override Thatcherite MPs and the Labour party’s 
opposition in seeking parliamentary approval of the British membership of the 
TEU (George, 1998).86 
As we saw earlier, one of the main reasons for increasing the EU’s budget 
was the creation of the Cohesion Fund. Regarding the Commission’s linkage 
between the TEU and the Delors II financial package, none of the issues were 
enough to cause Britain to reduce its rebate (Financial Times, 9 November 1992). 
An interviewee said that although Major took a pro-European approach which 
aimed to achieve the financial agreement during the term of the UK presidency, he 
was more concerned about retaining the rebate in order to prevent a faction in the 
Conservative party. He significantly concentrated on domestic politics rather than 
the European integration thanks to losing its majority in the general election and 
his decision of an ‘opt-out’ clause on the EMU. Thus, at that time, he did not have 
any ambitious European integration project which was pressurising him to 
                                           
85 The UK planned to take forward ratification by parliamentary approval in 1992, but the 
ratification was postponed until July 1993 (Nugent, 2006). 
86 Although in the 1992 general election, the Major government won 21 seats more than 
other political parties, the result was a narrow majority in Parliament compared to the 88 seats of 
the Thatcher government. The narrow majority caused the increase of Thatcherite MPs’ power in 
the House of Commons (George, 1998). 
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compromise on the rebate. In the negotiation, his priority was the retaining rebate 
rather than the role of the UK’s presidency. 
        The Major government opposed the increase of the EU’s budget and 
regional aid, which threatened to affect the retention of the UK’s rebate, and 
supported the reform of agricultural subsidies (George, 1998: 251). The British 
position on the increase of the EU’s budget was supported by net contributors, but 
brought about a conflict with net beneficiaries, particularly ‘cohesion countries’. 
With regard to financial burden-sharing between net contributors, the British 
position was in conflict with other net contributors on the reduction of the UK’s 
rebate and the reform of the CAP in the package (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000: 
223; Lindner, 2006: 136). 
 
3.3. Britain’s financial negotiation on the Delors II package 
Similar to the events of the Delors I package, the Delors II financial package saw 
two types of clashes: net contributors vs. net beneficiaries on the increase of the 
EU’s budget and regional aid, and between net contributors on sharing financial 
burdens (see Figure 5.3). The net beneficiaries strongly demanded an increase in 
the EU’s budget and regional aid while the net contributors deepened their 
complaints about the increase of their contribution. The UK Presidency of the 
Council took the negotiation of the Delors II package at the Edinburgh European 
Council in December 1992. The Major government wanted to achieve this 
financial agreement during its Presidency, even though it continued to demand 
retaining its rebate.  
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3.3.1. Net contributors versus net beneficiaries  
The UK Presidency of the Council scheduled four Council meetings in order to 
prepare the UK Presidency compromise and the Edinburgh European Council on 
11-12 December 1992: a General Affairs Council on 9 November; the Council of 
Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) on 23 November; a ‘jumbo’ meeting 
of Foreign Ministers and Finance Ministers on 27 November; and a General 
Affairs Council on 7 December (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000).  
In the General Affairs Council meeting on 9 November, Germany politicised 
its financial problem. Its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, stated that, 
before the unification, West Germany was one of the rich member states which 
had the second highest per capita income in the EC, but unification had dragged 
its prosperity down to sixth place. Yet, Germany continued to account for the 
highest contribution to the budget. Kinkel thus required reducing the size of its 
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contribution and the EU’s budget (Laffan, 1997). Net contributors, particularly the 
British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, supported Kinkel’s argument on the 
reduction of the size of the EU’s budget. In response, the Spanish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr Javier Solana, argued that the cohesion countries supported 
the Commission’s proposal and opposed any reduction of regional aid (Financial 
Times, 10 November 1992). 
In the ECOFIN meeting on 23 November, the UK Presidency noted the 
wide gap between net contributors and net beneficiaries in relation to the sizes of 
the EU’s budget and regional aid (Financial Times, 25 November 1992). In the 
‘jumbo’ meeting on 27 November, the UK released a Presidency compromise on 
the financial perspective for 1993-1999. In that, it pointed out that although net 
contributors had agreed to the net beneficiaries’ demand for an increase of 
revenue to a ceiling of 1.2 per cent of national GDP in the negotiation of the 
Delors I package in December 1987, substantial expenditure was 1.15 per cent of 
GDP at the end of the financial package period of 1992 (Laffan and Shackleton, 
2000). In the Presidency compromise, the UK Presidency proposed freezing 
revenue from GDP at a 1.2 per cent ceiling during the financial period for 1993-
1999, against the Commission’s proposal of 1.37 per cent. This compromise 
would provide a sufficient budget for the creation of Cohesion Funds (Financial 
Times, 29 November 1992).  
  In response to the UK Presidency compromise, the Spanish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr Solana, who led the cohesion countries in the negotiation, 
argued that the size of the EU’s budget would not be enough for the cohesion 
countries to meet economic convergence criteria, and demanded a new Presidency 
compromise to increase the size of the EU’s budget and arrange redistribution of 
the EU’s budget (Financial Times, 29 November 1992). Furthermore, Delors 
openly argued the Commission’s plan for the development of the EU had been 
passed over by the UK Presidency, whose proposed compromise did not mediate 
between net contributors and net beneficiaries, but just reflected the complaints of 
the net contributors. Thus, in a letter which was sent to the member governments 
Delors stated that the compromise was an unacceptable proposal (Financial Times, 
4 December 1992; Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). By contrast, net contributors 
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welcomed the compromise. Germany in particular strongly supported the 
compromise (Financial Times, 29 November 1992).   
At the General Affairs Council on 7 December, the UK Presidency 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade member states to agree to the compromise. The 
conflict was passed forward to the negotiation between Heads of State in 
Edinburgh on 11-12 December 1992   (Financial Times, 8 and 9 December 
1992).  At the Edinburgh European Council, the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe 
Gonzales, on behalf of the cohesion countries, stated that the Cohesion Fund 
constituted an essential redistribution policy to help cohesion countries meet the 
convergence criteria. He threatened a veto by cohesion countries of any financial 
agreement, saying they would not do their best in the national ratification of the 
TEU unless net contributors agreed to the increase of the EU’s budget (Financial 
Times, 14 December 1992). The threat had more effect upon France and Germany 
than the UK. Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand were concerned that 
member states’ failure in national ratification of the TEU would obstruct progress 
in the EU, as had been the case with the Danish referendum.87 They agreed to 
endorse the increase of the budget and proposed increasing the revenue of the 
GDP ceiling to 1.27 per cent, which went beyond the UK Presidency compromise. 
This concession brought about the financial agreement on the size of the EU’s 
budget (Financial Times, 14 and 19 December 1992). 
  
3.3.2. The negotiation between net contributors on sharing the financial 
burden 
At the meeting of the General Affairs Council on 9 November 1992, the UK 
Presidency and other net contributors not only concentrated on reducing the size 
of the EU’s budget but also discussed the UK’s rebate. Germany and other net 
contributors questioned the justification for continuing the UK’s financial 
privilege. Although they examined all possible ways to reduce their net 
contribution, they concentrated primarily on reducing the size of the budget rather 
than on a reduction of the UK’s rebate (Lindner, 2006). The UK Presidency 
                                           
87 In June 1992, the outcome of the Danish referendum was that 50.7 per cent of citizens 
opposed the TEU, while 49.3 per cent supported it (Bache and George, 2006). 
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argued that there were two reasons to retain its rebate. First of all, it was very 
difficult to reduce its rebate given the British domestic political situation. The 
rebate had to be retained if the UK wanted to succeed in national ratification of 
the TEU. Secondly, the UK was not part of the EMU and therefore should not pay 
for the Cohesion Fund. Thus, Mr Hurd argued that the UK would not let other net 
contributors take their rebate to the negotiation table (Financial Times, 10 
November 1993). 
Before the Edinburgh European Council in December, the net contributors 
continued to pay attention to reducing the size of the EU’s budget. The UK 
Presidency also used the Presidency compromise to avert net contributors’ eyes 
from the size of the budget. In the ‘jumbo’ meeting on 27 November, the UK 
Presidency proposed reducing the revenue of GDP to 1.2 per cent from 1.37 per 
cent in the Commission’s original proposal (Financial Times, 29 November 1992). 
However, the compromise did not refer to such issues as the UK’s rebate and CAP 
expenditure in order to avoid breaking up the united position of the net 
contributors on the size of the budget and the complex negotiation structure in the 
package for achieving financial agreement at the European Council. The UK 
Presidency also thought that the rebate and agricultural subsidies would not need 
to be reduced if the EU’s budget was frozen at 1.2 per cent of GDP (Lindner, 
2006). 
At the Edinburgh European Council in December, a deal was made between 
Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, who agreed the increase in the EU’s 
budget in order to avoid the cohesion countries’ threat. This deal brought about a 
chance for the UK to retain its rebate and achieve an agreement. As a result of the 
agreement between Germany and France, the UK’s contribution would increase 
by about 0.07 per cent of GDP, if accepted by the UK. In order to engineer the 
UK’s agreement, the two member states conceded keeping the UK’s rebate in the 
financial period for 1993-1999. Major, finally, decided to end the negotiation, and 
the other member states agreed the conclusion to the UK Presidency (Laffan and 
Shackleton, 2000). 
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3.4. Outcome 
The UK Presidency scheduled four Council meetings before the Edinburgh 
European Council in December in order to prepare the Presidency compromise 
and the European Council. The fist two Council meetings on 9 and 23 November 
were to examine the possibility of reducing the size of the EU’s budget. The UK 
Presidency proposed its compromise in the ‘jumbo’ meeting, and negotiated the 
financial perspective in the meeting of the General Affairs Council and the 
Edinburgh European Council (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). However, the UK 
Presidency’s schedule was not effective in achieving the outcome at the European 
Council. This was because the Major government did not want to reduce its rebate. 
The deal between Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand for a side-payment in 
order to avoid the cohesion countries’ threat had the effect of achieving the 
financial agreement and retaining the UK’s rebate (Financial Times, 16 December 
1992; Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). The agreement saw that the UK’s rebate 
would be retained until the end of the financial perspective period. The CAP 
expenditure was maintained, based on the 1988 system. Regional aid increased 41 
per cent from the UK Presidency compromise. The revenue ceiling on GDP was 
maintained at 1.2 per cent in 1993 and gradually increased to 1.27 per cent by 
1999. The existing 1.25 per cent VAT level was maintained until 1995 and 
progressively reduced to 1 per cent between 1995-1999 (Laffan and Shackleton, 
2000; Laffan and Lindner, 2005). 
 
 
4. The financial perspective negotiations for 2000-2006 
In the second half of the 1990s, enlargement of the Central and East European 
Countries (ECCEs) became a central issue for European integration. The EU took 
steps to prepare the enlargement with particular regard to the potential member 
states’ deficient democratic processes and poorer economic conditions. 
Subsequent to the successful handling of the Delors I and II packages, the 
Commission proposed the Agenda 2000 package to prepare for the enlargement. 
This section examines the UK’s financial negotiations for Agenda 2000, when 
despite strong pressure to reduce it; it succeeded in retaining is rebate.  
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The negotiations were carried out by the New Labour government, which 
in the May 1997 general election had beaten the Conservative government 
(Heffernan 2000: 65). New Labour dropped the party’s traditional anti-European 
approach for a new working relationship with the EU (Riddell 2005: 363), which 
still aimed to protect Britain’s interests. Blair argued the UK needed a 
‘constructive engagement’ with France and Germany in order to play a central 
role in the EU instead of standing on the sidelines (Gowland et al., 2010: 143-
144).88 
 
4.1. Analysis of the Commission’s proposal 
The European Commission made a political linkage between preparing the 
enlargement involving Central and Eastern European countries and the financial 
perspective for 2000-2006. This was because the enlargement would not only 
increase the number of member states, but would also have an economic impact 
on the EU due to the applicants’ poor economic condition. The Commission, 
however, proposed to freeze the ceiling percentage of the EU’s revenue from 
national GDP, because of national budgetary difficulties in most member states. 
Freezing EU revenue increased the pressure to reduce the UK’s rebate and reform 
the CAP.  
   
4.1.1. Preparing the enlargement of CEECs and the Amsterdam Treaty 
After the agreement of the TEU, the enlargement of the EU was an important 
issue for European integration. At the Lisbon summit on 26-27 June 1992, the 
member states agreed the enlargement of three EFTA countries: Austria, Finland 
and Sweden.89 The three countries became members of the EU on 1 January 1995. 
While the enlargement of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries was 
                                           
88 The Labour party won 418 seats while the Conservative party won 165 seats.  
89 In the late 1980s, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland as member states 
of the EFTA decided to apply for membership of the EC in order to share the investment boom 
related to the successful agreement of the 1992 programme. Switzerland took a referendum for 
membership in December 1992 and the Swiss people did not approve its membership. The 
Norwegians also rejected Norway’s membership again in a referendum in November 1994 (Bache 
and George, 2006; Nugent, 2010). 
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in progress, the CEECs attempted to gain membership of the European 
Community. This attempt was influenced by political, security and economic 
motivations (Mayes, 2007). Politically, the collapse of the communist block 
brought about the CEECs’ desire to be fully integrated in Europe and become 
members of the EC’s liberal democratic system (Sedelmeier, 2000). From a 
security point of view, the CEECs believed that EC membership would reduce 
their security protection level and that it would provide a chance to join the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Economically, the CEECs expected that EC 
membership would be a good opportunity to liberalise and re-generate their 
economies, and achieve higher economic growth (Sedelmeier, 2005). 
 
 
Table 4.5  Impact of enlargement (EFTA countries1995) 
 
Enlargement New members Additional 
population (%) 
Added GDP 
(%) 
GDP per capita of 
new members  
(% of existing) 
1995 Austria, 
Finland, 
Sweden 
6.3 6.5 103.6 
<Source: Barnes and Barnes (2007) ‘Enlargement’>  
 
 
The CEECs’ membership was proposed by the European Commission at the 
Strasbourg European Council in December 1989, as a way to end the division of 
Europe. The Commission stated that the EC (member states) had the 
responsibility to assist people and states in Europe which were demanding liberty 
and democracy. Although enlargement did not find immediate support across all 
EC member states, the EC still agreed on devising ‘an appropriate form of 
association’ with the CEECs. At the Dublin European Council in April 1990, it 
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agreed the creation of ‘European Agreements’ (EAs)90 to provide guidelines for 
the EC’s approach to CEECs. EAs firstly applied to Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia, which were the leading reformers in the CEECs. These countries, 
however, maintained that the EU’s economic support was below their expectation, 
and ceased their attempts towards membership of the EEC (Sedelmeier, 2005; 
Preston, 1997).  
At the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, the Commission raised 
the issue of the CEECs’ membership again. The member states not only adopted 
the Copenhagen declaration,91 which endorsed the CEECs’ membership but also 
demanded the devising of a strategy, based on the 'acquis communautaire, for 
preparing the CEECs’ accession (Sedelmeier, 2005). The preparation of a pre-
accession strategy became one of the issues in the review of the TEU. At the 
Corfu European Council in June 1994, member states agreed to establish a 
‘Reflection Group’ in order to examine and elaborate ideas on pre-accession 
strategy and the unfavourable public opinion of the Treaty’s review (Nugent, 
2006).92  In May 1995, the Reflection Group presented a White Paper which 
proposed three main areas: ‘enabling the EU to work better and prepare for the 
enlargement, making Europe more relevant to its citizens, and giving the EU 
greater capacity for external action’ (Preston, 1997). At the Madrid European 
Council in December 1995, member states discussed the White Paper and 
scheduled the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) for July 1996 (Sedelmeier, 
2005).  
 At the IGC in 1996, the UK blocked the negotiations in order to remove a 
                                           
90 At the Dublin European Council in April 1990, member states agreed to the creation of 
EAs, which meant that CEECs had to accept opening their domestic markets for industrial 
products, and a common foreign policy, if they wanted economic cooperation with the EC and to 
obtain EC technical and financial assistance (Sedelmeier, 2005). 
91 The Copenhagen declaration not only contained an endorsement of CEECs’ membership 
but also established ‘the Copenhagen criteria’. These criteria stipulated that a candidate country in 
the CEECs had to have an estabilised liberal democracy and a market-based economic system. It 
was also essential to the candidate to adopt the acquis communautaire (Nugent, 2004a and 2004b). 
92 The Reflection Group was composed of a representative at the Ministerial level from 
each member states, two representatives from the European Parliament, and one representative 
from the European Commission (Nugent, 2006). 
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ban on exports of British ‘mad cow’ beef to Europe. The member states awaited 
the British general election on 1 May 1997, in the hope that the Conservative 
government would lose to the Labour party, which under Tony Blair’s leadership 
had taken a pro-European approach. The IGC laid plans for the European Council 
in Amsterdam on 16-17 June 1997 in order to review the TEU (Bache and George, 
2006: 185). At the Amsterdam European Council, member states agreed the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which consisted of six sections: Section I: freedom, security 
and justice; Section II: the Union and its citizens; Section III: an effective and 
coherent external policy; Section IV: the Union’s institutions; Section V: closer 
cooperation-‘flexibility’; and Section VI: simplification and consolidation of the 
Treaties (Nugent, 2006: 96-102; Laursen, 2002: 12-14).  
 The pre-accession strategy for the enlargement of CEECs involved Section 
IV and V in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The EU focused on an extension of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), the functioning of the European Commission, 
and further strengthening the role of the European Parliament. Firstly, the 
extension of QMV was opposed by German Chancellor Kohl, who had at first 
supported it, particularly in the areas of industrial policy, social policy, and the 
free movement of labour. Section IV extended QMV in the areas of employment 
guidelines, social exclusion, equal opportunities for men and women, research in 
the EC pillar, and the CFSP policies. Secondly, the number of Commissioners 
would be retained: one representative from each member state unless more than 
six countries joined the EU. The size of the EP would be increased to about 700 
seats. Thirdly, the role of the EP in EU decision-making was strengthened through 
the extension of the assent and co-decision procedure areas. Moreover, it would 
approve the European Council’s nominee for Commission president (Phinnemore, 
2007; Shackleton, 2006; Falkner and Nentwich, 2000; Sedelmeier 2005). 
Section V legally accepted ‘flexibility’ which reflected a discussion between 
member states. At the IGC, the member states assumed that the increase number 
of member states would bring about difficulties to achieve agreements for the 
direction of European integration. With regard to domestic interests all member 
states would not be in favour to agree European integration issues. Member states 
discussed ‘flexible integration’ which proposed allowing partial membership 
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(Stubb, 2000: 154). When the major member states were confronted with a 
minority of the less integrationist member states’ dissatisfaction on certain issues, 
the Council of Ministers would take on such issues and achieve agreement by 
QMV. If any member state insisted its vital national interests on certain issues 
were threatened, the member state would not be allowed to participate in 
integration, instead of blocking the agreement (Sedelmeier, 2005; Stubb, 2000). 
 
4.1.2. The Commission’s financial proposal for 2000-2006 
In July 1997, the Commission under President Jacques Santer93 launched its 
financial proposal, named Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wide Union, which 
proposed a broad outline of the financial perspective for 2000-2006 and reforms 
of the EU’s policies, notably the reduction of the rebate and the CAP, and the 
reform of regional aid with regard to the pre-accession strategy for the 
enlargement of CEECs (COM, 1998: 29). Agenda 2000 was based on a financial 
section of the Reflection Group’s White Paper from May 1995 and proposed the 
creation of ‘pre-accession aid’ which consisted of the Instrument for Structural 
Policies for Pre-Accession Aid and the Special Accession Programme for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, in order to financially assist CEECs’ 
preparation for membership (Allen, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2005). On 18 March 1998, 
the Commission proposed a detailed financial proposal which was submitted at 
the Cardiff European Council on 15-16 June 1998. At the European Council, 
member states fixed a deadline for financial negotiations for Agenda 2000 of 
March 1999, before the European parliamentary election in June (Laffan and 
Shackleton, 2000). 
The Commission’s financial perspective for 2000-2006 reflected Germany’s 
financial problems and other member states’ domestic political difficulties. First 
of all, Germany was afraid its contribution to the EU’s budget would be high 
because it had struggled to overcome its national payment for the cost of its 
unification. Secondly, other member states had difficulties with their national 
budgets in spending on economic growth in order to meet the EMU convergence 
                                           
93 In 1995, Jacques Santer, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, was chosen to become the 
president of the Commission after Delors left Brussels (Peterson, 2006). 
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criteria (Lindner, 2006: 140). For all member states, in short, it was difficult to 
increase their contributions in view of the enlargement of CEECs, because they 
were struggling with their existing financial burden. The Commission, thus, 
proposed freezing the ceiling of GDP at 1.27 per cent (COM, 1998: 30). With 
regard to freezing the EU’s revenue from GDP, the Commission proposed a 
financial package: freezing regional aid, reforming the CAP, and reducing the 
UK’s rebate (Lindner, 2006). 
As we see from Table 4.6, the European Commission proposed allocating 
€275 billion, about 0.46 per cent of the EU’s GNP, for regional aid, which was 
broken down into €230 billion for existing regional aid and €45 billion for pre-
accession aid (Allen, 2005). It proposed the reform of the CAP, which would 
restrain CAP expenditure based on the 1992 MacSharry reforms94 in order to 
change the EU’s budgetary flow towards rural development and environmental 
protection (Fouilleux, 2007; Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). Finally, it proposed 
the reduction of the UK’s rebate in order to reduce net contributor countries’ 
financial burden (Lindner, 2006).   
 
 
Table 4.6  Financial perspective 2000-2006 (in EUR million-1999 prices) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Appropriations for commitments 
1. AGRICULTURE FUNDS 
40920 42800 43900 43770 42760 41930 41660 
2. STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS 32045 31455 30865 30285 29595 29595 29170 
3. INTERNAL POLICIES 5930 6040 6150 6260 6370 6480 6600 
4. EXTERNAL ACTION 4550 4560 4570 4580 4590 4600 4610 
5. ADMINISTRATION 
EXPENDITURE 
4560 4600 4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 
6. RESERVES 900 900 650 400 400 400 400 
7. PRE-ACCESSION AID 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 
TOTAL appropriations for 
commitments 
92025 93475 93955 93215 91735 91125 90660 
TOTAL appropriations for 
payments 
89600 91110 94220 94880 91910 90160 89620 
Available for accession   4140 6710 8890 11440 14220 
                                           
94 Agricultural subsidies initially guaranteed food prices on over-production and import 
competition. However, the Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry introduced the 
‘MacSharry reform’ in May 1992 which proposed the reduction of CAP subsidies, particularly 
reducing product support to farmers, in order to sink the prices of agricultural products in the 
Community to the levels of world prices (Rieger, 2005).  
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Appropriations for payments as % 
of GNP 
1.13 1.12 1.18 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.13 
Margin 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.14 
Own-resources ceiling (% of GNP) 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 
<Source: Commission ‘Agenda 2000: Financing the European Union’ COM (1998) 560> 
 
 
4.2. The UK’s attitude towards Agenda 2000 
In 1997, the Labour party’s pro-European approach, under the Blair leadership, 
won the general election. The new Labour government emphasised economic 
efficiency and social justice as the underpinning its domestic and European 
policies (Geddes, 2004; Ludlaw, 1988; Bache and Jordan, 2006). In domestic 
policies, the Blair government announced that it would concentrate on enhancing 
the role of the government with the aim of securing social welfare systems and 
public services. In European policies, it would base its approach on three 
elements: state intervention, social protection, and economic liberalism (Clift, 
1988: 59-61). Its pro-European approach had been spelt out in a famous speech in 
Manchester on 21 April 1997 (cited in Wall, 2008: 162).  
: 
 
There are three choices open to Britain. The first is leaving; the 
second is in but impotent; and the third is remaining in but leading… 
Of course we must stand up firmly for Britain’s interests. And, as I 
have always made clear, we must be prepared to stand alone in 
support of those interests if necessary. But it is misguided to make 
perpetual isolation the aim of our policy … I want Britain to be one of 
the leading countries in Europe … This is a good moment for Britain 
to make a fresh start in Europe.  
 
 
The New Labour government immediately embarked on two negotiations at the 
IGC for reviewing the TEU with regard to the enlargement of CEECs in June 
1997, and the negotiations of Agenda 2000, containing pre-accession aid, from 
June 1998 to March 1999. At the Amsterdam IGC, the government’s pro-
European approach positively dealt with European integration issues which tied 
up Britain’s interests, particularly the social chapter. Without any fear of a loss of 
national sovereignty, the new government agreed the reform of institutions which 
paid attention to the increased ‘pooling’ of national sovereignties through 
 125 
extensions in Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and increased powers for the EP 
in the EU, new rules on transparency and new human rights and anti-
discrimination provisions which were issues to prepare conditions for the 
enlargement of CEECs (Fella, 2006: 621, 624; Baker, 2005: 23). On the 
government’s agreements, the Conservative party, under Hague’s leadership95 
criticised the government’s pro-European approach. However, due to the absolute 
majority of the Labour party, it was not very difficult to continue its position on 
the EU (Baker et al., 2002: 404; Smith, 2005: 708; Redgrave, 2008: 424). In 
addition, the UK supported the enlargement and agreed to the Amsterdam treaty 
for preparing the enlargement, but did not accept the reduction of its rebate in the 
Agenda 2000 package. 
 
4.2.1. The enlargement of CEECs 
At the IGC in Amsterdam on June 16-17, 1997, the Blair government worked to 
remove the stigma of ‘awkwardness’ which had characterised the Conservative 
government’s attitude on the EC. On the enlargement of CEECs, some member 
states96 were not so enthusiastic, but the UK supported the enlargement. The New 
Labour government’s approach to the enlargement was influenced by the ‘third 
way’: Britain saw that the enlargement would bring about a much bigger internal 
market in the EU which would provide economic advantages97 to the UK via 
trading in the internal market (Baldwin et al., 1997).  
                                           
           95 In the 1997 leadership election in the Conservative party, William Hague won the 
election. The new leader changed the Major government’s pro-European approach and threw out 
members of the European wing from the leader group in the party. The party’s attitude on the EU 
returned to Thatcerite’s anti-European approach. See Baker et al., (2002). 
96 France was concerned about diminution of French influence in the direction 
of the EU. The enlargement would not only bring about an increased number of 
member states but would also risk generating institutional paralysis. The new member 
states would have veto powers which would obstruct the instinctual French preference 
for deeper integration. Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain were also concerned about 
possible reduction of their voting power and of their financial benefits from EU 
subsidies. See Gowland et al. (2010). 
97 In 1985, Germany accounted for 42 per cent of the total EU’ exports to the CEECs while 
the UK only accounted for 5 per cent. Thus, the  UK saw that the enlargement would cause an 
increase in the percentage of British exports to the CEECs (Baldwin et al., 1997).   
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The New Labour government’s attitude on the enlargement of CEECs 
affected Britain’s negotiations at the IGC in Amsterdam in June 1997. At the IGC, 
the Blair government was willing to agree both Section IV (the Union’s 
institutions) and Section V (closer cooperation - ‘flexibility’) which had relevance 
to the enlargement. In Section IV, Britain agreed to the institutional reforms: some 
extension of QMV (on the areas of anti-fraud measures, regional aid and 
environmental policy),  the increase of the EP’s power in decision-making, and 
the increase in numbers at the EP. However, on the extension of QMV, Britain 
opposed giving up its veto on the areas of taxation, defence and security, 
immigration and treaty changes. Furthermore, in Section V, Britain was willing to 
agree ‘flexibility’ which would protect non-participants’ interests in European 
integration (Best, 2002; Geddes, 2004; Gowland et al., 2010).  
 
4.2.2. The financial perspective 
With regard to the Commission’s financial package, the Blair government 
supported regional aid, freezing the EU’s budget and the reform of the CAP, but 
opposed the reduction of the UK’s rebate (Financial Times, 15 June 1998). Blair 
argued that the British rebate was not negotiable, for at least three reasons (Blair, 
2010: 533). First of all, in term of economic growth, the UK ranked ninth within 
the 15 member states. The reduction of the UK’s rebate would worsen this 
situation (Galloway, 1999). Secondly, the Blair government supported social 
protection, but social protection in the ‘Third way’ emphasised job creation rather 
than job protection (Gowland et al., 2010: 146). Blair argued that agricultural 
subsidies only focused on safeguarding farmers’ income even though it still 
represented about 48 per cent of EU expenditure. He, thus, supported the reform 
of the CAP in order to change the EU’s budgetary flow towards job creation 
(Financial Times, 16 June 1998). Thirdly, the Labour party adopted a pro-
European approach, vis-à-vis the previous Conservative governments, which had 
successfully retained the UK’s rebate in the financial negotiations in 1988 and 
1993 respectively. There was economic groups’ support to the Blair government’s 
pro-European approach on the enlargement. However, Blair hesitated to take a 
positive view on the rebate issues. This was because if the Blair government 
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agreed to the reduction of the UK’s rebate, the public, the Conservative party, and 
the Labour party’s left wing would criticise the government’s pro-European 
attitude (Financial Times, 16 June 1998). These fears were confirmed by Blair 
(2010: 532-534) himself in his memoirs.  
 
 
I had two problems over the rebate, both significant for how our 
relationship with Europe under my leadership could develop. The first 
was the near-hysterical-sorry, correct that-truly hysterical behaviour of 
the Eurosceptic media. Paper with a combined daily circulation of 
around eight million- a situation unique in Europe in terms of 
pervasion-were totally, wildly and irredeemably hostile to Europe, 
misrepresented what Europe was doing and generally regarded it as a 
zero-sum game: anything that pleased Brussels was bad for Britain … 
Moreover, in the rest of the world a Britain semi-detached from 
Europe was regarded as odd, part of British eccentricity, something to 
be amused by, a ‘goo old Brits’ type of thing which I really detested. 
 
 
 
In the light of all these reasons, Blair argued that even though the UK supported 
the enlargement of CEEC it would not accept the reduction of the UK’s rebate – in 
fact, the reform of the CAP would be able to secure pre-accession aid (Financial 
Times, 16 June 1998). 
 
 
Table 4.7  A historical perspective on agriculture in Europe 
 
                   Population active in agriculture               Share of agriculture (% GDP)             
                            (% total population)                                                                                      
                ----------------------------------------------------       -------------------------------------------- 
                   1950             2000                  1950           2000                                                                        
Netherlands 17.7 3.4 12.9 2.2 
Belgium 11.9 1.8 8.8 1.1 
Luxembourg 24.7 2.3 9.5 0.6 
France 30.9 3.4 15.0 2.2 
Germany 23.0 2.5 12.3 0.9 
Italy 44.4 5.3 29.5 2.4 
Denmark 25.7 3.8 20.4 2.3 
Ireland 40.2 10.2 31.3 2.5 
UK 5.5 1.8 6.0 0.6 
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Portugal 53.1 14.3 26.8 2.4 
Spain 51.5 7.3 35.0 3.6 
Greece 48.9 13.4 33.5 6.7 
Sweden 22.8 3.5 7.0 0.6 
Finland 36.9 5.9 … 0.9 
Austria 34.2 5.1 16.4 1.3 
<Source: Rieger (2005) ‘Agricultural Policy: Constrained Reforms’> 
 
 
4.3. Britain’s financial negotiation on Agenda 2000 
Although in its proposal the Commission had considered net contributors’ national 
budgetary difficulties and proposed freezing the EU’s budget, Germany demanded 
the reduction of its financial burden. This significantly complicated the 
negotiations. Agenda 2000 entailed difficult negotiations between net contributors 
and net beneficiaries on the size of regional aid, and within the net contributors’ 
group on sharing of the financial burden. 
 
4.3.1. Net contributors versus net beneficiaries 
Net contributors and net beneficiaries disagreed over reducing their financial 
burden and securing their financial benefits respectively. At the Cardiff European 
Council on 15-16 June 1998, under the UK Presidency, net beneficiaries drew a 
hard-and-fast line on the issue of freezing regional aid. The Spanish government, 
which had taken financial benefits from regional aid, argued that the creation of 
pre-accession aid was a primary element in threatening net beneficiaries’ financial 
benefits and was unwilling to agree the flow of the financial benefits it received 
towards preparing for the enlargement of CEECs. Hence, Spain was prepared to 
resist all attempts which would threaten its beneficial position (Financial Times, 
15 June 1998). The other Mediterranean member states, Greece and Portugal 
supported the Spanish argument, and demanded the increase of regional aid 
(Laffan and Shackleton, 2000). The Irish government also argued that it could not 
agree to Agenda 2000 because it was confronted with its own financial difficulties. 
Due to a steady economic growth since 1990, financial benefits from regional aid 
would be reduced. Furthermore, with regard to the Commission’s CAP proposal, 
its benefits from agricultural subsidies would be reduced too (Laffan and 
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Shackleton, 2000).    
While net beneficiaries opposed Agenda 2000, net contributors supported 
the Commission’s proposal on freezing the EU’s budget and regional aid. In 
particular, Chancellor Kohl was preoccupied with German national budgetary 
difficulties on paying the cost of German unification as well as the domestic 
political issue of a general election in September, and demanded the reduction of 
Germany’s net contribution. Kohl also demanded the establishment of a 
‘correction mechanism’ in order to reduce net contributors’ financial burden98. 
Blair and other the heads of other ‘net contributor’ governments saw that the 
demand restricted net beneficiaries’ requirements on the size of regional aid, and 
thus, supported Germany (Financial Times, 15 and 17 June 1998). At the Cardiff 
European Council, member states ascertained that a wide gap between net 
contributors and net beneficiaries on Agenda 2000 was blocking a financial 
agreement and therefore decided to postpone the financial negotiation so that 
Chancellor Kohl could avoid domestic political difficulties 99 in the German 
general election and fixed a deadline for financial agreement of March 1999 
(Financial Times, 17 June 1998).  
At the Vienna European Council under the Austrian Presidency on 11-12 
December 1998 member states started the financial negotiation, but could not 
bridge the wide gap which again was blocking agreement. Gerhard Schröder, 
Germany’s new chancellor, pointed out the size of Germany’s contribution to 
explain the appropriateness of reducing its contribution (Financial Times, 12 
                                           
98  Chancellor Kohl pointed to the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria as large net 
contributors to the EU’s budget (Financial Times, 15 June 1998). 
99 The financial negotiation for Agenda 2000 would provide political difficulties for 
Chancellor Kohl in the German general election on 27 September 1998. Kohl’s demands for the 
reduction of Germany’s net contribution, and an agreement of the financial negotiation were 
difficult to meet. Thus, if Kohl agreed to increase the EU budget and Germany’s contribution in 
order to achieve a financial agreement, he would not be able to avoid criticism from the other 
candidates over the increase of Germany’s financial burden. If Kohl delayed the financial 
agreement in order to reduce Germany’s financial burden, he would not be able to escape being 
criticised on the matter of his leadership in the EU (Financial Times, 17 June 1998). 
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December 1998). 100  With regard to the Commission’s report Budgetary 
imbalance for an individual member state on 7 October 1998, Germany’s payment 
to the EU’s budget was Ecu 11.08 billion in 1997 while the Netherlands, which 
was the second-biggest net contributor and the wealthier member state based on 
GDP, was Ecu 2.32 billion; Britain’s payment was Ecu 1.88 billion (Financial 
Times, 8 October and 10 December 1998). Due to Germany’s economic 
difficulties, Schröder demanded freezing the EU’s budget and regional aid in 
order to reduce its contribution. Blair hoped that Schröder’s argument would 
effectively bring about a concession from net beneficiaries but actually brought 
about opposition from the net beneficiaries and blocked the negotiation (Financial 
Times, 12 December 1998). The Austrian Presidency handed over negotiations of 
Agenda 2000 to the German Presidency in the first half of 1999. 
The German Presidency argued that it would concentrate on the reduction of 
Germany’s contribution, a freeze of regional aid, the reform of the CAP, and the 
reduction of the UK’s rebate in the financial negotiation for Agenda 2000 
(Financial Times, 27 January 1999). During the meetings of Economic and 
Financial Ministers on 7 February 1999, and Foreign Ministers on 25 February 
1999, the Presidency explored the possibility to reduce the wide gap between net 
contributors and net beneficiaries on the size of regional aid (Financial Times, 7 
and 26 February 1999). 
At the Berlin European Council on 24-25 March 1999, both net contributors 
and net beneficiaries made concessions to achieve the financial agreement. 
However, the concessions were caused by non-budgetary issues: the creation of a 
permanent committee for improving coordination of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), and an institutional crisis101 (Lindner, 2006; Laffan and 
Shackleton, 2000; Financial Times, 24 March 1999). Both net contributors and net 
beneficiaries recognised the importance of the financial agreement in order to 
                                           
100 In the German federal election on 27 September 1998, Schröder led the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) to victory, and became the Chancellor of Germany. 
101 Article 214 of TEU stipulated that the European Parliament had a voting power to 
approve nomination of the President and the other members of the Commission. In January 1999, 
the EP held an approval vote and dismissed the Research Commissioner, Edith Cresson, which 
caused Commissioners’ mass resignation in March 1999 (Peterson, 2006). 
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successfully encourage agreements to solve non-budgetary issues (Financial 
Times, 24 March 1999). The Presidency compromise proposed €213 billion of 
regional aid during the financial period for 2000-2006 which mediated between 
net beneficiaries’ minimum acceptance level of €239 billion and net contributors’ 
maximum acceptance level of €200billion. Finally, both groups agreed the 
Presidency compromise (Allen, 2000). 
 
4.3.2. The negotiation between net contributors on sharing the financial 
burden 
At the Cardiff European Council in June 1998, the UK’s rebate was attacked by 
other net contributors. The UK Presidency pointed out Germany’s demand on the 
size of its contribution which required not only the reduction of the UK’s rebate 
but also the increase of other net contributor’s contribution in order to reduce its 
contribution, and defined that the demand was a central issue in the negotiation 
between net contributors. The Presidency said that due to increased number of net 
contributors (the enlargement of EFTA countries in 1995) and freezing the size of 
the EU budget in the Agenda 2000, Germany’s contribution would be reduced. 
Nevertheless Germany continuously demanded the reduction its contribution 
which pressured Britain and other net contributors. Blair argued that Britain was 
still struggling with the imbalance between its contributions and receipts (see 
Figure 5.4). Therefore, although the British Presidency took a pro-European 
approach, it was very difficult to accept Germany’s demand on the reduction of 
the rebate (Financial Times, 15 June 1998).  
In response, other net contributors argued that, in 1984, member states had 
agreed the rebate mechanism in order to reduce a British imbalance which 
resulted from over 70 per cent of the EC’s budget spending going on agricultural 
subsidies. During the financial period for 1993-1999, farm spending was less than 
50 per cent. The percentage of agricultural subsidies indicated a reduction of the 
British budgetary imbalance (Financial Times, 8 October 1998). Thus, the 
appropriateness of the British rebate was in question. Furthermore, the net 
contributors pointed out the percentage of the British contribution to the EU’s 
 132 
budget was too little compared to that of Germany, Greece, France, and Italy102, 
and thus, demanded sharing of the financial burden with regard to Germany’s 
demand. Nevertheless, Blair was not convinced by these arguments and the 
negotiations on sharing financial burden were postponed to the Vienna European 
Council in December 1998 (Financial Times, 17 June 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
At the Vienna European Council, Schröder’s argument for reduction of the 
German contribution not only suppressed net beneficiaries’ demands for the 
increase of regional aid, but also required the reduction of the UK’s rebate and the 
reform of the CAP (Financial Times, 12 December 1998). Schröder argued that 
the reduction of the British rebate was essential to prepare pre-accession aid for 
the enlargement involving CEECs (Financial Times, 12 December 1998). Blair 
made a political linkage between the reduction of the rebate and the reform of the 
                                           
102 In 1997, Germany accounted for 26 per cent of the EU’s total GNP, and contributed 
28.2 per cent of the EU’s budget. Greece was 1.5 per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. France 
was 17.5 per cent and 17.5 per cent. Italy was 14.2 per cent and 11.5 per cent. However, the UK 
was 16.1 per cent and 11.9 per cent (Financial Times, 8 October 1998). 
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CAP. He insisted that the British rebate was fully justified because the CAP, 
which had caused the UK’s imbalance, still accounted for the highest expenditure 
in the EU’s budget. If net contributors wanted to reduce the UK’s rebate, they 
should agree to a significant reform of the CAP in order to address the British 
imbalance (Financial Times, 17 December 1998). The French President Jacques 
Chirac argued that budgetary imbalance was not solely a British problem. 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria also had had budgetary 
imbalances and had paid their contribution without the rebate. Thus, he criticised 
Blair’s political linkage and rejected an agreement on the reform of the CAP 
(Financial Times, 15 December 1998). Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg 
Prime Minister, criticised the debate on the reduction of the UK’s rebate and the 
reform of the CAP and the concomitant deadlock of the negotiations (Financial 
Times, 12 December 1998).  
At a meeting of Agricultural Ministers in Brussels on 9 March 1999, Jean 
Glavany, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing in France, agreed to the reform 
of the CAP in order to keep the strong alliance between France and Germany. The 
agreement placed considerable pressure on Britain to reduce the British rebate 
(Financial Times, March 9, 12, 1999; Lindner, 2006). At the Berlin European 
Council in March 1999, Chirac agreed to reduce agricultural subsidies from € 51.6 
billion in the Commission’s initial proposal to € 41.6 billion. Schröder argued that 
the reform of the CAP would reduce the UK’s imbalance, and all member states, 
except Britain, welcomed the reform of the UK’s rebate (Financial Times, 23 
March 1999). Britain criticised the agreement over CAP reform as being not 
enough to reduce the British imbalance. With regard to the EU’s market-based 
economic policies, the reform would significantly cut down the size of 
agricultural subsidies (Financial Times, 12 and 23 March 1999). Although Britain 
provided several reasons for retaining the rebate, the Blair government’s fear of 
criticism over its European policies in the domestic political arena, compared with 
the previous Conservative governments’ success, was a major factor (Blair, 2010: 
535-536). Finally, given Schröder’s ambition to be as much a leader of Europe as 
his predecessor, the Germany Presidency accepted retaining the UK rebate. 
Schröder thought that this consolidated reputation would help his party to win in 
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the election of the EP in June 1999 (Lindner, 2006).  
 
4.4. Outcome 
In the two European Councils in Cardiff and Vienna, Germany concentrated on 
the reduction of its contribution to the EU’s budget, and thus, demanded 
agreement of the Agenda 2000 package: the reduction of the UK’s rebate, the 
freeze of the EU’s budget and regional aid, and the reform of the CAP. However, 
during the German Presidency, Schröder not only concentrated on the reduction of 
his nation’s contribution but also the agreement of Agenda 2000 on time to 
maintain the continuity of German Chancellors as ‘leaders of Europe’. Although 
the German Presidency succeeded in cutting down EU revenue from 1.27 per cent 
of GDP to 1.13 per cent, agricultural subsidies from €51.6 billion to €41.6 billion, 
and regional aid, including the pre-accession aid, from € 32.5 billion to € 29.1 
billion, the Presidency failed in the matter of the reduction of the UK’s rebate; 
This meant that Germany would remain the biggest net contributor. Britain 
retained the UK’s rebate safely (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000; Lindner, 2006).   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the Delors I package, article 130s of the SEA (economic and social cohesion) 
was a key element in increasing the EC’s budget and regional aid which placed 
pressure on Britain to reduce its rebate. On the European project of ‘deepening’, 
whilst the Thatcher government supported the single market programme which 
was in line with its market-based economic ideas, it had a sceptical attitude on the 
SEA because it was believed to undermine national sovereignty, which was one of 
the elements of Thatcherism. The Thatcher government’s approach on the SEM 
meant that the UK agree the increase of regional aid and the size of the EC budget 
in the negotiations between net contributors and net beneficiaries at the 
Luxembourg European Council in December 1985. The British concession was a 
side-payment to the Mediterranean member states in order to boost the member 
states’ co-operation for completing the single market by 1992. In the negotiation 
within net contributors on sharing financial burden, due to the sceptical approach 
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to the SEA, Britain was undaunted by other net contributors’ threats. Other net 
contributors were willing to support the SEM. Thus, their threats were not strong 
enough to pressure Britain to reduce its rebate; the UK succeeded in retaining its 
rebate at the Brussels European Council in February 1988.  
The Delors II package contained the key element of creating the Cohesion 
Fund which aimed to support poorer member states to meet economic 
convergence criteria in the EMU. The Cohesion Fund caused the EU’s budget to 
increase, which called into question once again the British rebate. On the TEU, 
the Thatcher government took an anti-European approach in order to secure 
national sovereignty. In the financial negotiations, although the new Major 
government wanted to take a more pro-European approach, the Conservative 
government’s anti-European approach was restrained by Thatcherites in the 
Conservative party. In the negotiation between net contributors and net 
beneficiaries on the size of the EC budget and regional aid, the UK did not feel 
heavy pressure to reduce its rebate. Although the Conservative government was 
able to retain the rebate and to oppose the increase of the EC budget, due to 
Major’s wish to change the view of the UK of being an ‘awkward partner’, it 
agreed to the increase of the EC budget and regional aid in order to play the role 
of the Presidency successfully. In the negotiation with net contributors on sharing 
financial burden, the net contributors did not have any cards to use to pressure 
Britain to reduce its rebate. At the Edinburgh European Council in December 
1992, the UK managed to retain its rebate.  
Finally, the pre-accession aid for preparing the enlargement of CEECs was a 
key concern in the Agenda 2000 package. Taking into account the net 
contributors’ financial burden, the European Commission proposed freezing the 
EU’s budget and regional aid. However, Germany’s demand for reduction of its 
contribution complicated the negotiations. The New Labour government not only 
had a pro-European approach but also supported the enlargement. In the 
negotiations between net contributors and net beneficiaries on the size of the EU’s 
budget, and within net contributors on sharing financial burden, Germany’s and 
net contributors’ demands were further removed from the project. Although the 
New Labour government took a pro-European approach, Germany’s demand was 
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unacceptable to Britain and thus, the Blair government opposed the reduction of 
its rebate at the Berlin European Council in March 1999. 
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Chapter 5 
Sacrificing the rebate: the UK’s concession in 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
On 10 February 2004, the European Commission published a proposal which 
packaged together the Lisbon strategy and the financial perspective for 2007-2013. 
Taking into account the enlargement of Central and Eastern European Countries in 
2004 it proposed a reduction of the UK’s rebate. The UK rebate became a 
controversial issue at the Brussels European Council in June 2005, under the 
Luxembourg presidency. On the one hand, several member states added to 
pressure on the UK, despite their being aware of the UK’s imbalanced 
contributions, in order to avoid an increase of their own contribution. On the other 
hand, the UK struck a blow, but in line with its support of the Lisbon strategy and 
the enlargement, Tony Blair made a conditional offer, linking the UK’s rebate and 
the reform of the CAP. For Britain, the CAP was not only a barrier to the 
modernisation of EU spending priorities, but also a primary cause of Britain’s 
financial imbalance. This proposal was confronted with French and German 
opposition, which caused Britain to leave the negotiation table, and the eventual 
failure to achieve a compromise under Luxembourg’s Presidency.  
The financial negotiations were continued in the Brussels European Council, 
December 2005. The new UK Presidency organised several meetings, such as an 
informal European Council and other Council meetings, to persuade member 
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states on the importance of the modernisation of the EU. Member states continued 
to pressure the UK to take seriously the responsibilities of net contributors and of 
the Presidency of the Council, and change its position on the rebate in order to 
achieve the financial agreement. At the Brussels European Council in December, 
Britain unexpectedly accepted a reduction in the size of its rebate and successfully 
led member states towards achieving the financial agreement. 
This chapter, thus, explores the negotiations for the 2007-2013 financial 
perspective, explaining the change of the UK’s position on the rebate in December 
2005. To do so, it consists of three main sections. The first section analyses the 
Commission’s proposal in order to identify the main influences upon the 
Commission proposed reduction of the UK’s rebate. In particular, it looks at the 
Lisbon strategy, the Eastern enlargement, and the proposal to cut the British rebate. 
The second section concentrates on the UK’s approach to the Commission’s 
proposal, again paying attention to the Lisbon strategy, the enlargement, and the 
proposal for a reduction of its rebate. The third section concentrates on the 
negotiations between member states, first under the Luxembourg Presidency and 
then under the UK presidency. The aim is to explain the difference in the British 
decisions between the two European Council meetings in June and December 
2005. 
 
 
2. The Commission’s financial proposal for 2007-2013 
Two elements affected the shaping of the Commission’s financial proposal: the 
Lisbon strategy and the enlargement of Central and Eastern European Countries. 
The Lisbon strategy indicated the direction of the EU for further European 
integration with regard to the challenge of globalisation, and in the intention of the 
Commission the 2007-2013 financial perspective aimed to financially support it. 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds not only increased the number of member 
states from 15 to 27 but also resulted in the increase of the size of the EU budget 
for redistribution.   
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2.1. The Lisbon strategy 
At the European Council in Lisbon on 23-24 March 2000, the member states 
discussed a modernisation of the EU which derived from Delors’ White Paper in 
1993. The White Paper not only emphasised strengthening the EU’s economic 
growth, competitiveness, and jobs in order to prepare conditions within the EU for 
the global stage, but also required radical social and economic reforms. The 
Delors proposal had originally died out with Delors’ resignation. However, when 
the EU was faced with the challenge of globalisation and demographic changes, 
the Delors’ White Paper was revitalized (Jones, 2005). 
Since the 1990s, two elements had boosted globalisation: the development 
of technology and the collapse of the Cold War. First of all, it could be said that 
globalisation was an outcome of the development of technology which had been 
able to encourage information sharing, and movement of goods across countries 
and continents, thereby facilitating communication. Secondly, after the end of the 
Cold War, neo-liberalism spread and led to the removal of trade barriers, which 
resulted in a dramatic growth in foreign trade and investment (Dion, 2005). 
Globalisation had brought about the boosting of ‘competitiveness’ in the world 
market (Howarth, 2007).  
At the time, the EU was witnessing the economic success of the US under 
the Clinton administration. In response to financial advice from the Federal 
Reserve Bank, the Clinton administration changed its macroeconomic policies, 
notably cutting down interest rates. This policy brought about an increase in 
investment concentrated on technological innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) industries. The investment not only stabilized 
US economic growth but also ended the run of the previous Republican 
administrations under Reagan and Bush senior fighting against stagnation, and the 
high fiscal deficits of 1985-1992 (Collignon, 2008). Furthermore, the investment 
raised productivity in the ICT industries which encroached on the global market. 
The US experienced an increase in GDP from 2.2 per cent in 1992 to 3 per cent in 
2000 and a 4 per cent fall in the unemployment rate in 2000 (Collignon, 2008; 
Dierx and Ilzkovitz, 2006; Mundschenk et al., 2006). This outstanding 
performance brought about a wide gap between the EU and the US. In particular, 
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the EU’s per capita GDP was 30 per cent lower than that of the US while the EU’s 
employment was about 87.4 per cent of the US. A reform to modernise the EU 
was seen as essential to catch up with the US’s economic growth in the global 
market (Dierx and Ilzkovitz, 2006). 
Furthermore, the European Commission expected that, from 2010 onwards, 
the EU would experience a demographic shock: declining birth rates and an 
increasing of life expectancies. Due to the retirement of the post-war baby-boom 
generation, the working population in Europe would decline about 18 per cent by 
2050. The reduction of the working population would not only contribute 
problems for the EU economy in terms of low productivity but also would 
become a cause of difficulty in providing finance for welfare systems in Europe. 
This demographic change meant that an appropriate solution to the reduction of 
the EU’s labour force and productivity, and the financial shortfall needed to be 
found (Dierx and Ilzkovitz, 2006; Dion, 2005). 
With regard to the challenge of globalisation and the demographic changes, 
the EU held a series of European Councils. At this series of European Councils, 
member states did not agree to create any substantial policies for the reform of the 
EU. Thus, the outcomes of the European Council were called ‘processes’ 
(Collignon, 2008). At the first European Council in Luxembourg in December 
1997, the member states launched the ‘Luxembourg process’ which focused on 
promotion of employment and a lifelong learning strategy.103 Six months later, 
the member states held the Cardiff European Council in June 1998, and agreed the 
‘Cardiff process’, which required a proposal from the Commission on a new 
policy of environmental protection.104 Finally, at the Cologne European Council 
in June 1999, the ‘Cologne process’ outlined the reform of the EU (Wallace, 2004; 
McCann, 2010; Meyer et al., 2007).  
At the Lisbon European Council on 23-24 March 2000, the member states 
                                           
103  In the context of the ‘Luxembourg process’, the Commission analysed national 
employment action plans and proposed an annual employment report in order to provide 
guidelines. The report had suggested the reform of the labour market, notably towards lifelong 
learning strategy, in order to increase labour supply and participation (Nugent, 2010).  
104 The Cardiff European Council required the Commission to prepare a report regarding 
creating integrated environmental projections within EU policies (Nugent, 2010).  
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adopted the Lisbon strategy. The Lisbon strategy was a ten-year agenda for 
making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’ by 2010. At the Gothenburg European Council in June 
2001, the environmental dimension became an additional component in the 
strategy (McCann, 2010; Begg, 2008; Dion, 2005; Mundschenk et al., 2006).   
The Lisbon strategy consisted of 6 objectives: economic performance, 
employment, research, innovation and education, economic reform, social 
cohesion, and environment. On the objective of economic performance, member 
states agreed to increase the average economic growth rate by 3 per cent. On 
employment, the member states agreed increasing the overall employment rate to 
about 70 per cent and that for older workers about 50 per cent by 2010. For the 
objective of research, innovation and education, the member states agreed 
financial expenditure of about 3 per cent of the EU’s GDP to support human 
capital, Research and Development (R&D), innovation, Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) and education for the development of human 
resources and life-long learning by 2010. On economic reform, the member states 
agreed to complete the internal market for finance and services. For social 
cohesion, the strategy proposed combating poverty and securing pensions. Finally, 
the strategy proposed reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2005 and reducing 
the use of electricity by 22 per cent by 2010 (Wallace, 2004; Dieckhoff and Gallie, 
2007; Jones, 2005; Meister and Verspagen, 2006). 
  Within the objectives of the Lisbon strategy, the objective on research, 
innovation and education in particular was top of the agenda for the modernisation 
of the EU with regard to the challenges of globalisation and demographic change. 
The strategy emphasised that the objective would increase labour participation 
through the extension of older workers’ retirement, and would strengthen the EU’s 
competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy to catch up with the US’s 
economic growth in the global market. Thus, the strategy proposed an increase in 
the EU’s expenditure on education and training systems in order to improve the 
quantity and quality of human capital. Although human capital and R&D 
investment would bring about lower employment and economic growth during the 
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education and training period, the member states believed that the improvement of 
human capital would be a key element for increasing economic prosperity through 
higher labour skills and productivity in the global market (Dion, 2005 Jones, 
2005; Meister and Verspagen, 2006). 
The Lisbon strategy did not propose any uniformity and regulation of 
methods to achieve the objectives, but proposed a flexible ‘Open Method of 
Coordination’ (OMC). The OMC allowed the member states to take diverse 
approaches to the objectives in order to avoid member states’ reluctance to 
transfer competences to the EU on economic and social policy and areas about 
which the member states had political sensitivities, and to find the best practices 
(Schelkle, 2005; Dion, 2005). In the OMC, the Commission played a key role of 
‘quantitative and qualitative indicators’. The member states submitted annual 
reports about the progress of their approaches to the Commission. The 
Commission adopted the best practices in order to recommend them to member 
states. The member states would take benchmarking from the best practices in 
order to effectively shape their approaches. The strategy was scheduled for mid-
term review in March 2005 in order to check the member states’ progress (Nugent, 
2010; Wallace, 2004).    
The Brussels European Council in March 2004 established a special 
committee, under the leadership of the former Dutch Minister, Wim Kok, in order 
to investigate the progress of the Lisbon strategy for the mid-term review. The 
committee published a report: Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Employment in November 2004, and presented it to the Brussels 
European Council in March 2005 (Haar and Copeland, 2010). The Kok report not 
only indicated member states’ efforts had been inadequate in achieving the Lisbon 
strategy but also flagged necessary reform of the EU in order to deal properly with 
globalisation (Begg, 2008). The report said that globalisation had encouraged the 
leadership of the US through technological development, and had strengthened 
Asia countries’ competitiveness by ‘imitation productivities’ in the world 
market.105 The exceptional performance of the US and Asian countries in the 
                                           
105 Since the 1990s, Asian countries had imitated the industrial model in order to develop 
and increase their productivities. Due to the cheap labour cost in Asian countries, Asian products 
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global market alarmed the EU sufficiently for it to rapidly adopt the Lisbon 
strategy and raise the level of high-tech productivities for strengthening the EU’s 
competitiveness (Dieckhoff and Gallie, 2007; Haar and Copeland, 2010). In 
particular, the report emphasised the EU’s knowledge-based productivities in 
order to defend against imitation of their products and to compete with the US’s 
products, and suggested a creation of financial incentives through the EU’s 
budgetary flow toward knowledge-based economic areas, in order to encourage 
member states to endeavour to achieve the Lisbon objectives (Meister and 
Verspagen, 2006; Dion, 2005). 
The European Commission agreed with the Kok report’s viewpoint and 
proposed an increase of the EU’s budgetary spending on research and 
development in order to modernise EU industries and employment policies 
(Nugent, 2010: 341). At the Brussels European Council on 22-23 March 2005, the 
member states agreed to set up ‘integrated guidelines’ on economic and 
employment policies. These ‘Integrated guidelines’ proposed establishment of the 
European Technology Institute (ETI) which would not only focus on improving 
research and education programmes in order to develop EU policies of knowledge, 
innovation and human capital but also would concentrate on securing the EU’s 
budgetary flow towards education and training (Jones, 2005; Dion, 2005; Haar 
and Copeland, 2010). 
 
2.2. The enlargement of CEECs 
During 1994-1996, ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) applied 
for membership of the EU. 106  The accession negotiations included two 
Mediterranean island states: Malta and Cyprus. 107  The EU divided the ten 
                                                                                                                   
had not only reduced the price of products but also encroached on the world market. See Dion 
(2005).  
106 In 1994, Hungary and Poland within the CEECs first decided to apply for the EU 
membership. Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria applied for membership 
in 1995. In 1996, the Czech Republic and Slovenia joined the applicant group (Barnes and Barnes, 
2007). 
107 Although Cyprus and Malta applied for membership of the EU on 4 and 16 July 1990 
respectively, Cyprus’ EU membership was delayed by Turkey’s opposition and Malta also had a 
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applicants plus Malta and Cyprus into two groups according to the Copenhagen 
criteria. The first group included the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, 
and Slovenia, plus Cyprus which were close to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia plus Malta composed the 
second group, which needed more time to meet the criteria (Nugent, 2004b). 
At the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, the member 
states agreed that the EU would open the first accession negotiations with the first 
group in March 1998 (Sedelmeier, 2005). In the Commission’s regular report in 
October 1999, the Commission suggested a start to accession negotiations with 
the second group (Barnes and Barnes, 2007: 423). At the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999, the member states adopted the Commission’s 
recommendation and decided to open the negotiations in February 2000. The 
member states also agreed to complete the enlargement before the European 
Parliament’s election in June 2004 (Nugent, 2010). 
In November 2000, the Commission proposed a flexible framework which 
provided flexible conditions with regard to the Copenhagen criteria to the 
applicants, and a ‘roadmap’ which would give priority of EU membership to the 
more prepared states within the applicants, in order to complete the negotiations 
by December 2002 (Nugent, 2010). There were two reasons for the Commission’s 
proposal. First of all, the EU was considering its economic growth through the 
enlargement. The enlargement would bring about an increase in size of the EU’s 
internal market due to increasing the EU’s population by about 106 million people. 
Thus, removing trade barriers between the EU and CEECs would boost trade and 
would revitalise the EU’s economic growth. The Commission focused on 
speeding up the completion of the enlargement in order to overcome the recession 
affecting the EU’s economic growth (Nugent, 2004a: 5; Bache and George, 2006: 
212). Secondly, the EU was wary of the President of the Russian Federation 
                                                                                                                   
domestic political debate on the EU which delayed its EU membership. In March 1998, the two 
Mediterranean island states joined the accession negotiations of the CEECs. See Pace (2006). 
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Vladimir Putin’s aggressive nationalism108 and its role in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which caused it to accelerate the accession negotiations with the 
applicants (Archer, 2004; Barnes and Barnes, 2007). 
At the Nice European Council in December 2000, and the Gothenburg 
European Council in June 2001, the member states discussed and accepted the 
Commission’s proposal. At the Copenhagen summit in December 2002, the 
member states achieved agreement of the enlargement and scheduled the signing 
of an agreement in April 2003. The agreement indicated that all applicants apart 
from Bulgaria and Romania would become member states of the EU in May 2004. 
The member states decided to delay Bulgaria and Romania’s membership until the 
two applicants were ready to meet the Copenhagen criteria. At the Brussels 
European Council in December 2004, the member states agreed Bulgarian and 
Romanian membership – they would become EU members in January 2007 
(Goetz, 2005; Nugent, 2004b). 
Since the application of flexible conditions to the applicants to speed up the 
negotiations, the EU succeeded in making the enlargement despite the applicants’ 
poor economic condition. The enlargement increased the size of both the 
population of the EU and territory by about 33 per cent, and the EU’s GDP by 
only 5 per cent, while it brought about a fall of about 18 per cent in the EU’s 
average per capita GDP (Allen, 2005; Nugent, 2004a; Barnes and Barnes, 2007). 
The applicants’ economic condition was poorer than that of the EU’s poorest 
member state, Greece. The poor economic condition of the new members 
demanded that the Commission propose generous redistributive policies in the 
financial proposal for 2007-2013 (Nugent, 2004a).  
 
2.3. Analysis of the Commission’s financial proposal  
In December 2003, the heads of the net contributor states (Austria, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) sent a joint letter to the President 
                                           
108 The nationalist Vladimir Putin became acting President in December 1999 and won the 
2000 presidential election. Once President of the Russian Federation, Putin’s nationalism focused 
on recovering  the status of ‘great power’, which was one of the elements of Russian identity.  
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of the Commission, Romano Prodi,109 proposing a ceiling of 1 per cent of the 
EU’s GDP on revenue as a level for Agenda 2000 for the Commission’s financial 
proposal for 2007-2013, with a view to reducing their financial contribution 
(Nugent, 2010). However, on 10 February 2004, the European Commission 
proposed 1.14 per cent on the EU’s expenditure and 1.24 per cent on the EU’s 
revenue in its financial proposal (COM, 2004a, 2004b). The increase resulted 
from the Commission’s consideration of elements of the Lisbon strategy and the 
enlargement of Central and Eastern European Countries (Laffan and Lindner, 
2010; Nugent, 2006).  
Firstly, the European Commission took into account the Sapir report,110 
which suggested a transformation of the EU’s redistributive policies from 
supporting regional aid and farmers’ income to paying attention to education, 
research and technology, aimed at strengthening the EU’s competitive economy in 
the world (Laffan and Lindner, 2010: 220). The Commission not only introduced 
a new title of ‘competitiveness for growth and employment’ in the EU’s 
expenditure policies but also allocated 8.3 per cent of the EU’s budgetary 
spending to support achieving the Lisbon strategy by 2010 (Nugent, 2006: 436; 
COM, 2004a; Lorca, 2005). 
Secondly, the Commission predicted that the enlargement would add 5 per 
cent to the EU’s GDP and revenues but would expand the EU by 30 per cent in 
terms of population (Financial Times, 12 February 2004). The new member states’ 
economic poverty demanded an increase in regional aid. The Commission 
proposed increase of regional aid from €275 billion in the 1999-2006 financial 
                                           
109 After the resignation of Jacques Santer as President of the Commission in 1999, 
Romano Prodi succeeded him as President and took was in the position during 1999-2004. Prodi 
prepared the Commission’s financial proposal for 2007-2013. Josè Manuel Barroso succeeded the 
President in 2004 and took part in financial negotiation in 2005. See Appendix No. 2: The 
Presidents of the Commission.  
110 Prodi mandated an independent economic expert’s group, chaired by the 
Belgian economist, Andrè Sapir, to present a report about the EU’s redistributive 
policies for solving the EU’s sluggish economic growth. In July 2003, the Sapir report 
criticised the EU’s redistributive policies which had focused on agricultural subsidies 
and suggested refocusing EU spending policies towards research and technological 
development in the Lisbon strategy. See Laffan and Lindner (2010).  
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perspectives to €335 billion in the 2007-2013 financial perspectives (Allen, 2005: 
222, 233). 
On the EU’s revenue side, for the increase of the EU’s expenditure and 
budget, the Commission was not able to package it with the reform of the CAP for 
sharing CAP expenditure with the objectives of ‘competitiveness for growth and 
employment’ and regional aid because of the 2003 reform 111 , which fixed 
agricultural subsidies at about 42.8 per cent of the EU’s budget until 2013 (Nugent, 
2010: 404, 2006: 466). In order to fulfil the increase of the EU’s budget, the 
Commission proposed a ‘generalized correction mechanism’112 to re-adjust the 
UK’s rebate system (Laffan and Lindner, 2010: 221). The Commission expected 
that thanks to the enlargement of CEECs, EU spending which had gone to poorer 
parts of Britain would go to new members. The consequence would be that, in the 
UK’s rebate system, the UK would pay in less than any other rich member states: 
0.25 per cent of the EU’s budget compared with 0.56 per cent for the Netherlands, 
0.54 per cent for Germany and 0.37 for France (The Economist, 10 July 2004). 
Therefore, with the new corrective mechanism, the European Commission 
proposed to replace Britain’s special treatment with a general rebate for all 
countries with excessive net budget contributions, thus putting pressure on Britain 
to share the other net contributors’ financial burden (Financial Times, 9 September 
2004; COM, 2004b). 
 
 
 
 
                                           
111 In December 2001, at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Doha Ministerial Meeting, 
the EU and other countries agreed to launch the Doha round. The Doha round focused on reducing 
domestic support programmes which had distorted trade. At the Brussels European Council in 
October 2002, the member states not only discussed the CAP expenditure but also concluded the 
reform of the CAP which would apply to the period of 2003-2013. The 2003 reform reduced 
agricultural subsidies through reducing costs for export subsidies from about 48 per cent of the 
EU’s budget to 42.8 per cent. See Rieger (2005), Woolcock (2005), and Fouilleux (2007).. 
112 A ‘generalised correction mechanism’ focused on the budgetary burden, which would 
otherwise become excessive in relation to member states’ relative prosperity. In the Commission’s 
proposal, the new mechanism concentrated on the reduction of the UK’s abatement (Laffan and 
Lindner, 2010).  
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Table 5.1  Financial Perspective 2007-2013 (in EUR million) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Appropriations for commitments: 
1. SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
47582 59680 62800 65800 68240 70660 73715 76790 
1a. Competitiveness For growth and 
employment  
87910 12110 14390 16680 18970 21250 23540 25830 
1b. Cohesion for Growth and 
employment 
38791 47570 48410 49120 49270 49410 50175 50960 
2. PRESERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL 
RESOURCES 
56015 57180 57900 58120 57980 57850 57825 57810 
Of which: Agriculture-Market 
related expenditure and direct 
payments 
43735 43500 43670 43350 43030 42710 42506 42290 
3. CITIZENSHIP FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE 
1381 1630 2015 2330 2645 2970 3295 3620 
4. THE EU AS A GLOBAL 
PARTNER 
11232 11400 12180 12950 13720 14500 15115 15740 
5. ADMINISTRATION 3436 3675 3815 3950 4090 4225 4365 4500 
Compensations 1.041        
Total appropriations for 
commitments 
120690 133600 13870
0 
14310
0 
14670
0 
15020
0 
15432
0 
15850
0 
Total appropriations for payments 114740 124600 13650
0 
12770
0 
12600
0 
13240
0 
13840
0 
14310
0 
Appropriations for payment as a % 
of GNI 
1.09 1.15 1.23 1.12 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.15 
Margin 0.15 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 
Own-resources Ceiling (% of GNI) 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
<Source: Commission ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Financial Perspectives 2007-2013’ COM (2004) 487 final> 
 
 
3. The UK’s attitude to the Commission’s proposal 
The Blair government played a leading role in the adoption of the Lisbon strategy 
– considered an optimal way to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in the global 
market – and supported the enlargement of Central and Eastern European 
Countries – with the aim of not only gaining some economic advantages but also 
strengthening the position of the EU in the global arena. It could not, however, 
accept the Commission’s proposal to package the Lisbon strategy, the enlargement 
and the financial perspectives for 2007-2013, particularly the reduction of the 
UK’s rebate. This section, thus, reviews the reaction of the Blair government, 
paying particularly attention to the domestic political difficulties it would have to 
face if it accepted the reduction of its budget rebate.   
 
 149 
3.1. The Lisbon strategy 
In the early 1980s, the Labour party adopted the Alternative Economic Strategy 
(AES), which emphasised the role of the British government in economic policy 
to protect national industries, to manage renationalisation, and to secure public 
services.  For this the Labour party took an anti-European approach and even 
called for a British withdrawal from the EC,113 its concern being that the EC had 
put too much emphasis on the role of the market rather than the role of the state.  
However, after the failure of the 1987 general election, the Labour party gave up 
its argument on British membership and abandoned the AES (Daniels, 2003: 227). 
In the early 1990s, the Labour party attempted to come to terms with 
globalisation and changed its economic policy with regard to the market and 
global economies. It understood that globalisation was an inevitable external 
economic constraint which required Britain to consider the increasing 
liberalisation of trade and market individualism, in order to rightly respond to the 
global activities of businesses (Wilkinson, 2000:137). The Labour party, thus, 
devised the concept of the ‘Third Way’ instead of continuing Labour’s traditional 
social democracy114. But this divided the party into ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour 
(Finlayson, 1999: 272; Heffernan, 2000:xii; Watson and Hay, 2003: 296). After 
the 1997 general election, the New Labour government concretised its economic 
policy with regard to the ‘Third Way’, which meant adapting the market 
individualism of the neo-liberal approach in order to modernise the UK (Coates, 
2000: 2). By doing so, it distanced itself from ‘old’ Labour’s state-centred 
approach to regulating market forces and focused on designing market forces to 
be dynamic and to secure the public interest (Newman, 2001: 1; Coates, 2000: 6). 
The Blair government not only concentrated on promoting dynamic and 
                                           
113 In the 1983 and 1987 general elections, the Labour party’s manifesto clearly pointed out 
its anti-European approach. The Labour party argued that its economic ideas on the role of the 
government in economy were incompatible with the EC (Daniels, 2003). 
114 Since the 1990s, the Labour party has adopted the concept of the ‘Third Way’ which 
was a criterion of a division of the Labour party between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labours. ‘Old’ Labour 
was defined by its ideology of social democracy which not only emphasised the government’s 
intervention in the market but also focused on the role of the government in controlling taxation 
and public expenditure for economic and welfare politics. ‘New’ Labour adopted the concept of 
the ‘Third Way’. See Heffernan (2000), and Chadwick and Heffernan (2003a).   
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competitive business but also considered combining economic dynamism and 
social cohesion to design its domestic policies. It focused on the role of the 
government in supporting education and training systems for improving the 
quantity and quality of human capital (Coates, 2000: 11; Stedward, 2000: 171). It 
argued that Britain needed to invest in strengthening human capital in order for 
the British economy to survive in globalisation and international competition, and 
to enhance employability to reduce the rate of unemployment. Thus, the 
government repositioned the education and training system to become a primary 
component in economic policy in order to assist workers to effectively develop 
their skills and competencies (Tonge, 1999: 228). Ultimately high-skilled workers 
would become high-waged employees and would contribute to economic 
prosperity. The support for the education and training system was an appropriate 
policy to meet the government’s social cohesion aim, which paid attention to 
increasing employability rather than increasing the UK’s national budget 
expenditure on public services (Stedward, 2000: 171, 174). 
Globalisation not only influenced a change in Labour’s economic ideas but 
also affected the New Labour government’s approach to European integration. In 
the ‘Britain in Europe’ campaign in October 1999, Blair pointed out the UK’s 
economic connections with the European single market. He said that, in 1999, the 
single market provided 3.5 million British jobs due to over 50 per cent of British 
trade being with EU member states. In trade, the British companies daily sold 
about 320 million pounds value of their goods and services in the single market. 
Furthermore, the British membership attracted investment flows from non-EU 
companies which tended to choose Britain as a bridgehead for getting their 
products into Europe. Non-EU investment created 50, 000 British new jobs (Blair, 
2003a: 237; Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003b: 223). Finally, not only did he 
emphasise the British membership of the EU but he also stressed a common 
destiny between the UK and the EU in terms of economic prosperity in the global 
market (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003: 223). 
The New Labour government not only focused on the modernisation of 
British economic policies but also addressed the development of the single market 
in the EU (Hughes and Smith, 2003: 233; Blair and Schröder, 2003: 115). It 
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argued that the EU urgently needed to reform its social regulation agenda of the 
1980s in order to strengthen the competitiveness of European industry (Blair and 
Schröder, 2003: 115; Gifford, 2007: 472: Redgrave, 2008: 424). Moreover, 
considering that all member states were faced with the same challenges, it called 
for the EU to advance a collective response to effectively deal with the challenges 
of globalisation (Sherrington, 2006: 71; Gifford, 2007: 472; Chadwick and 
Heffernan, 2003b: 223; Blair, 2003b: 240). This new pro-European approach 
overcame the Labour party’s traditional hostility to the EU and put the UK in a 
position to be able to guide the reform of the EU: to advocate working with 
globalisation rather than against it (Bulmer, 2008: 608; Daniels, 2003: 228; 
Hughes and Smith, 2003: 232). 
In view of the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the Commission 
proposed that the EU would focus on the development of a knowledge-based 
economy for strengthening innovation, competition, and employment (Bulmer, 
2008: 608; Sherrington, 2006: 71). The New Labour government supported the 
Commission’s proposal and tried to persuade other member states, arguing that 
the Commission’s proposal would not only enhance the EU’s economic 
competitiveness but would also help to tackle unemployment (Sherrington, 2006: 
71; Gifford, 2007: 472; Hughes and Smith, 2003: 232). As for the other member 
states, the centre-right politicians, the Prime Minister of Spain, José Maria Aznar 
and his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi supported the UK views (Smith, 
2005: 710; Bulmer, 2008: 608). The French President Jacques Chirac was 
concerned that the new economic strategy would reduce France’s financial 
benefits from the CAP. Furthermore, he argued that Britain’s economic idea for 
the modernisation of the EU was based on an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economic model,115 
and, thus, the reform of the EU would undermine the EU’s traditional social 
model (Hopkin and Wincott, 2006: 51, 61; Gowland et al., 2010: 148). 
Blair, in turn, argued that the New Labour government’s Third Way 
                                           
115 Chirac used the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ regarding the economic model in order to criticise 
the New Labour government’s economic idea of the ‘Third Way’ which guided the modernisation 
of the EU. He described the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model as based on US-style economic policies which 
focused on achieving economic growth rather than social cohesion. See Hopkin and Wincott 
(2006). 
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combined an ‘Anglo’ dimension by focusing on economic competitiveness and a 
‘Nordic’ component by emphasising social equity. The Third Way, therefore, 
could be described as an ‘Anglo-Social’ model rather than an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
economic approach (Hopkin and Wincott, 2006: 61). Furthermore, he argued that 
the Third Way was a ‘post-ideological’ concept, which was able to modernise the 
EU’s economy in response to globalisation and concentrated on the reform of the 
EU’s economic policy to provide people’s needs in the global era (Bulmer, 2008: 
608; Hughes and Smith, 2003: 232; Redgrave, 2008: 424). Eventually, the 
member states adopted the Lisbon strategy and also agreed on the voluntary 
approach of the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC), welcomed by the UK as 
a soft way to promote the Lisbon strategy’s acceptability to member states, several 
of which did not support the UK’s economic ideas for the modernisation of the 
EU (Bulmer, 2008: 609; Smith, 2005: 710). 
 
3.2. The enlargement of the CEECs 
The EU faced a dilemma between ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ in the enlargement 
of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Some member states 
(France, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) argued that deepening would threaten 
widening, while the UK was a member of the group which supported the 
enlargement (Nugent and Mather, 2006: 144). 116  Britain’s requirements for 
recovering British world power, gaining economic benefits and strengthening the 
EU’s competitiveness affected the shaping of its position on the enlargement 
(Gowland et al., 2010: 153; Bulmer, 2008: 602; Nugent and Mather, 2006: 144; 
Barnes and Barnes, 2007: 422). First of all, Britain’s support for the enlargement 
derived from the New Labour government’s goal to recover British leadership in 
the world. The New Labour government not only demanded maximisation of 
                                           
116 France and less prosperous member states, notably Ireland, Spain and Portugal, were 
not willing to support the enlargement of the CEECs. They were concerned about a potential 
reduction of their financial benefits from the EU budget, to be used to support new member states. 
Thus, they argued that the enlargement should be postponed. Germany and the UK supported the 
Eastern enlargement. Germany considered its security and economic benefits from the 
enlargement. Britain’ position on the enlargement was reflected by its attempt to recover world 
power and modernise the EU (Nugent, 2004a). 
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British national power to influence matters abroad through the EU but also played 
a leading part in leading the EU to have a new political vision and role in 
international affairs (Stephens, 2003: 254; Hughes and Smith, 2003: 231). The 
British position considered the CEECs’ security issues. During August and 
December 1991, the Soviet Union experienced the independence of member states 
in the former Soviet Republics which brought about the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. After the period, the Russian government was pressured by nationalists to 
recover its world power and to increase its involvement in Central and East 
Europe. In these circumstances, the CEECs were anxious about threats to their 
security from a recovery of Russian nationalism, which proclaimed an aggressive 
Russia’s involvement in Europe. Thus, CEECs urgently pressed both the EU and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to accept their membership in 
order to include them under the liberal democratic states’ security umbrella 
(Nugent, 2004a: 4). In NATO, the US hesitated over the membership of the 
CEECs because the US did not want to upset its relations with Russia. In the EU, 
Britain pressured the EU to accept the membership of the CEECs in order for the 
EU to play a role in stabilising Central and Eastern Europe. For Britain, the 
enlargement was an opportunity to demonstrate its leadership in European affairs 
(Bache and George, 2006:551; Barnes and Barnes, 2007: 422). 
Secondly, Britain not only considered its economic advantages from the 
enlargement of the CEECs in 2004, but was also interested in strengthening the 
EU’s competitiveness through the enlargement (Gowland et al., 2010: 153; 
Nugent and Mather, 2006: 144; Nugent, 2004a: 5). The accession of the 10 + 2 
countries would increase the size of the single market in the EU and the EU’s 
population by 106 million people (Nugent, 2004a: 5). The accession of the CEECs 
into the single market would not only abolish national governments’ control on 
the movement of goods but would also remove trade barriers. Britain expected to 
gain economic prosperity from trade liberalisation in the new EU (Grabbe, 2004: 
71). Furthermore, the CEECs’ EU membership would be attractive to both EU and 
non-EU companies because of the availability of high-skilled labour with cheap 
labour cost. Increasing investment flows would develop the new member states’ 
economies and would transfer their economic structure from manufacturing 
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industries to technological industries. Investment would also create jobs and 
would solve unemployment in the new member states (Baltas, 2004: 155). The 
economic development of the new members would boost the EU’s economic 
dynamics, which would strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in the global market. 
These economic developments would meet with the new Labour government’s 
ambition to modernise the EU’s economic policies in order to enhance the EU’s 
competitiveness in the Lisbon strategy (Bulmer, 2008: 602). 
 
3.3. The financial perspective 
In its proposal for the financial perspective for 2007-2013, the European 
Commission introduced a new title of ‘competitiveness for growth and 
employment’ in the EU’s expenditure policies with regard to the Lisbon strategy 
and decided to take into account the potential impact of the enlargement of the 
CEECs. As a result, it proposed 1.24 per cent of GDP for the EU’s revenue and 
the reduction of the UK’s rebate (Nugent, 2010: 404). In response, the UK argued 
that the EU’s expenditure in the financial period of Agenda 2000 (1999-2006) was 
only 0.98 per cent and, even taking into account the Lisbon strategy and the 
upcoming enlargement rounds, the increasing size of the EU’s revenue was too 
high and would add to net contributors’ financial burden. Consequently, it insisted 
on keeping the ceiling at 1 per cent of GDP (The Guardian, 10 February 2004). 
Moreover, an interviewee said that he and his colleagues understood the 
domestic economic groups’ demand to financially support the Lisbon strategy and 
the enlargement of CEECs. However, they recognised that the Commission’s 
financial proposal was not a new version of ‘Lisbon budget’ plan for financially 
supporting the modernisation of the EU. Rather, the proposal continued in line 
with the ‘Delors budget’. As a result of this, the government had to focus on 
retaining the rebate and Britain’s financial imbalance as the previous governments 
did during the ‘Delors budget’ negotiations. The government argued that the CAP 
expenditure still remained a big size in the budget. Though the Commission could 
not include the reform of the CAP in the financial proposal due to reform in 2003, 
it still want the Commission to propose some changes to reflect the Lisbon 
strategy in its proposal (Nugent, 2010; The Guardian, 10 February 2004). In fact, 
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the Commission’s proposal would bring about imbalance for the UK: compared 
with France, which has a similar size of population and economy, the UK would 
pay more for the EU budget but would receive fewer benefits from farm subsidies 
(See Figures 6.1 and 6.2)117 Thus, the UK had no desire to reduce its rebate and 
to accept the Commission’s proposal (The Guardian, 15 July 2004; Financial 
Times, 8 July 2004). 
 
                                           
117 With regard to the Commission’s financial perspective for 2007-2013, without the UK’s 
rebate, the British financial contribution would soar from 0.25 per cent to 0.65 per cent, i.e. 50 per 
cent more than France (The Economist 10 July 2004; Financial Times, 9 July 2004). 
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It should be also take into consideration that Blair’s unpopularity with the British 
public increased the burden upon the New Labour government’s approach on its 
rebate. The UK’s involvement in the war in Iraq 118 in 2003 resulted in a 
significant reduction of the Labour party’s parliamentary majority of 65 and loss 
of public support (Bulmer, 2008: 603; 605; Smith, 2005: 714).119  Meanwhile, 
Britain’s euroscepticism also increased and pressured the Blair government’s pro-
European approach. In 2004, a YouGove poll found that only 27 per cent of 
Britons believed that British membership of the EU was a ‘good thing’. The 
                                           
118 After the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, 
the Bush administration proclaimed ‘The War on Terror’. The US made an association between 
the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaeda and took military action to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein in 
2003. The Blair government took heed of the special relationship between the UK and the US and 
decided to participate in the US-led military action. See Gelpi et al., (2005) and Bulmer (2008). 
119 In the 1997 general election, the Labour party won a remarkable parliamentary majority 
of 418 and became the governing party. Although in the 2001 general election, the Labour party 
lost 3 seats, the party still had a parliamentary majority of 413. In the 2005 general election, 
Blair’s unpopularity affected the result of the election which was significantly reduced to 355 
seats. See Geddes (2004), Smith (2005).   
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percentage significantly decreased. 50 per cent of the electorate were against the 
Blair government’s pro-European approach while 18 per cent said ‘don’t know’ 
(Daily Telegraph, 30 April, 2004). The anti-Blair Daily Mail, argued that the 
figure showed that public attitudes on the EU changed from uninterest to hostility, 
and criticised Blair’ pro-European approach (Daily Mail 21, April 2004). 
Furthermore, in the 2005 general election campaign, the leader of the 
Conservative party Michael Howard made his party’s position clear which 
indicated the Conservative party’s opposition to the Blair government’s pro-
European approach (Baker and Sherrington, 2005: 308). Furthermore, the 
government was under pressure from colleagues in the Labour party and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, who argued that the UK must retain 
the rebate to avoid any increase of the Labour government’s unpopularity (Brown, 
2005: 14). Mr Brown, who was the most influential actor to the government’s EU 
policies due to his special relationship with Mr Blair (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 
138; Heffernan, 2004: 359),120 thought that the unpopularity of the government 
would threaten his ambition to become Prime Minister after Mr Blair (Naughtie, 
2002: 69-75; Smith, 2005: 706). Thus, he opposed any the reduction of the UK’s 
rebate (Brown, 2005: 15).  
In light of all these issues, Blair vowed to veto the existing proposal on the 
size of the EU’s budget and the reduction of the UK’s rebate on the UK rebate, 
which triggered several disputes between member states (Financial Times, 8 July 
2004; Laffan and Lindner, 2005). 
 
 
 
                                           
120 After the Labour leader John Smith’s death in 1994, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 
formed the ‘Granita Pact’ (named after a restaurant in London where they met) for leading the 
Labour party in the 1997 general election. Brown agreed to concede the Leadership of the Labour 
party to Blair, who  would lead the party in the 1997 general election. If the Labour party won the 
election, Blair would hold the position of Prime Minister. In return, Brown would be allowed to 
dominate powers over the UK’s domestic policy while Blair would have a commitment to policies 
on social justice and employment. Furthermore, after Blair’s premiership during an agreed period 
of time, Blair would hand over the position of the Prime Minister to Brown. See Naughtie (2002). 
 158 
 
4. Britain’s negotiation on the financial perspective for 2007-2013 
In line with what had happed with the schedule of the financial negotiations in 
1987, the financial negotiations for the financial perspective for 2007-2013 was 
delayed by heads of government or state from December 2004 to June 2005 due to 
Britain’s General Election on 5 May 2005 (Financial Times, 21 June 2005). In 
2005, there were two European Councils in Brussels, in June and December, 
which dealt directly with the negotiations of the financial perspective for 2007-
2013. The UK’s rebate was a controversial issue, which not only blocked a 
financial agreement in June but also brought about conflicts between the UK and 
other member states in December. The Blair government changed its position in 
the second half of 2005, whilst the UK held the Presidency of the Council and at 
the Brussels European Council on 15-16 December 2005 agreed to reduce its 
rebate. This change was affected by both the UK’s presidency responsibilities and 
its ambition to lead the EU towards modernising EU policies in response to the 
challenge of globalisation.  
 
4.1.The financial negotiation at the Brussels European Council in June 2005 
The Brussels European Council in June 2005 initiated the financial negotiations 
for the financial perspective for 2007-2013. At the European Council, the 
Luxembourg Presidency proposed its compromise which focused on mediating 
conflicts between the Commission’s proposal and member states’ oppositions. 
However, the compromise did not satisfy member states’ demands and was unable 
to overcome conflicts between member states. The European Council paved the 
way to clarify member states’ positions on the financial perspective for 2007-2013. 
 
4.1.1. The Luxembourg presidency compromise 
Luxembourg held the Presidency of the Council in the first half of 2005. On the 
EU budgetary issue, Prime Minister Juncker recognised that the UK and other net 
contributors, i.e. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria, as the 
six biggest net contributors, opposed the Commission’s proposal, notably 
concerning the size of the EU’s revenue. They demanded that the budget ceiling 
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be held below 1 per cent of the EU’s GDP (Financial Times, 12 May 2005). The 
EU, meanwhile, had experienced the ‘No’ vote by the French on 30 May 2005, 
and by the Dutch on 2 June 2005, in referendums on the EU constitutional treaty, 
and, consequently urged net contributors towards compromise for the financial 
perspective for 2007-2013 as a step towards overcoming this political crisis in the 
future of Europe (Financial Times, 21 June 2005; Church and Phinnemore, 2007).  
At the Brussels European Council on 16-17 June 2005, the Luxembourg 
Presidency proposed a compromise. This compromise occupied a middle point 
between the UK and the net contributors’ oppositions and the Commission’s 
proposal. In particular, it proposed freezing the UK rebate at the average for 1997-
2003, i.e. € 4.6 billion, in 2007, and then gradually reducing it from 2008 to 2013 
(European Report, 11 June 2005; Times, 21 May 2005; Financial Times, 15 June 
2005; Hearl, 2006: 54). Such reduction would allow the excessive Dutch, German 
and Swedish contributions to be reduced in turn (Hearl, 2006: 54). The 
Luxembourg Presidency also suggested a compromise of 1.06 per cent, € 870 
billion of the EU’s revenue above the largest contributor nation’s demand of 1 per 
cent and significantly below the Commission’s proposal of 1.24 per cent 
(Financial Times, 14 and 16 June 2005; European Report, 11 June 2005; Hearl, 
2006: 54). This meant reducing all areas of budget expenditure: competitiveness 
by (39 per cent), cohesion policy (10 per cent), natural resources (5 per cent), 
citizenship, security and justice (20 per cent), global partnership (19 per cent), and 
administration (12 per cent) (European Report, 11 June 2005). Although the 
compromise was meant to reduce conflicts, it actually did the opposite, between 
old and new beneficiaries on sharing benefits, between net contributors and net 
beneficiaries on the size of the EU’s revenue, and within net contributors on 
sharing of the financial burden (Laffan and Lindner, 2005: 205-206). 
 
4.1.2. Old versus new beneficiaries on sharing financial benefits 
The new member states in the CEECs could be characterised by the term ‘new 
beneficiaries’. Because of their poorer economic condition, the Commission 
decided to increase the EU budget but also divided net beneficiaries into old and 
new beneficiaries, and challenged the old net beneficiaries’ financial benefits from 
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the EU’s expenditure through the sharing of budgets (Zeff, 2004: 171; Nugent, 
2004a: 15). In particular, it proposed to allocate cohesion spending121 to these 
new beneficiaries in order to boost their economic growth to catch up with the 
overall levels of the EU. The old beneficiaries concentrated on preventing an 
abrupt ending of the EU’s financial support to their poor regions as a result of 
transferrance of financial aid to the new beneficiaries. The new member states, 
being full member, were able to veto the financial agreement. Thus old 
beneficiaries’ demands to reduce financial flow to the new member states were 
difficult to achieve (Lindner, 2006: 209). 
At the Brussels European Council in June 2005, both old and new 
beneficiaries opposed the Luxembourg Presidency compromise (Financial Times, 
17 June 2005). They argued that the compromise implied a reduction of regional 
aid which would not be able to cover net beneficiaries’ demands for economic 
growth (Financial Times, 18 June 2005). Furthermore, both sets of beneficiaries 
were in favour of reducing the UK rebate because they believed that the reduction 
of the UK’s rebate would reduce other net contributors’ financial burden, which in 
turn could concede the increase of the EU’s budget (Financial Times, 18 June 
2005). Italy and Spain, as part of the beneficiaries in regional aid, persisted in 
demanding a reduction of the UK’s abatement. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi 
complained that the Luxembourg Presidency compromise to reduce regional aid 
would mean a substantial fall in Italy’s receipts from the EU. In his view, a radical 
revision of the UK rebate was one of Italy’s priorities (European Report, 17 June 
2005). Spanish Europe Minister Alberto Navarro and Foreign Minister Miguel 
Moratinos also said that Spain demanded a modification of the UK rebate 
(European Report, 18 June 2005). 
                                           
121 Regional aid had another name: the Structural Funds, which consisted of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Financial Instrument 
for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and the Cohesion Fund. The Structural Funds existed for the 
purpose of enhancing economic cohesion between member states. They were funnelled into three 
objectives, which had been reduced from since Agenda 2000. In particular, Objective 1 was 
designed to support the development of regions whose development was behind the overall EU 
average. Under the Commission’s proposal for 2007-2013, 78 per cent of the structural funds 
would be allocated to objective 1. Regions in the new member states would be the main 
beneficiaries from Objective 1. See Allen (2005) and Zeff (2004).  
 161 
 
4.1.3. Net contributors versus net beneficiaries 
The UK and other net contributors not only opposed the Luxembourg presidency 
compromise but also refused net beneficiaries’ demands to sustain the level of the 
Commission’s proposal on the size of the EU’s revenue, and instead proposed a 
revenue size of about less than 1 per cent of GDP (Financial Times, 18 June 2005).  
In particular, after the failure122 to ratify the constitutional treaty on 1 June 
2005, the Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende faced domestic political 
pressure on the issue of European integration. For this, he insisted that the 
Netherlands not only opposed the Presidency’s suggestion on the size of the EU’s 
budget but also called for a cut in €1.5 billion of the Dutch net contribution 
(European Report, 18 and 22 June 2005). 
 
 
Table 5.2  Classification of net recipients and net contributors 
 
Net recipients 
€ million, total 1986-2003 Spain Greece Portugal Ireland Belgium Denmark 
Contribution 85,833 17,510 15,785 12,380 46,384 23,260 
Receipts 161,812 76,397 49,413 44,554 56,308 25,559 
Net payment -75,976 -58,885 -33,631 -32,174 -9,926 -2,305 
 
Net contributors 
Finland Austria Luxembourg Sweden Italy Netherlands France UK Germany 
10,252 17,817 2,678 20,243 155,131 72,282 208,568 146,216 307,225 
9,800 12,454 11,045 10,787 135,313 45,597 180,332 91,621 145,757 
450 5,364 8,997 9,458 19,817 26,682 28,241 54,593 161,469 
 <Source: Parliament ‘Parliamentary answer ‘How much do other countries pay in?’ 25 February 
2005> 
 
 
Germany focused on reducing its contribution to the EU’s budget, which 
                                           
122 The Netherlands held a referendum on approval of the Constitutional Treaty on 1 June 
2005. The Dutch’s financial burden to the EU’s budget was one of the reasons why 61.7 per cent 
of voters were against the Treaty on a 63 per cent turnout (Nugent, 2010).   
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would flow to the new member states. The Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard 
Schröder, was very eloquent: ‘in the past, if there has been a problem, the 
Germans would just write a cheque to sort it out. The Germans aren’t willing or 
able to do that any more’ (Financial Times, 18 June 2005). The financial 
framework for 2007-2013 not only indicated a doubling of the German 
contribution but also foresaw a reduction in German benefits from regional aid, 
which would be quietly allocated the poorer regions in the new member states 
from the former Soviet bloc. The German argument was in favour of reducing the 
EU budget to 1 per cent of GDP (Financial Times, 30 July 2004). 
France initially supported the other net contributors’ position which not only 
opposed the size of the EU’s revenue in the Commission’s proposal but was also 
against the Presidency compromise. In particular, at the beginning of the 
European Council, Chirac refused the compromise as it involved a cut of €8 
billion from the CAP on natural resources to fund the farm sector in the acceding 
states (European Report, 18 June 2005). During the European Council, he argued 
that if the CAP spending was retained, France would be ready to accept the 
compromise on the issue of increasing the revenue to 1.06 per cent of GDP. 
Chirac considered increasing Frances’ contribution in response to retaining the 
CAP expenditure, but then argued for the reduction of the UK’s rebate. Other net 
contributors supported Schröder’s argument on reducing the EU budget size 
because they were also interested in the reduction of their contribution. As a result, 
the UK’s rebate became a central issue for the financial burden to be shared 
(European Report, 22 June 2005). 
 
4.1.4. The negotiation between net contributors on sharing the financial 
burden 
The UK was not ready to accept the Luxembourg Presidency compromise 
(Gowland et al., 2010: 178). Firstly, it restated it initial objections that the change 
in the EU’s budget was not enough to support the Lisbon strategy (Financial 
Times, 13 June 2005) and that the reduction of the CAP expenditure would not 
really allow to prioritise research, education, and innovation (Gowland et al., 
2010: 179). Secondly, the member states and the Commission’s demand for the 
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reduction of the UK’s rebate, and the net contributors’ demand on the size of the 
EU’s budget for reducing their contribution, implied that net contributors would 
shift the cost of the enlargement onto Britain. The Blair government argued that 
the UK did not want to become a sacrifice for the cost to be borne (Financial 
Times, 15 June 2005). 
 
 
      Table 5.3  Towards Lisbon-related goals (Euro) 
 
Purpose of the money Extra money 
For the Social Agenda 100 million 
For Competitiveness and Innovation 400 million 
For trans-European networks 500 million 
For Research and Development 300 million 
For Lifelong Learning 800 million 
       <Source: Commission ‘Financial Perspectives 2007-2013’ COM (2004) 487 final> 
 
 
 Nevertheless, it proposed a political linkage between the reform of the CAP and 
the reduction of the UK’s rebate: if the other member states member states were 
ready to accept the reform of the CAP, the UK would concede the reduction of its 
rebate (Financial Times, 13 and 15 June 2005). This approach was spelt out by 
Blair in a speech in the European Parliament on 23 June 2005, when he presented 
the lines of the UK Presidency: 
 
 
People say: we need the budget to restore Europe’s credibility. Of 
course we do. But it should be the right budget. It shouldn’t be 
abstracted from the debate about Europe’s crisis. It should be part of 
the answer to it. I want to say a word about last Friday’s summit. 
There have been suggestions that I was not willing to compromise on 
the UK rebate; that I only raise CAP reform at the last minute; that I 
expected to renegotiate the CAP on Friday night. In fact I am the only 
British leader that has ever said I would put the rebate on the table. I 
never said we should end the CAP now or renegotiate it overnight. 
Such a position would be absurd. Any change must take account of 
the legitimate needs of arming communities and happen over time. I 
have said simply two things: that we cannot agree a new financial 
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perspective that does not at least set out a process that leads to a more 
rational budget; and that this must allow such a budget to shape the 
second half of that perspective up to 2013. Otherwise it will be 2014 
before any fundamental change is agreed, let along implemented. 
Again, in the meantime, of course Britain will pay its fair share of 
enlargement. I might point out that on any basis we would remain the 
second highest net contributor to the EU, having in this perspective 
paid billion more than similar sized countries. 
 
 
Britain’s political linkage was supported by the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Sweden within the net contributors (European Report, 18 and 22 June 2005), but 
was opposed by France and Germany. In particular, the French President Jacques 
Chirac, fearing domestic unpopularity, insisted that Britain had to respect the 2003 
agreement on CAP expenditure and that the reduction of CAP expenditures was 
not an option in the financial negotiation (The Guardian, 14 June 2005; European 
Report, 15 June 2005). For Schröder, the UK rebate issue was ‘the central point’, 
which generated too many conflicts within net contributors on sharing the 
financial burden. He pointed out that the UK had the sixth-highest per capita 
income among the member states but its contribution to the EU budget was far 
behind this, due to its rebate (Financial Times, 17 June 2005). He also made it 
clear that Germany would not reopen discussions on reform of the CAP, as 
demanded by the UK (Financial Times, 18 June 2005). 
 
4.1.5. Outcome 
The Brussels European Council meeting on 16-17 June 2005 on the future EU 
budget was unable to overcome the conflicts between member states. The British 
proposal was rejected by France, which was in favour of retaining the CAP 
expenditure and argued for the reduction or elimination of the UK’s rebate – in 
order to shift the cost of the enlargement of the CEECs onto the UK, to reduce its 
net contribution, and to avoid any reduction of its benefits. France’ opposition 
brought about Britain’s departure from the negotiation table. The Netherlands, 
Denmark and Sweden could not accept the request for the increase of their 
contribution compared with their demand to contribute to the EU’s budget. Italy 
also refused reducing its financial benefits in sharing regional aid with the new net 
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recipient group in the Luxembourg compromise. The financial negotiation for 
2007-2013 therefore became the responsibility of the UK Presidency which 
started on 1 July 2005 (The Guardian, 18 June 2005; European Report, 22 June 
2005). 
 
4.2. Analysing the UK’s presidency in the second half of 2005 
During the UK Presidency in the second half of 2005, the British position on its 
rebate changed from ‘conditional change’ to ‘reduction’. Holding the Presidency 
meant that the UK had the ‘responsibility’ to guide member states towards 
achieving the agreement: the UK had to reduce its rebate in order to strengthen the 
credibility of British leadership in driving the EU towards modernisation with 
regard to the Lisbon strategy. The Blair government considered the role of the 
Presidency and its own ambitions for modernisation, and after lengthy and 
difficult negotiations, decided on the reduction of its rebate at the Brussels 
European Council in December 2005. 
 
4.2.1. The Presidency of the Council 
When the UK commenced the six-month-rotating Presidency of the Council, 
expectations were low. In general, a successful Presidency would be ready to 
sacrifice its own interest to solve conflicts rather than being at the centre of 
conflicts in negotiations. Britain’s position on its rebate would be a central part of 
the problem rather than the solution in the EU budgetary negotiations (Whitman 
and Thomas, 2007: 61-62). 
My interviewees, on the contrary, explicitly stated that they felt a strong 
sense of responsibility towards the role of the Presidency and that shaped the 
UK’s position on the rebate. In his speech to the European Parliament on 23 June 
2005, Tony Blair explicitly indicated that the UK’s Presidency would emphasise 
engaging the EU budget with the interests and enthusiasm of EU citizens rather 
than retaining the UK’s rebate, and reaching financial agreement (Whitman, 2006; 
Henderson, 1998). In particular, referring to the CAP expenditure in the 
Commission’s proposal for the financial perspectives for 2007-2013, he argued 
that nearly 45 per cent of the EU budget would go on supporting 5 per cent of the 
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population of farmers, and 20 per cent of CAP spending would go to France alone 
(European Report, 25 June 2005). This financial plan would never satisfy EU 
citizens’ desires to tackle sluggish economic growth and the problem of 20 million 
unemployed and that the extant EU expenditure policies in the Commission’s 
proposal would have delivered neither the economic prosperity nor the social 
justice that its citizens desired (Financial Times, 23 June 2005).123 The UK 
Presidency argued that the CAP funds should flow instead towards the 
modernization of the EU, in particular the new member states, and go towards 
alleviating the impoverishment of farmers in underdeveloped areas, rather than to 
French farmers (Financial Times, 23 June 2005). My interviewees confirmed that 
the British presidency sought to find the best way to achieve a financial agreement 
to favour the new member states’ financial need for regeneration of their 
economic structures in the globalisation era for the new member states. For this, 
he criticised the Luxembourg presidency compromise, which guided the EU in the 
wrong way, if the aim was to rebuild public support and trust (Financial Times, 13 
and 15 June 2005).  
 
4.2.2. Persuading member states 
The British presidency not only sought to challenge the Luxembourg presidency 
compromise, but also speeded up the progress of the financial negotiations for 
achieving an agreement. For this, it scheduled the informal European Council on 
28-29 October 2005 at Hampton Court Palace in England with the view to 
persuading member states before the Brussels European Council in December 
2005 on the need to modernise EU expenditure policies to avoid being ‘victims of 
globalisation’ (European Report, 28 October 2005).  
In that context, the UK insisted that EU policies would need to concentrate 
on strengthening economic competitiveness and reducing unemployment to 
overcome the challenges of globalisation (The Guardian, 27 October 2005). To 
achieve this objective, the presidency emphasised the reform of EU spending 
                                           
123 Blair’s analysis was that the EU constitutional crisis resulted from EU citizens’ 
dissatisfaction with sluggish economic growth and having 20 million unemployed (Financial 
Times, 13 June 2005). 
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priorities as essential to the future direction of Europe (European Report, 28 
October 2005). In particular, the reform of the CAP would allow transferring the 
EU budget towards modernisation of EU economies, placing the emphasis on 
creating jobs and development of trade, education, innovation, and research (The 
Guardian, 27 October 2005). 
France and Germany, once again, opposed the UK’s arguments. Schröder 
explained that the EU was confronted with a choice between liberalisation and the 
retention of basic European values of socialism. The UK’s vision for the EU’s 
future direction, he argued, was ‘social dumping’, undermining the European 
social model by liberalisation (Financial Times, 28 October 2005). Chirac argued 
that the EU had to respect the CAP agreement which was modified in 2003124 
with a process to open up to the world by 2013, and thus said that the UK 
presidency’s challenge on the reform of EU spending priorities before the end of 
the financial perspective period of 2013 would undermine the credibility of the 
EU. He explicitly insisted that France would protect its traditional CAP benefits at 
the December summit. The French argument for keeping its traditional CAP 
benefits was in direct conflict with the UK’s desire to reform EU spending 
priorities. Chirac also used the informal summit to advise caution over Europe’s 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s plan125 which would agree the reform of 
the CAP in the WTO talks in Hong Kong in December 2005 (The Guardian, 24 
and 28 October 2005; Financial Times, 28 October 2005; The Birmingham Post, 
29 October 2005).  
The new beneficiaries placed a harsh spotlight upon the responsibility of the 
                                           
124 In the ‘Doha Development Round’, it was agreed that all issues would be concluded in 
December 2005 in Hong Kong. The agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round mainly focused 
on the reduction of tariff and export subsidies which distorted trade in the CAP. In view of the 
WTO negotiations in 2005, in 2002 the European Commission proposed the reform of the CAP to 
introduce the Single Farm Payment (SFP) to reform the CAP direct payment. In 2003, the 
Agricultural Council agreed to shift 3 per cent of direct payment each year towards EU rural 
development measures from 2007-2013. See Fouilleux (2007) and Smith (2007). 
125 Europe’s Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson would offer farm concessions to cut 
over 60 per cent of EU’s highest agriculture import tariffs in WTO negotiation in Hong Kong in 
December 2005. He decided his plan in the Geneva WTO negotiation on 8 July 2004. See The 
Birmingham Post (29 October 2005). 
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UK presidency to make a financial agreement work at the European Council in 
December. Hungary’s Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany, who chaired the 
Visegrad group,126 argued that the new member states were angry with the UK 
presidency for delaying the financial negotiation until December 2005, and 
pressured the presidency to call in strong terms for the EU budget agreement to 
match their needs (The Guardian, 27 October 2005; European Report, 3 
November 2005). Artis Pabriks, the Latvian foreign minister, and Danuta Hubner, 
Poland’s European Commissioner, also argued that delaying the EU budget 
agreement to the next Austrian presidency in the first half of 2006 would cause 
them to be unable to implement key regeneration projects (The Guardian, 24 and 
27 October 2005). 
The UK presidency’s plan to discuss the reform of EU spending priorities 
throughout the informal summit did not succeed. Blair understood that securing 
the EU budget was a priority issue for the future of the EU and it was also 
important for the new member states to be given a chance for their economies to 
regenerate. He vowed that he would do his ‘level best’ to ensure EU budget 
agreement in December 2005. The UK presidency organised two additional 
meetings, of the 25 Foreign Ministers on 7 November, and of EU ambassadors on 
10 November. The aim was to reach a compromise after these two meetings 
(European Report, 3 November 2005). 
 
The Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 7 November 
On 7 November, the 25 foreign ministers from the EU member states met in 
Brussels for their first formal discussions on the EU budget after the collapse of 
the EU budget negotiations in June (Financial Times, 7 November 2005). At the 
meeting, the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, and the European Affairs Minister, 
Douglas Alexander, argued for further change of the Luxembourg presidency 
compromise. Mr Straw said that the UK presidency would concentrate on 
restructuring and modernising the EU budget, to balance spending between 
traditional EU expenditure policies, particularly farm subsidies, and new areas 
such as innovation, education and research (The Independent, 8 November 2005). 
                                           
126 The Visegrad group is composed of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
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Furthermore, he insisted that the UK was a low recipient from EU budget 
spending, especially CAP spending, despite the UK contributed more than France 
and Italy, even with the abatement: with the Luxembourg presidency compromise, 
the UK contribution would significantly increase, at the level of the EU’s second 
largest net contributor (The Independent, 8 November 2005; The Guardian, 8 
November 2005). Mr Straw, therefore, argued that the EU budget would need to 
adjust CAP spending, and this could only be the option for the UK to accept the 
reduction of its abatement in December 2005 (The Independent, 8 November 
2005; The Guardian, 8 November 2005) 
Philippe Douste-Blazy, the French Foreign Minister, tried to isolate the UK, 
arguing that its attempts to retain its budget rebate would cause delay in the EU 
budget agreement (The Independent, 8 November 2005; European Report, 9 
November 2005). He also warned that at the European Council in December 
France would not accept any change of the Luxembourg presidency compromise, 
also because it had been agreed by 20 member states (The Independent, 8 
November 2005).127  
Four of the net contributor states (the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and 
Germany128) accepted the UK’s focus on the modernisation of the EU in response 
to the challenges of globalisation, but required the reduction of their contribution 
to the EU budget (European Report, 9 November 2005).129 However, they joined 
in the French criticism of the UK rebate (Financial Times, 7 November 2005; The 
Guardian, 8 November 2005). The new beneficiaries also criticised the UK 
abatement discussion which was delaying the agreement, as the French argued, 
and sought concessions from the UK over the rebate (Financial Times, 7 
November 2005; The Guardian, 8 November 2005). Furthermore, they stressed 
the need to achieve a financial agreement in December 2005 in order to obtain 
                                           
127  The UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, and Spain vetoed the Luxembourg 
presidency compromise in June 2005 (European Report, 9 November 2005). 
128 Angela Merkel, who was a new leader in a grand coalition of the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD), restricted increasing the EU budget, See 
Heisenberg (2006).  
129 In particular, the Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot said that The Netherlands 
welcomed the presidency’s challenges as a step in the right direction, but required further changes 
and the reduction of their contribution by € 1 billion (European Report, 9 November 2005). 
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their financial benefits130.  
   Although the European Foreign Ministers reopened the financial 
discussion, the UK presidency’s recognised there was deadlock (The Irish Times 8 
November 2005). The UK presidency organised a new Foreign Ministers’ meeting 
for November 21 and said that a detailed presidency compromise would be 
presented in early December (European Report, 9 November 2005). 
 
The meeting of the EU member states’ ambassadors on 10 November 
At the meeting of EU member states’ ambassadors on 10 November, a large 
number of delegations criticised the presidency paper for not concentrating on the 
issues essential to the financial negotiations in December 2005 and they saw it as 
indicative of reluctance to make an agreement on the EU budget negotiation. 
Responding to the criticisms, the UK ambassador Kim Darroch promised that he 
would discuss his understanding with London and organised a new meeting for 17 
November, with the view to proposing the timing for review clause on EU 
spending priorities and revenue (European Report, 11 November 2005). 
 
The meeting of EU member states’ ambassadors on 17 November 
At the meeting of EU member states’ ambassadors on 17 November, the UK 
presidency did not present a detailed proposal of the UK presidency compromise 
for the EU budget negotiation in December 2005. It proposed a Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund (GAF), but it was opposed because there was not enough time 
to decide before the December European Council. Some countries in the net 
contributor group, moreover, were not willing to add extra money to the EU 
budget (European Report, 19 November 2005). 
  
                                           
130 At the Lisbon European Council, the member states not only agreed the Lisbon strategy 
but also agreed to provide the cohesion fund of about € 9.7 billion to the new member states. The 
cohesion fund would be allocated in the financial perspective for 2007-2013. Delaying a financial 
agreement to the next year would mean that it would be difficult for the new member countries to 
receive the cohesion fund in 2006 to modernise their economic structure and growth (European 
Report, 11 and 29 June 2005). 
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The Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 21 November 
The Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 21 November 2005 was the final meeting 
before the negotiation in December. Mr Straw was confronted with opposition 
from 20 member states which had agreed the Luxembourg presidency 
compromise in June 2005. The 20 member states pressured the UK presidency not 
to deviate too far from the Luxemburg presidency compromise, including the 
reduction of the UK rebate (European Report, 23 November 2005; European 
Report, 30 November 2005). In particular, Mr Douste-Blazy, the French Foreign 
Minister, argued that the UK must concede its rebate to pay its fair share of the 
financial burden with other net contributors, and to achieve financial agreement in 
line with its presidency responsibilities. France led other member states to 
pressure the UK to take responsibility as one of the rich countries in the EU to 
contribute towards the EU budget for the development of the EU, even though the 
UK still received few benefits from EU expenditure policies (European Report, 23 
November 2005; The Irish Times, 22 November 2005). 
Responding to the opposition, Mr Straw said that the UK presidency would 
do its best to reach an agreement in December 2005 and that a compromise would 
be presented on 5 December (European Report, 23 November 2005). It was his 
intention, he argued that the total EU budget would be reduced to 1.03 per cent of 
GDP, as compared to 1.06 per cent of EU GDP under the Luxembourg presidency 
compromise. Consequently, the presidency would propose the reduction of 
regional aid (European Report, 30 November 2005). The UK presidency 
organised a special meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 5 December 2005 to 
prepare for the European Council on 15-16 December (European Report, 23 
November 2005).  
 
4.2.3. The UK presidency compromise 
At the special meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 5 December 2005, the UK 
presidency presented its compromise. It proposed the total ceiling to € 847 billion 
at 1.03 per cent of GDP, which was reduced from € 871 billion at 1.06 per cent of 
GDP under the Luxembourg compromise, and € 1,025 billion at 1.24 per cent of 
GDP under the Commission proposal of 2004 (European Report, 5 and 7 
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December 2005). To reduce the EU budget, the compromise proposed that 
regional aid for the old and new net recipient groups would be cut by 10 per cent, 
about € 14 billion compared to the Luxembourg compromise (European Report, 5 
December 2005; Financial Times, 5, 6, 8, and 10 December 2005; House of Lords, 
5 December 2005; Whitman and Thomas, 2007: 71; Whitman, 2006: 61). UK 
officials gave two reasons for this reduction in regional aid. First, the UK argued 
that the structural funds were not fully spent each year (European Report, 5 
December 2005). Secondly, the UK pointed out that € 150 billion of regional aid 
was twice the value of the Marshall Fund for the economic reconstruction of 
Western Europe after World War II.131 The UK presidency asserted that reduced 
regional aid would still be enough to help build net beneficiaries’ economic 
growth (European Report, 3 and 7 December 2005). 
The British Presidency took the difficult decision to propose a cut of the UK 
rebate by € 8 billion over the seven-year budget period. The size of the reduction 
in the UK’s rebate also took into account the exclusion of the new net recipient 
group’s benefits under CAP spending (European Report, 7 December 2005).  
On the basis of my interviews and an analysis of Blair’s speech in the House 
of Commons on 19 December 2005, the change in Britain’s position was affected 
by two main reasons. First of all, an interviewee claimed that it resulted from the 
Blair government’s willingness to reach an agreement under the UK presidency, in 
order to strengthen the credibility of Britain’s leadership towards the 
modernisation of the EU through the Lisbon strategy. Due to the net contributors’ 
demand to reduce the UK’s rebate and thus reduce their own contribution, if 
Britain had continued to argue for retaining its rebate, the financial agreement 
would not have been achieved at the Brussels European Council in December. 
Secondly, Blair said that the UK presidency had considered the UK’s ‘moral 
uprightness’ as a rich member state in taking decisions on the rebate. If the UK 
received its rebate from the poor new member states through the UK rebate 
system, it would have invalidated the UK’s role as net contributor (House of 
                                           
131 After World War II, in 1948, the Secretary of State of the US, Mr Marshall, proposed 
about $ 13 billion of aid to West European countries to rebuild their economies: See Geddes 
(2004). 
 173 
Common, 19 December 2005): 
 
 
We supports enlargement; yes, we supports enlargement.-
[interruption.] We support the wealthy countries paying for the poorer 
countries. That is right too; isn’t it? ... The one thing that is obvious is 
that the budget does indeed need fundamental change, but the whole 
point about getting this deal in December is that, without it, the new 
central and eastern European countries could not have planned ahead 
for the next budget period. That is why we had to have an immediate 
deal in December so that they could have the certainty of the money 
coming to them, and then, in the medium and longer term, the 
prospect of the mid-term review that would allow us fundamentally to 
change the structure of the budget. 
 
 
Finally, an interviewee said that the Blair government’s vision of modernising the 
EU matched with the new member states’ demands to achieve the financial 
agreement in December for regeneration of their economic structures and growth. 
Britain was willing to support the new member states’ economic regeneration 
through providing cohesion funds in 2006, and regional aid in the financial 
perspective for 2007-2013. The new beneficiaries would had economic difficulties 
in supporting modernising Eastern Europe, if the UK presidency had decided to 
delay the financial agreement to the next (Austrian) presidency in the first half of 
2006 (The Guardian, 19 December 2005). 
Due to reducing the size of the EU’s revenue, the UK presidency proposed 
to cut € 7 billion from the rural development budget, € 2 billion from farm 
spending for Romania and Bulgaria, € 0.7 billion from internal policies, and € 1 
billion from administrative costs (European Report, 7 December 2005). The UK 
presidency, furthermore, proposed a review of EU spending priorities as part of 
future reform of EU policies for modernisation in its compromise (European 
Report, 7 December 2005). In the review clause, the European Commission would 
examine all EU spending, particularly the CAP, in the mid-term of the financial 
perspective for 2007-2013, and would submit its report to the European Council. 
Heads of member states would, then, make a decision about the reform of EU 
spending priorities. The review would be held in 2008 (Financial Times, 5 
December 2005).  
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At the Foreign Ministers meeting, ministers from new net recipient 
countries criticized the compromise on the reduction of their benefits from EU 
regional aid. In particular, Poland’s Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz132 
said that it was a ‘bad budget’ and a ‘bad proposal’, and required improvement 
before the European Council (European Report, 7 December 2005). In the net 
contributor group, France and Sweden were the most vocal. Sweden was not 
likely to benefit under the UK presidency’s compromise, as it would reduce the 
Swedish net contribution by 0.01 per cent; hence, it was unhappy with this lack of 
improvement in the country’s net contributor position. France, whose net 
contribution would increase by 0.01 per cent, criticized the reduction by just €8 
billion of the UK rebate. The French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy 
asserted that the limited reduction of the rebate was unacceptable in terms of 
solidarity and fairness, and called for a new compromise with a further reduction 
to € 14 billion, instead of reducing regional aid. Furthermore, France would have 
domestic political difficulties if it accepted the review clause, particularly the 
CAP.133 (European Report, 7 and 10 December 2005).  
In the old net recipient group, due to receive a cut of € 7 billion from the 
rural development budget, Portugal and Spain would lose 20 per cent and 33 per 
cent of their rural development allocations respectively, compared to the 
Luxembourg presidency proposal (European Report, 10 December 2005).  
In the net contributor group, the Netherlands and Germany were positive 
about the UK presidency compromise, involving as it did a trimming of EU 
expenditure. Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm welcomed the cut of € 700 
                                           
132 Marcinkiewicz envisaged that cutting 10 per cent of regional aid would result in a 20 
per cent reduction in structural funds for Poland. Due to some structural and cohesion funds being 
allocated to rural development funds, Poland was a prosperous country compared to other new 
member states, and, as a result, it would lose € 530-560 million from regional aid. Marcinkiewicz 
demanded the increase of regional aid in order to ensure Poland’s financial benefits (European 
Report, 10 December 2005). 
133 Chirac’s EU policies were regarded with suspicion  by the French public. As a result, 
the government not only lost the French regional election of 2003 and the European election of 
2004 but also were defeated in the national referendum of the Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. 
Chirac was afraid of the French farming union’s opposition to his EU policies. He opposed the 
review clause in the UK presidency compromise (Gowland et al., 2010). 
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million in the Dutch contribution, as they had demanded a € 1 billion saving in 
June. Germany also had a positive position on the reduction of the EU budget, 
which would now flow towards the new net recipient group instead of the East 
German regions. However, Germany was concerned that the UK proposal would 
not be accepted by the old and new net recipient groups, and by members of the 
net contributor group whose net contribution would not be reduced under the 
compromise (European Report, 7 December 2005). 
In the UK presidency compromise, reducing the UK abatement by € 8 
billion was not a large enough concession to obtain a deal for the financial 
negotiations in December 2005. Although the UK presidency took account of the 
net contributor group’s desire for a reduction in the EU budget and their net 
contribution, and proposed a ‘Mini-budget’, the presidency compromise still 
failed to fulfil all member states’ demands, particular those of the net beneficiaries 
(European Report, 7 December 2005). France and Sweden were especially 
adamant in demanding reductions in their net contributions. The old and new net 
recipient groups also argued for increases in the regional aid budget to build their 
economies (European Report, 7 December 2005).134 To obtain a deal with these 
countries, the UK presidency needed to reduce its rebate by more than € 8 billion 
over the financial period. Such a move seemed as if it might be the only solution 
that would allow an increase in EU expenditure simultaneous with a reduction in 
the net contributor group’s contribution to the EU budget (European Report, 9 
December 2005). 
 
4.2.4. The Brussels European Council in December 2005 
On the eve of the Brussels European Council on 15-16 December 2005, there 
were many criticisms of the UK presidency compromise. Of course, the two net 
recipient groups condemned the UK presidency compromise for reducing regional 
aid. The net contributors group found fault with the compromise. Both France and 
the European Commission’s President, Mr Barroso, criticized the compromise. Mr 
                                           
134 European Commission President José Manuel Barroso defined the UK compromise 
‘unacceptable’, and labelled the proposed UK budget one for a ‘Mini-Europe’. He pressured the 
presidency to increase the size of the EU budget and reduce the size of the UK’s rebate (European 
Report, 7 December 2005). 
 176 
Barroso pressurised the UK presidency to propose a new presidency compromise 
with €855 billion of the total EU budget at 1.04 per cent of GDP, to offer a higher 
level of regional aid to the new net recipient group, and to permanently adjust the 
UK rebate mechanism (European Report, 14 December 2005). Chirac demanded 
that the UK rebate be cut by up to € 14-15 billion to ensure the UK made a fair 
contribution and to increase both the EU’s budget and regional aid. Chirac also 
argued that the UK must consider accepting the new collective system with 
permanent abolition of the UK rebate, in order to avoid the debate recurring in 
future negotiations. Spain and Germany also agreed with the French request for 
adoption of a new permanent UK rebate mechanism (European Report, 14 
December 2005; European Report, 21 December 2005). 
Taking into account all these criticisms, the UK presidency proposed a new 
compromise. The new compromise indicated an increase by €2 billion in the total 
EU budget to €849 billion from the 5 December proposal. The rate of the EU’s 
revenue, however, was to remain around 1.03 per cent of GDP (European Report, 
17 and 21 December 2005; Financial Times, 17 December 2005). The new 
compromise allocated an increase of around €2.175 billion to competitiveness 
spending on growth and employment, including structural and cohesion funds, 
and increased by €340 million the budget for rural development compared to the 
first presidency compromise of 5 December. The new compromise also allocated 
an additional €465 million to cut the Dutch and Swedish net contributions in order 
to induce them to accept the deal. Increasing regional aid meant that the 
compromise proposed a total of €260 billion for the new net recipient group. The 
UK conceded reducing the rate of the UK rebate to €10.5 billion as a maximum 
reduction that would constitute the UK’s contribution to increasing the EU budget 
(European Report, 17 December 2005) 
Despite these new adjustments, the UK was still faced with opposition from 
the new net recipients group, as well as from France, which insisted that the 
compromise was not enough for them to participate in the deal. The new net 
recipients group argued that only a reduction of the UK rebate by €14 billion, as 
the French had insisted upon all along, would be enough to generate additional 
funds that would satisfy their demands. Furthermore, the review of EU spending 
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priorities was conditioned by France’s blocking tactics and pressure for a € 14 
billion UK rebate reduction in the UK presidency compromise (European Report, 
15 December 2005) 
The UK presidency asked Germany to concede €100 million, which would 
have been allocated for German regional aid, to Poland. Germany accepted but 
demanded that the financial agreement be achieved in December (Nicoll and 
Delaney, 2007: 1). Mrs Merkel understood the British presidency’s efforts to 
resolve the financial agreement and persuaded Chirac to make a concession on the 
issue of the review clause. France finally accepted a compromise with the review 
clause by 2008. Finally, the member states achieved the agreement of the financial 
negotiation for the financial perspective for 2007-2013 at the Brussels European 
Council in December 2005 (European Report, 23 December 2005; Financial 
Times, 17 December 2005; House of Common, 19 December 2005).  
 
4.2.5.  Outcome 
The negotiation of the financial perspective for 2007-2013 achieved an agreement 
on 16 December 2005. The UK’s offer to cut its rebate to €10.5 billion persuaded 
the net contributor and the net recipient groups to agree to €862.3 of the EU 
budget at 1.045 per cent of GDP. Due to the increase in the EU budget, regional 
aid was slightly increased to 0.37 per cent from 0.36 per cent in the second 
presidency compromise. Rural development funds were €69.25 billion compared 
to €66.34 billion (European Report, 21 December 2005; Financial Times, 17 
December 2005; House of Commons, 19 December 2005; Whitman and Thomas, 
2007: 71; Lorca, 2005: 6). All EU leaders were satisfied with the outcome (Begg 
and Heinemann, 2006; Lorca, 2005).  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In February 2004, the Commission published its financial proposal for the 
financial perspective for 2007-2013, which was influenced by both the Lisbon 
strategy in 2000 and the enlargement of the CEECs in 2004. First of all, the 
Lisbon strategy not only proposed modernisation of EU policies in order to 
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strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in the global market, but also paid attention 
to investing in education and training systems in order to improve the quality of 
human capital which would boost employment and economic growth. Secondly, 
the EU accelerated the enlargement of the CEECs with the view to increasing the 
size of the EU’s internal market and protecting CEECs from aggressive Russian 
nationalism. With regard to the Commission’s considerations of the Lisbon 
strategy and the enlargement, the Commission not only introduced the title of 
‘competitiveness for growth and employment’ in the EU’s expenditure policies 
but also proposed an increase of the EU budget in order to support the increase in 
regional aid. In order to secure the EU budget, the Commission proposed both the 
reduction of the UK’s rebate and the increase of the EU’s revenue. 
The Blair government both supported and played a leading role in European 
integration projects in line with its notion of the ‘Third Way’ and its ambition to 
recover British global power. The government not only led the agreement of the 
Lisbon strategy in 2000 in order to effectively deal with the challenge of 
globalisation, but also guided member states to agree the enlargement. Although 
the Blair government supported these projects, it did not welcome the 
Commission’s financial proposal. Britain not only pointed out that the CAP 
expenditure would allocate about 45 per cent of the EU’s expenditure in the 
Commission proposal, but also identified CAP expenditure as a main barrier to the 
modernisation of the EU and argued that the Commission’s proposal was not 
compatible with the Lisbon budget. Furthermore, the Blair government was also 
confronted with domestic political pressure which required the government to 
retain the UK’s rebate in the financial negotiations. This motivated the Blair 
government to take an oppositional stance on the Commission’s proposal, and the 
Luxembourg presidency compromise, which meant that at the Brussels European 
Council in June 2005 member states failed to achieve financial agreement. 
 In the second half of 2005, Britain assumed the presidency of the Council, 
and this heavily affected the negotiations. Although the UK presidency focused on 
a change of the Commission’s proposal towards the ‘Lisbon budget’ through the 
informal European Council and Council meetings, it was faced with 
uncompromising positions by France over the reform of the CAP, and by the net 
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beneficiaries over the increase of the EU budget. Furthermore, the new member 
states pressured the presidency to achieve financial agreement at the Brussels 
European Council in December in order to secure cohesion funds. The British 
presidency understood that without the reduction of its rebate, it would have been 
very difficult to achieve an agreement. For this, the UK not only conceded 
introduction of the review clause in 2008 instead of the reform of the CAP, but 
also decided to sacrifice the UK’s own interests and significantly cut its rebate. At 
the European Council in December 2005, thus, Blair was able to announce that 
the member states had found an agreement for the financial perspective for 2007-
2013.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: budgetary politics and the UK’s 
approach to European integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the UK joined the EC in 1973, the size of its contribution to the budget has 
been a very controversial issue. For more than 10 years, various British 
governments led by both Conservative and Labour leaders blocked the increase in 
price of agricultural products as a means of solving the UK’s financial problem. 
Eventually, at the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984, the Thatcher 
government successfully drew concessions from other member states with the 
establishment of the UK’s rebate system. This agreement generated a number of 
clashes between the UK and other net contributors over sharing of the financial 
burden. In the 1980s and 1990s the Conservative governments firstly and the 
Labour government laterally managed to defend the rebate. Eventually, at the 
Brussels European Council in December 2005, the Blair government decided to 
substantially reduce its rebate. 
The thesis briefly, in this chapter, looks at the results of four alternative 
issues: public opinion, intra-party politics, the pressure of national economic 
interest groups and the dynamics of EU negotiation, which were tested in the 
empirical chapters, in explaining the UK’s behaviours in the rebate negotiations. 
First, public opinion did not play its role in shaping Britain’s behaviours in its 
rebate negotiations. This was because the Heads of government or states managed 
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the schedule of the financial negotiations in order to avoid giving the UK 
government any room for manoeuvre in shaping Britain’s actions from public 
pressure (the result of an election). Due to scheduling Britain’s general election on 
11 June 1987, and 5 May 2005, Heads of government or states agreed to delay the 
financial negotiation until after the general election, and initiated the negotiation 
on 29-30 June 1987, and on 16-17 June 2005 respectively. The delay gave a 
chance to the UK government to avoid public pressure in shaping its behaviours 
during its rebate negotiations. Furthermore, after his involvement in the war in 
Iraq, Blair was faced with significantly increasing unpopularity. His pro-European 
approach was also confronted with significant criticism from the Conservative 
party and the popular press, which pressured Blair to protect the UK rebate. 
Despite this, Blair decided to reduce the rebate at the Brussels European Council 
in December 2005. 
 Second, in Britain’s intra-party politics, European integration project: the 
SEM/SEA and the EMU that linked with the Delors I and II package respectively, 
in the negotiations there was a clash between Thatcher, Major and other members 
of the Conservative party. These divisions however did not affect the Conservative 
governments’ position and the UK was able to retain its rebate in both 
circumstances. Furthermore, during the 2005 financial negotiation, Brown had a 
personal ambition to become the Prime Minister, and his followers encouraged 
Brown to pressure Blair to take opposition on the rebate issue in order to prevent 
the increase of the Labour party’s unpopularity. This division, however, did not 
prevent Blair from agreeing to reduce the size of the rebate in December 2005. 
Third, the preferences of the various Conservative governments in the 
1980s and early 1990s certainly reflected the positions of economic groups, but 
only because these coincided with the Conservative party’s neo-liberal ideology. 
Nevertheless, the Thatcher and Major governments did not hesitate to block 
agreements when EU budget negotiations – even when these were packaged with 
important European projects: the SEM and the EMU – threatened the UK budget 
rebate. Under the Labour governments, domestic economic groups were eager to 
reap the benefits of the upcoming enlargement to CEECs in the Agenda 2000 
negotiations. The first Blair government, however, resisted the pressure and 
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refused to accept any reduction of the UK rebate due to Germany’s unacceptable 
demand. The Blair government’s behaviour changed in the 2005 negotiation for 
the 2007-2013 financial perspectives. This was due to transforming the perception 
of the UK from an ‘awkward partner’ into a ‘constructive partner’ and becoming 
‘good’ and ‘effective’ Presidency, the Blair government agreed the reduction of its 
rebate. 
 Fourth, in the financial package issues, the enlargement of the CEECs 
would bring about the UK’s economic benefits, particularly new investment 
opportunities. The enlargement not only dealt with the Agenda 2000 negotiation 
but also was an issue in the 2005 financial negotiation for the financial 
perspective for 2007-2013. However, the Blair government took different 
behaviours in negotiation. If it assumed that the UK used the rebate as a side-
payment to guide their partners towards the agreements for gaining its other 
economic advantages, this assumption would become wrapped in mystery to 
explain the changes of the Blair government’s behaviours on the enlargement 
between the 1998-1999 and the 2005 negotiations. 
Rather, by tracing the history of Britain’s rebate negotiations, this thesis has, 
therefore, shown that domestic political parties’ approaches to European 
integration have played a central role in shaping the UK’s behaviour in the EU’s 
financial negotiations. By doing so, it has challenged Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, which emphasises the role of economic interests and 
downplays the role of political factors. Moreover, it has qualified the view that the 
UK is an ‘awkward partner’. For this, rather than talking about national 
preferences, it would be better to talk of the preferences of the party in 
government, which since the early 1980s have adopted anti- and pro-European 
stances. Due to the fact that the Blair government adopted a more constructive 
approach together with the expected role of acting ‘appropriately’ whilst holding 
the rotating presidency explains why there was an unexpected decision to cut the 
rebate.  
These findings on British politics’ contribution are more generally re-
discussed together with the politics of budget negotiation in the EU. The last 
section briefly sketches the prospects of rebate in the financial perspectives for 
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2014-2020. The expectation is that the (remaining portion of the) rebate would 
still be a contentious issue: most member states will demand a further reduction, 
but the existence of a coalition government comprising of a pro-integration party 
and an anti-integration party will complicate matters.   
 
 
2. Summary of the main findings 
This thesis has indentified three main phases in the UK’s negotiations for the EU 
budget: securing the rebate between the 1970s and 1984; defending the rebate, in 
the late 1980s and in the 1990s; and then sacrificing the rebate in 2005. In the first 
phase, the UK penalised by the late accession and membership deal, eventually 
found a remedy to the imbalance between contributions and receipts through the 
settlement of the rebate system. In the second phase, the common strategy by 
Conservative and Labour governments was that of retaining the rebate, which 
attracted criticism from a number of fronts. In the third phase, the UK made 
concessions to reduce the size of its rebate, with the view to modernising the EU’s 
economy.  
Similarly, since the UK joined the EU in 1973, there have been three distinct 
types of disputes between member states in EU budgetary politics. The first phase 
was characterized by an intense conflict between the UK and the other member 
states over Britain’s financial problem, which ended with the 1984 deal. During 
the second phase there was an increased number of conflicts between member 
states over different issues: between net contributors and net beneficiaries on the 
size of the EU budget, and between the UK and other net contributors on sharing 
their financial burden. This involved the negotiations of the Delors I package 
between June 1987 and February 1988, the negotiations of the Delors II package 
in December 1992, and the negotiations of Agenda 2000 between June 1998 and 
March 1999. The third phase, which involved the negotiations between June and 
December 2005 for the financial perspective for 2007-2013, was characterised by 
the addition of new conflicts between old and new net beneficiaries on sharing the 
financial benefits to the existing conflicts. 
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2.1. British politics and European integration   
In explaining Britain’s behaviours in the rebate negotiations, the governing party’s 
approach to European integration plays a prominent role. This also affects the way 
in which the government in power views its role of rotating presidency: if it takes 
a pro-European approach, it tends to act responsibly and a concession can be 
reached more readily. By contrast, if it takes an anti-European approach, it may 
use the privileged position to pursue its interest and retaining the rebate looks like 
the most plausible option. Yet, although Britain takes a pro-European approach 
and holds the presidency, Britain’s concession to reduce the rebate depends on the 
presence of an ambitious and feasible European project.  
This thesis has identified two approaches that have characterised the UK’s 
behaviour over the EU’s budgetary negotiations, one more anti-European taken by 
the Conservative party and one more pro-European taken by the Labour party. But 
this has not always been the position of these parties. For instance the 
Conservative government under Heath took a pro-European approach: in line with 
its neo-liberalism ideology in economic policies, it supported the idea of the 
common market and therefore sought to gain potential economic advantages by 
applying for EC membership. Because of this, it was prepared to accept the own 
resources system, which was going to cause a number of financial problems in the 
years to come. 
The Thatcher government represents an interesting case. Initially, it had a 
pro-European approach on the common market, consistent with the Conservative 
party’s neo-liberal ideology. It also tried to address the financial problem, with the 
view to overcoming the euroscepticism at the domestic level. But when in 1983 
the European Community started undertaking negotiations for the reform of the 
budget in preparation for Spain and Portugal’s accession in 1986 and considering 
that a large chunk of expenditures were still used for the CAP, the Thatcher 
government changed position. The dispute between the UK – which wanted to 
settle a rebate system – and France – which sought to preserve the CAP and resist 
the introduction of a rebate because that would increase its financial contribution 
– was tense. A solution was eventually found at Fontainebleau European Council 
in June 1984, where the French presidency made its concession in setting up the 
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rebate system, partially reforming CAP expenditures, and increasing VAT to 
consolidate its reputation as a leader of Europe. 
The anti-European approach characterised the other Conservative 
governments in the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, in the 1987-88 and 1992 
financial negotiations, the UK not only opposed the reduction of its rebate, but 
was not particularly interested in increasing the size of the budget for supporting 
European integration projects. In fact, the ‘Delors I package’ emphasised upon the 
completion of the SEM by 1992, and the SEA which not only focused on the 
reform of institutions, noticeably the extension of QMV and the increase of the 
EP’s involvement in the decision-making, for the SEM measure but also presented 
‘economic and social cohesion’ with the aim of reducing economic disparities 
between member states, which in turn would promote the development of all 
member states’ economies. On the integration issues, there was a faction regarding 
the ideology of the Conservative party in shaping Britain’s approach beyond 
economic integration. In the faction, Thatcher and anti-Marketeers’ concern on 
losing the national sovereignty in the SEA went against pro-Europeanists who 
emphasised the reform of the institutions in completing the SEA by 1992. 
Thatcher was persuaded by pro-Europeanists in the government, and then 
reluctantly agreed the SEA. This meant that the government’s hostility on the 
direction of the integration slightly increased and affected Britain’s behaviour in 
the financial negotiation for the Delors I package. In the negotiations, the net 
beneficiaries threatened to withdraw their cooperation for the completion of the 
SEM unless the net contributors agreed to boost the budget. Eventually, the UK 
and the group of net contributors accepted the net beneficiaries’ demands, but the 
increased size of the budget brought about a conflict on sharing financial burden. 
In the negotiation between Britain and other net contributors, the UK adopted an 
aggressive negotiation style: rather than cutting the rebate it argued that the 
reform of the CAP would have freed up an enormous amount of resources for 
other policy areas. It was possible to take this style of negotiation thanks to its 
position on the SEA. Facing a stumbling block, Germany made a concession in 
order to reaffirm its position as a leader of Europe.   
Similarly, the Conservative Party’s anti-European approach affected the 
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UK’s behaviour in the negotiations for the financial perspective for 1993-1999. In 
1992, the European Commission proposed the ‘Delors II package’, in which the 
EMU became a primary element behind the increase of the budget. The creation 
of the Cohesion Fund was meant to financially support Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
and Ireland, to meet the EMU’s economic convergence criteria. In the initial 
discussion for the TEU, a faction between Thatcherites and pro-Europeanists in 
the Conservative party emerged again in shaping Britain’s approach. Thatcherites 
took an ‘anti-European’ approach, particularly on the social charter and the EMU. 
Thatcherism on free-market policy and the importance of British national 
sovereignty affected the shaping of their ‘anti-European’ attitude. Its main concern 
was that the creation of EMU would involve a loss of national sovereignty on 
monetary policy, and that the social charter would be a socialist attack on the EC’s 
free-market policy. The ‘anti-European’ attitude was challenged by the pro-
Europeanists, especially when Major successfully replaced Mrs Thatcher as Prime 
Minister. Although the new pro-European government took charge of Britain’s 
negotiations for the Delors II package, because of the pressure of Thatcherite MPs, 
it had a little room for manoeuvring. In the negotiations, the four cohesion 
countries’ argument for increasing the size of the budget was accepted by the net 
contributors, particularly Germany and France which were the main actors in 
support of the EMU and the social chapter in the TEU. However, at the Edinburgh 
European Council in December 1992, Germany and France not only faced 
political difficulties for their support to the cohesion countries, but also 
recognized Britain’s strong opposition to the reduction of the rebate which 
reflected Britain’s position on the EMU and the social chapter in the TEU. 
Eventually their decision to become paymasters in the Delors II package was a 
decisive factor in achieving the financial agreement. 
The pro-European approach of the Labour party shaped its behaviour in the 
negotiations for the 1999-2006 and 2007-2013 financial perspectives. In 1997, the 
European Commission proposed Agenda 2000 which packaged together the multi-
annual budget plan for 2000-2006, and the preparations for the enlargement of 
Central and Eastern European Countries, particularly through the creation of ‘pre-
accession aid’. The New Labour government took a pro-European approach to 
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European integration and enlargement in line with the concept of the ‘Third Way’. 
In fact, it expected that the enlargement would not only extend the internal market 
but would also bring about economic advantages to Britain via added commercial 
opportunities. Nevertheless it took its pro-European approach and presidency, at 
the Cardiff European Council in June 1998, it did not want to accept any reduction 
of the rebate, mainly for two reasons. First of all, Germany’s demand to reduce its 
financial contribution was not of an acceptable size to the UK. In its proposal, the 
European Commission proposed freezing the size of the budget with regard to 
Germany’s financial problem, which had arisen from the cost of unification in 
1990, other member states’ financial difficulties in preparing for EMU, and the 
enlargement of the EFTA countries in 1995 which not only increased the number 
of net contributors but also implied a reduction of the financial burden. The UK 
argued that Germany’s demand on a reduction size of its contribution was too big 
to be accepted. Secondly, Britain’s rebate was not a central factor in the budgetary 
negotiations. Germany’s demand called for sacrifices by all member states in 
order to maximise the reduction in size of Germany’s contribution. The reduction 
of the UK’s rebate was not enough to satisfy Germany and all the other member 
states’ demands. Britain, the other net contributors and the net beneficiaries could 
not accept Germany’s demands. Consequently the negotiation was delayed to the 
Berlin European Council in March 1999, where the German presidency not only 
proposed the reduction of its demand in order to reduce other member states’ 
financial burden, but also led other member states to agree on retaining the rebate, 
and eventually achieved the agreement on time.  
Finally, in February 2004, the European Commission proposed the financial 
perspectives which packaged together the multi-annual budget plan for 2007-2013 
and the Lisbon strategy, which sought to strengthen the EU’s economic 
competitiveness through the development of human capital and reinvigorate the 
new member states’ economies. In line with the Blair government’s concept of the 
Third Way emphasising free market, the UK took a pro-European approach on 
both the Lisbon strategy, which would help meet the challenge of globalisation, 
and on the enlargement, which would bring about economic and political 
advantages to the UK in playing its leadership role in the EU and the world. At the 
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Brussels European Council in June 2005, the Blair government paid attention to 
modernising the EU’s budget expenditure rather than to retaining the rebate. 
Although it was faced with a political faction with the Chancellor Brown over the 
rebate, it proposed a package involving the reduction of the rebate and the reform 
of the CAP. However, the proposal was rejected due to France’s opposition over 
the reform of the CAP, which handed over the negotiations to the UK presidency. 
At the Brussels European Council in December 2005, the British presidency 
agreed on a reduction of the rebate without the reform of the CAP, as a result of 
the pressure made by the new member states about their economic regeneration 
and the fact that the Blair government appreciated the responsibility involved in 
holding the presidency. 
 
The role of the presidency 
The way the UK behaved when it held the rotating presidency during the financial 
negotiation round deserves some attention. The six-month-rotating presidency of 
the Council offers member states the opportunity to pursue their own interests – 
and in the case of the UK this would mean retaining the rebate – or to mediate 
between the parties with the view to pursuing the common good – and in the case 
of the UK this would mean sacrificing the rebate. The UK held the presidency in 
the 1992, 1998, and 2005 financial negotiations. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, in the Conservative party, there was a 
division, particularly on the social charter and EMU, between Thatcherites who 
had a more euro-sceptical view and pro-Europeanists who took a pro-European 
attitude in shaping Britain’s approach on the Delors II package. The division 
limited the behaviour of the Major government when it held the rotating 
presidency in the context of the 1992 financial negotiations. On the one hand, it 
actively sought to achieve a feasible compromise and remove Britain’s image as 
an ‘awkward partner’. On the other hand, retaining the rebate was a very sensitive 
issue, used by Thatcherite MPs in the Conservative party, and by the Labour party 
to weaken the credibility of the Major government. The presidency proposed a 
weak compromise, reducing revenue to a 1.2 per cent ceiling from the 
Commission’s proposal of 1.37 per cent but also removing the rebate and the CAP 
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reform from the debate. Despite strong criticisms made by the net beneficiaries, 
the UK presidency did not change position. Eventually, the decision of Chancellor 
Kohl and President Mitterrand to pay for the increase of the budget to 1.27 per 
cent represented the only way out of the impasse. 
In the negotiation for Agenda 2000, the UK held the presidency in the first 
half of 1998. Although the New Labour government had a pro-European approach, 
it also had to bear in mind the level of the UK’s economic growth, the risks of 
criticism in domestic politics, and its overall approach to European integration in 
line with the ‘Third Way’. First of all, economic growth had been slower in the 
UK than in other member states, and a reduction of the rebate would bring about 
Britain’s financial problem again. Secondly, the New Labour government was 
concerned about criticism from the Labour party’s left wing, the Conservative 
party, and the public over its pro-European approach if it accepted the reduction of 
the rebate. Finally, the ‘Third Way’ did not support the EU’s expenditure policies 
which concentrated on agricultural subsidies instead of emphasising job creation. 
All these factors prevented the Labour government from being a ‘responsible’ 
presidency and achieving a compromise. It should be however added that 
Germany’s demand for a substantial cut of the UK’s rebate, the increase of other 
net contributor’s budget contribution, and the reduction of net beneficiaries’ 
financial benefits was deemed not acceptable not only by the UK but also by the 
majority of other member states. In fact, neither the net beneficiaries nor the other 
net contributors were ready to, respectively; accept a cut of their benefits and an 
increase of their contributions for reducing Germany’s budget contribution. In the 
financial negotiation, in fact, Germany’s demand was a central issue rather than 
the UK’s rebate. This meant that although the Blair government held the 
presidency, it could not make the presidency concession because the rebate was 
not a controversial issue which could satisfy all member states in the negotiation. 
Finally, during the negotiation of the financial perspective for 2007-2013, 
the UK held the presidency in the second half of 2005. In general, the Blair 
government had a pro-European approach on the Lisbon strategy and the 
enlargement of CEECs in 2004, whilst at the same time was not happy about the 
size of the CAP expenditure. Moreover, the Blair government faced a faction 
 190 
between Blair and Brown over the rebate thanks to the Blair government’s 
unpopularity due to its involvement in the war on Iraq in 2003. The faction 
brought about a political difficulty in deciding the reduction of the rebate. 
Nevertheless, the UK presidency tried its best to persuade member states to 
understand the case for modernising the EU in response to the challenge of 
globalisation. The new member states added significant pressure arguing they 
needed financial support for the regeneration of their economies. The New Labour 
government considered the responsibilities of the presidency in order to achieve 
the financial agreement before the end of its term. Furthermore, it considered the 
UK’s ‘moral uprightness’ as one of the net contributors, arguing that it was not 
possible for poor member states to pay for the UK’s rebate. 
 
2.2. Budgetary politics  
Budgetary politics can be defined as the process of achieving agreements on the 
size of the EU’s budget, with member states seeking to contribute as little as 
possible to, and to extract as much as possible from the budget. The outcome of 
the negotiations clearly indicate the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ and figures often 
cause domestic political difficulties to heads of governments or states in that they 
draw the attention of domestic political parties, public and the media. However, 
following the 1988 budgetary reform, the concept of the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ 
partially changed in that the financial perspectives started to be seen against the 
broader evolution of the European Union. More generally, the financial 
perspectives require richer member states, generally net contributors, ‘to act 
responsibly’ and compensate for poorer member states, with the aim of advancing 
European integration and fostering higher economic growth in Europe. Poorer 
member states, by contrast, seek to lower the level of their contribution and at the 
same time demand increases in their benefits. All these tensions underpin each 
negotiation round (Lindner, 2007; Laffan and Lindner, 2010). 
The increase of the budget generated several conflicts between net 
beneficiaries and net contributors on its size, and between the UK and other net 
contributors on sharing of the financial burden. The net beneficiaries sought to 
maximise their financial benefits from European integration projects: economic 
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and social cohesion in the SEA, the Cohesion Fund in the TEU, pre-accessional 
aid in the Amsterdam Treaty, and the increase in EU spending on education and 
training systems in the Lisbon strategy. The enlargement of CEECs in 2004 not 
only divided net beneficiaries into two groups, old and new, but also brought 
about a conflict between them on sharing financial benefits. The remainder of this 
section explores all these conflicts, identifying three different phases (Laffan and 
Shackleton, 2000; Lindner, 2006; Laffan and Lindner, 2010).  
 
Phase 1: the UK vs. other EU member states 
The own resource system in 1970 budget treaty disadvantaged the UK on both the 
revenue and expenditure sides. On the revenue side, considering its trade with the 
Commonwealth countries and the US, the UK was the second-largest contributor, 
but was one of the member states that received little benefits. In contrast, on the 
expenditure side, the predominance of the CAP provided little benefit to the UK in 
the EC’s expenditure policies. The UK called for a reform of the CAP and for 
budgetary discipline, and the development of other EC spending policies to bring 
about a better balance of the UK’s contributions and receipts. Margaret Thatcher 
continuously referred to the unacceptable size of the UK contribution to the 
budget. At the Fontainebleau European Council in 1984, the EC member states 
agreed the UK rebate system, which would refund two-thirds of the difference 
between British contributions and receipts. 
 
Phase 2:  net beneficiaries vs. net contributors and UK vs. other net 
contributors 
The enlargement of Mediterranean countries brought about new dynamics. Net 
beneficiaries threatened blocking an agreement of the financial package: 
European integration project (the SEM and the SEA) and the multi-annual 
financial plan for 1988-1993 in order to pressure net contributors to agree on the 
increased size of the budget. The net contributors sought to reduce their 
contribution, but eventually had to agree to for the sake of completing the project. 
This, however, brought about a new conflict between the UK and other net 
contributors, which not only argued that the UK had to contribute to the budget in 
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a way commensurate to its economic capabilities, but also put pressure on the UK 
to reduce its rebate in order to share the financial burden with them. This conflict 
delayed the agreement of the Delors I package until Germany, which was holding 
the presidency, in a special summit made some extra concessions by increasing its 
contribution and persuaded net contributors to agree the financial negotiation. 
This concession not only reduced net contributors’ contribution but also retained 
Britain’s rebate. 
Similarly, with the Delors II package, the increase of the budget caused by 
the creation of a new Cohesion Fund replicated the conflict between net 
beneficiaries and net contributors on the size of the budget and between net 
contributors and the UK on sharing of the financial burden. Interestingly, when 
the UK held the EU rotating presidency in second half of 1992, it opposed the 
increased size of the budget caused by the Cohesion Fund due to its unwillingness 
to share the costs of the EMU and actually proposed a significant reduction of the 
budget from the Commission’s original proposal. The threat of the ‘cohesion 
countries’ led by Spain’s Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales to veto any other 
agreement which did not include an increase of cohesion funds had an effect on 
some of the net contributors. Chancellor Kohl, in the light of the failure of the 
Danish referendum in June 1992 on the Maastricht Treaty and the political 
difficulties of some countries to agree on the EMU, urged the UK to take more 
responsibilities as president of the EU and agree on a reduction of its rebate. 
Facing a stumbling block, in order to recover public enthusiasm for European 
integration, Germany made some extra concessions and agreed on a higher 
spending plan in order to make an effective deal for building the EMU. 
The budgetary politics of Agenda 2000 were similar to the negotiations of 
the Delors I and II packages. In March 1998, although the EU created ‘pre-
accession’ aid, the European Commission proposed stabilizing the size of the EU 
budget at the level of the Delors II package. This was a response to the complaints 
about the financial burden made by some net contributors, particularly Germany 
and the Netherlands. In the negotiations, Germany demanded a reduction of its 
contribution by more than the level proposed by the European Commission. 
Germany’s demand made the conflicts more difficult. The net beneficiaries argued 
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that they could not accept the European Commission’s proposal and Germany’s 
demands, because pre-accession aid would reduce their financial benefits. The net 
contributors – the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 had brought 
an increase in the number of net contributors – supported Germany’s demand for 
the reduction of the EU budget but opposed the increase of their contribution. 
Although there were two European Councils, in Cardiff in June 1998 under the 
UK presidency and in Vienna in December 1998 under the Austrian presidency, 
Germany’s demand blocked negotiations. 
In the first half of 1999, Germany held the presidency and scheduled the 
Berlin European Council in March 1999. In that context, both net beneficiaries 
and net contributors conceded to change their initial position on the size of the 
budget in order to promote European integration: improving the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and solving the institutional crisis which eventually led to the 
resignation of the Santer Commission. Finally, in the conflict between net 
beneficiaries and net contributors, the member states found a middle ground and 
agreed the size of the EU budget. In the conflict between the UK and other net 
contributors, Germany continued to demand the reduction of Britain’s rebate in 
order for financial burden-sharing to take place, while Britain opposed it. Finally, 
the new German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, made the presidency’s concession 
in order to make Germany’s presidency successful. 
 
Phase 3:  net beneficiaries vs. net contributors, UK vs. other net contributors, 
old vs. new beneficiaries 
In the financial negotiation for the financial perspective 2007-2013, the 
enlargement of CEECs in 2004 not only divided net beneficiaries into two groups 
(old and new recipients) but also brought about a new conflict between two 
groups on sharing the financial benefits from regional aid. Due to the increase in 
EU spending on education and training systems in the Lisbon strategy and the 
enlargement, the Commission proposed a significant increase of the EU’s budget.  
At the Brussels European Council in June 2005 under the Luxembourg 
presidency, both old and new net beneficiaries sought an increase of the EU’s 
budget, and strongly pressured the net contributors to agree the increase of the EU 
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budget. This affected the conflict between the UK and other net contributors over 
sharing of the financial burden. Other net contributors pressured Britain to reduce 
its rebate, while Britain made a linkage between the reduction of its rebate and the 
reform of the CAP in order to transfer more resources for the implementation of 
the Lisbon strategy. Due to the French opposition to the reform of the CAP, the 
UK’s proposal was rejected and the negotiation was postponed to the second half 
of 2005 under the UK’s presidency. The Blair’s pro-European approach held the 
presidency and re-considered shaping its behaviour over the rebate. Finally, at the 
Brussels European Council in December 2005, due to its responsibility of the 
presidency, the UK accepted a significant reduction of its rebate in order to 
achieve the agreement on time. 
 
 
3. The future of the UK’s rebate negotiation in 2013 
In 2012, the EU will begin the negotiations for the 2014-2020 financial 
perspectives. How will the UK behave in respect of the rebate? Britain’s 
behaviours will certainly be affected by political parties’ approaches to European 
integration. As a result of the 2010 general election, the Conservative party 
successfully established a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. This 
means that the Conservative party’s neo-liberalism and anti-European approach 
could come into an ideological conflict with the Liberal Democratic party’s pro-
European approach. The Conservative party may oppose the increase in size of the 
EU’s budget to financially support regional programmes and agricultural subsidies 
in order to reduce states’ intervention in the market, while the Liberal Democrats 
will continue to support European integration. Furthermore, other member states 
may pressure Britain to reduce the rebate from the 2005 concession in order to 
increase Britain’s contribution for financial burden sharing and to increase EU 
spending for overcoming economic depression in Europe. These positions may 
bring about conflicts between the UK and other member states. New research, 
thus, will be necessary.  
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Appendix No. 1: Legislative Procedures 
 
 
 
 
The Consultation Procedure 
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     seeks opinion  
     of EP (& ESC, 
     where required) 
3. Council  
     makes final 
     decision (by 
     unanimity) 
1. Commission  
     submits 
     proposal to 
    Council 
 
 
The procedure dealt with issues of agricultural policy issues, asylum, immigration, 
and visa. 
 225 
 
The procedure was most legislation relating to the single market programme. 
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The Co-Decision Procedure 
 
 
The procedure dealt with subjects of cultural policy, the multi-annual 
technological research, and development framework programmes. 
 
Source: Bache and George 2006 
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Appendix No. 2: The Presidents of the Commission 
 
 
The Presidents of the Commission 
Presidents (nationality*) Period of tenure 
Walter Hallstein (D) 1958-67 
Jean Rey (B) 1967-70 
Franco Maria Malfatti (I) 1970-72 
Sicco Mansholt (N) 1972-73 
François Xavier-Ortoli (F) 1973-77 
Roy Jenkins (UK) 1977-81 
Gaston Thorn (L) 1981-85 
Jacques Delors (F) 1985-95 
Jacques Santer (L) 1995-99 
Romano Prodi (I) 1999-2004 
José Manuel Barroso (P) 2004-present 
 
*Note that the Presidency has been held by a non-national of 
one of the original EEC-6 only twice. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Peterson 2006 
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Appendix No. 3: The Constitutional Treaty 
 
From Nice to a Constitutional Treaty 
2001 26  February         Treaty of Nice signed 
7   March           ‘Future of Europe’ debate launched 
15  December        Laeken Declaration 
    2002  28  February         Inaugural plenary session of the European convention 
28  October          Praesidium unveils first ‘skeleton’ constitution 
    2003  26  May            Praesidium unveils revised text of Part I 
          27  May             Praesidium unveils revised text of Part II-IV 
       11-13  June             Convention debates and agrees by ‘broad consensus’ revised Parts I              
                              and II of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
         20  June             Part I and II of the Draft Treaty presented to the Thessaloniki  
                              European Council  
        9-10  July            Convention debates and agrees by ‘broad consensus’ revised Parts III  
                              and IV of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe  
         18  July             Complete Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe  
                              presented to the President of the European Council  
         29  September        IGC opens 
      12-13  December         European Council fails to reach agreement on a Treaty establishing a 
                              Constitution for Europe and IGC negotiations are effectively                 
                               Suspended 
   2004  24  March            European Council decides to resume IGC negotiations 
         17  May              IGC negotiations resume 
         18  June              European Council agrees a Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
                               Europe 
         29  October          Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed 
   2005  29   May             French electorate reject the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum 
          1   June             Dutch electorate reject the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum 
       16-17  June             European Council announces a ‘pause’ in ratification  
          11  November        New German government announces it wishes to revive ratification 
                               in 2007 
   2007    1  November        Scheduled date for the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty 
Source: Nugent 2010 
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Structure of the Constitutional Treaty 
The Treaty was divided into four parts, each of equal rank. 
 
Part І was devoted to the principles, objectives and institutional provisions governing the 
new European Union and was divided into nine Titles: the definition and objectives of the 
Union; fundamental rights and citizenship of the Union; Union competencies; the Union’s 
institutions; the exercise of Union competence; the democratic life of the Union; the 
Union’s finances; the Union and its neighbours; and Union membership.  
Part ІІ comprised the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. It contained seven Titles, 
preceded by a Preamble: dignity; freedoms; equality; solidarity; citizens’ rights; justice; 
general provisions.  
Part III comprised the provisions governing the policies and functioning of the Union. 
The internal and external policies of the Union were laid down, including provisions on 
the internal market, economic and monetary union, the area of freedom, security and 
justice, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and the functioning of the 
institutions. It contained seven Titles: provisions of general application; non-
discrimination and citizenship; internal policies and action; association of the overseas 
countries and territories; the Union’s external action; the functioning of the Union; and 
common provisions.  
Part IV grouped together the general and final provisions of the Constitution, including 
entry into force, the procedure for revising the Constitution and the repeal of earlier 
Treaties.  
 
A certain number of protocols were annexed to the Treaty establishing the Constitution, in 
particular the: Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union; 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; Protocol 
on the Euro Group; Protocol amending the Euratom Treaty; Protocol on the transitional 
provisions relating to the institutions and bodies of the Union.  
 
 
 
Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/introduction_en.htm 
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Composition of the Constitutional Convention 
In addition to its Chairman (Valéry Giscard ďEstaing) and two Vice-Chairmen (Giuliano Amato 
and Jean-Luc Dehaene), the Convention was composed of: 
• Fifteen representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one 
from one Member State); 
• Thirteen representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the candidate States (one 
per candidate State); 
• Thirty representatives of the national parliaments of the Member States (two from each 
Member State); 
• Twenty-six representatives of the national parliaments of the candidates States (two from 
each candidate State); 
• Sixteen members of the European Parliament; 
• Two representatives of the European Commission. 
There were alternates for each full member.  
 
Observers were invited to attend from the Economic and Social Committee (three representatives), 
the Committee of the Regions (six representatives), the social partners (three representatives), and 
the European Ombudsman. 
 
The Laeken Declaration provided for the candidate States to take a full part in the proceedings 
without, however, being able to prevent any consensus emerging among the Member States.  
 
 
 
 
Source: http://european-convention.eu.int/organisation.asp?lang=EN 
 
 
 
 
